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This	  state	  of	  the	  knowledge	  review	  sets	  out	  to	  identify	  the	  main	  research	  themes	  and	  findings	  in	  the	  
literature	  on	  labour	  relations	  and	  conditions	  on	  Western	  Cape	  fruit	  farms	  over	  the	  past	  20	  years.	  	  The	  
paper	  also	  compares	  if	  and	  how	  farmworker	  livelihoods	  have	  changed	  since	  the	  heyday	  of	  Apartheid,	  and	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  these	  changes.	  While	  farmworkers	  enjoy	  vastly	  more	  legal	  protection	  than	  in	  the	  
past,	  most	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  worse	  off	  economically.	  This	  lack	  of	  improvement	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  state’s	  
contradictory	  policy	  approach	  to	  the	  sector:	  while	  it	  extended	  protection	  to	  farmworkers	  post-­‐1994,	  it	  
withdrew	  support	  from	  producers,	  especially	  regulatory	  support	  that	  previously	  forced	  them	  to	  bargain	  
collectively	  with	  international	  retailers.	  Since	  1994,	  international	  retailers	  have	  increasingly	  consolidated	  
and	  formed	  buyer	  monopolies,	  so	  producers	  now	  face	  extremely	  powerful	  bargaining	  partners	  as	  
individuals	  and	  have	  therefore	  become	  price	  takers.	  To	  protect	  their	  profit	  margins,	  producers	  have	  
externalised	  and	  casualised	  their	  labour	  forces,	  and	  moved	  workers	  off-­‐farm.	  The	  research	  points	  to	  the	  
limited	  power	  of	  the	  state	  to	  regulate	  employer-­‐employee	  relations	  that	  are	  embedded	  in	  global	  value	  
chains,	  and	  to	  the	  problematic	  of	  relying	  on	  a	  narrowly	  rights-­‐based	  approach	  to	  remedy	  working	  
conditions.	  While	  aiming	  to	  regulate	  employer-­‐employee	  relations	  within	  its	  national	  jurisdiction,	  the	  
state	  has	  failed	  to	  insulate	  such	  relations	  from	  the	  power	  wielded	  in	  the	  global	  fruit	  value	  chain	  that	  
shapes	  relations	  right	  into	  the	  farmyard.	  Such	  power	  relations	  not	  only	  shape	  the	  commercial	  relations	  
between	  international	  retailers	  and	  local	  producers,	  but	  also	  between	  local	  producers	  and	  their	  workers.	  
The	  review	  also	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  analysing	  producer	  agency	  in	  contesting	  or	  circumventing	  
state	  policy	  decisions,	  which	  ultimately	  affect	  workers’	  livelihoods.	  Yet,	  the	  paper	  points	  out	  that	  worker	  
and	  producer	  responses	  to	  the	  impacts	  on	  them	  have	  been	  underexplored.	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Working paper 41, Margareet Visser 1	  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Farm	  work	  -	  which	  in	  the	  Cape	  originates	  in	  slavery	  -	  has	  been	  mired	  in	  controversy.	  Up	  until	  
1994	  farmworkers	  have	  been	  some	  of	  the	  lowest	  paid	  workers	  in	  South	  Africa,	  trapped	  in	  
paternalist	  labour	  relations,	  isolated,	  unorganised,	  and	  their	  plight	  overlooked	  –	  first	  by	  the	  
Apartheid	  state,	  and	  then,	  as	  for	  instance	  claimed	  by	  Hall	  and	  Du	  Toit	  (2014),	  also	  by	  the	  ANC	  
government.	  More	  recently,	  after	  the	  2012	  farmworker	  protest	  that	  broke	  out	  in	  De	  Doorns,	  the	  
spotlight	  has	  again	  turned	  to	  farmworkers’	  lives	  and	  working	  conditions.	  While	  the	  dust	  in	  
Stofland	  has	  largely	  settled,	  a	  positive	  consequence	  of	  this	  renewed	  focus	  on	  farmworkers	  and	  
their	  plight	  is	  that	  more	  energy	  is	  being	  channelled	  into	  researching	  issues	  affecting	  farmworkers.	  
This	  renewed	  focus	  is	  a	  welcome	  change,	  given	  that	  for	  some	  time	  farmworkers	  were	  not	  high	  on	  
the	  research	  agenda.	  Yet,	  over	  the	  last	  20	  years,	  some	  researchers	  have	  kept	  their	  finger	  on	  the	  
pulse	  of	  farmworker	  labour	  relations	  and	  have	  published	  seminal	  papers	  on	  farmworkers’	  living	  
and	  working	  conditions.	  These	  seminal	  papers	  help	  us	  gauge	  which	  issues	  are	  new,	  which	  are	  
perennial,	  and	  which	  are	  the	  main	  factors	  that	  impact	  on	  farmworkers	  conditions.	  
	  
This	  paper	  aims	  to	  (1)	  identify	  the	  main	  themes	  and	  findings	  of	  research	  conducted	  in	  this	  field	  
over	  the	  past	  20	  years;	  (2)	  identify	  consensus	  positions	  and	  differences	  in	  opinions	  across	  the	  
research;	  and	  (3)	  identify	  possibly	  gaps	  in	  the	  research,	  due	  to	  new	  developments	  or	  lack	  of	  
historical	  research	  in	  the	  field.	  A	  central	  focus	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  to	  unpack	  how	  both	  private	  and	  
public	  regulation	  of	  agricultural	  value	  chains	  have	  influenced	  farmworkers’	  living	  and	  working	  
conditions,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  structural	  power.	  
Scope 
Due	  to	  time	  and	  space	  constraints,	  not	  all	  papers	  written	  on	  the	  topic	  in	  the	  last	  20	  years	  have	  
been	  surveyed.	  A	  concerted	  effort	  however	  has	  been	  made	  to	  review	  seminal	  papers	  in	  the	  
Western	  Cape’s	  fruit	  and	  wine	  sector.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  completeness,	  some	  seminal	  papers	  that	  
do	  not	  fall	  neatly	  within	  the	  scope	  have	  been	  included.	  
	  
A	  fairly	  narrow	  scope	  was	  chosen	  because	  farming	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  diverse,	  so	  linking	  specific	  
outcomes	  to	  variables	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  if	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  variables	  are	  factored	  in.	  Such	  
variables	  would	  typically	  include	  different	  products,	  labour	  intensity,	  market	  focus,	  and	  regions.	  
But,	  moreover,	  the	  Western	  Cape	  has	  been	  exceptional	  since	  farmers	  in	  the	  province	  have	  
historically	  struggled	  more	  than	  those	  in	  other	  provinces,	  to	  secure	  labour.	  
	  
Although	  the	  review	  mainly	  focuses	  on	  changing	  labour	  relations	  in	  the	  agricultural	  industry	  
over	  the	  past	  20	  years,	  the	  last	  20	  years	  are	  also	  compared	  to	  a	  much	  earlier	  period:	  	  that	  of	  the	  
mid-­‐1970s	  -	  the	  so-­‐called	  heyday	  of	  Apartheid.	  This	  comparison	  is	  possible	  due	  to	  a	  series	  of	  
papers	  produced	  for	  a	  1976	  conference	  on	  farm	  labour	  hosted	  by	  the	  Southern	  Africa	  Labour	  
and	  Development	  Research	  Unit	  (SALDRU)	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Cape	  Town.	  This	  series	  of	  papers	  
discuss	  working	  conditions	  on	  fruit	  farms	  in	  the	  Boland	  (Elgin,	  De	  Doorns	  and	  Citrusdal)	  and	  
serve	  as	  an	  important	  benchmark	  for	  measuring	  if	  and	  how	  farmworkers’	  livelihoods	  have	  
changed	  over	  time.	  The	  comparison	  also	  allows	  for	  theorisation	  on	  what	  factors	  -	  especially	  
regulatory	  changes	  -	  have	  contributed	  most	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  farmworkers’	  lives.	  
Theoretical approach 
The	  concept	  of	  value	  chain	  analysis,	  used	  to	  explain	  how	  development	  happens	  in	  the	  age	  of	  
globalisation,	  emphasises	  the	  ability	  of	  lead	  firms	  in	  global	  value	  chains	  (GVCs)	  to	  direct	  the	  
course	  of	  development	  (or	  underdevelopment).	  This	  analytical	  approach	  was	  only	  developed	  in	  
the	  late	  1990s.	  Gereffi	  (2014:	  12,	  citing	  Gereffi&Fernandez-­‐Stark	  2011),	  a	  main	  proponent	  of	  
this	  approach,	  describes	  global	  value	  chain	  analysis	  as	  follows:	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[It]	  focuses	  on	  globally	  expanding	  supply	  chains	  and	  how	  value	  is	  created	  and	  captured	  therein.	  	  
By	  analysing	  the	  full	  range	  of	  activities	  that	  firms	  and	  workers	  perform	  to	  bring	  a	  specific	  product	  
from	  its	  conception	  to	  its	  end	  use	  and	  beyond,	  the	  GVC	  approach	  provides	  a	  holistic	  view	  of	  global	  
industries	  from	  two	  contrasting	  vantage	  points:	  top-­‐down	  and	  bottom-­‐up.	  The	  key	  concept	  for	  the	  
top-­‐down	  view	  is	  the	  ‘governance’	  of	  GVCs,	  which	  focuses	  mainly	  on	  lead	  firms	  and	  the	  organisation	  
of	  local	  industries;	  the	  main	  concept	  for	  the	  bottom-­‐up	  perspective	  is	  ‘upgrading’,	  which	  focuses	  on	  
the	  strategies	  used	  by	  countries,	  regions	  and	  other	  economic	  stakeholders	  to	  maintain	  or	  improve	  
their	  positions	  in	  the	  global	  economy.	  	  
In	  other	  words	  the	  GVC	  approach	  allows	  researchers	  to	  (1)	  identify	  the	  main	  agents	  in	  the	  
chain;	  (2)	  reveal	  which	  agents	  in	  the	  chain	  are	  the	  main	  power	  brokers;	  and	  (3)	  show	  by	  which	  
processes	  and	  mechanisms	  such	  agents	  wield	  power.	  Initially	  Gereffi	  (2014)	  identified	  two	  seats	  
of	  power	  within	  value	  chains:	  one	  driven	  by	  buyers	  in	  what	  he	  called	  as	  “buyer-­‐driven	  chains”;	  
the	  other	  by	  producers	  in	  what	  has	  become	  known	  as	  “producer-­‐driven	  chains”.	  However,	  the	  
original	  concept	  has	  since	  been	  revised	  as	  it	  was	  ‘too	  broad	  to	  capture	  the	  full	  complexity	  of	  GVC	  
governance	  structures’	  (Gereffi	  2014:	  13).	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  analysis	  however,	  this	  
distinction	  is	  useful,	  as	  will	  be	  explained	  later.	  
	  
Gereffi	  (2014)	  has	  argued	  further	  that	  the	  governance	  concept	  is	  useful	  to	  capture	  current	  
changes	  in	  the	  global	  economy,	  including:	  
• the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Washington	  Consensus;	  
• a	  growing	  consumer	  base	  in	  the	  Global	  South	  leading	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  end	  markets	  of	  
developing	  countries;	  
• geographic	  consolidation	  and	  value	  chain	  concentration	  in	  the	  global	  supply	  base	  in	  some	  
cases,	  shifting	  bargaining	  power	  from	  lead	  firms	  in	  GVCs	  to	  large	  suppliers	  in	  developing	  
economies;	  and	  
• a	  growing	  shortage	  of	  some	  raw	  materials	  making	  lead	  firms	  more	  aware	  of	  the	  vulnerability	  
of	  their	  supply	  chains	  and	  leading	  them	  to	  enter	  strategic	  collaborations	  with	  suppliers.	  
Although	  Gereffi	  (2014:	  29)	  includes	  the	  public	  sphere	  in	  the	  description	  of	  ‘multiple	  
governance	  structures	  …	  that	  link	  different	  components	  of	  the	  system	  together’,	  he	  treats	  the	  
state	  as	  one	  actor	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  ‘multiple	  governance	  structures’.	  	  	  
	  
Neilson	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  comment	  that	  explicit	  theorisation	  of	  the	  state’s	  role	  has	  been	  somewhat	  
lacking	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  GVCs	  and	  Global	  Production	  Networks	  (GPNs).	  They	  argue	  that	  state	  
action	  -	  as	  much	  as	  inaction	  -	  creates	  the	  enabling	  or	  disabling	  conditions	  that	  shape	  whether	  
and	  how	  firms,	  regions	  and	  nations	  are	  able	  to	  engage	  with	  global	  markets	  and	  extract	  benefits	  
from	  such	  engagements.	  They	  argue	  that	  global	  economic	  change	  is	  increasingly	  demanding	  
greater	  prominence	  for	  the	  state’s	  role	  in	  creating	  the	  context	  in	  which	  value	  chains	  function	  
and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  state	  actively	  shapes	  the	  structure	  of	  these	  chains.	  
	  
Some	  of	  the	  reviewed	  papers,	  written	  after	  the	  year	  2000,	  use	  value	  chain	  analysis	  to	  describe	  the	  
consequences	  of	  the	  insertion	  of	  South	  African	  agriculture	  into	  global	  value	  chains.	  Earlier	  papers	  
tend	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  power	  relations	  between	  workers	  and	  farmers	  (and	  sometimes	  how	  the	  
state	  influences	  such	  power	  dynamics)	  to	  describe	  development	  and	  underdevelopment	  in	  the	  
sector.	  Most	  earlier	  papers	  are	  however	  silent	  on	  whether	  and	  how	  South	  African	  producers	  fit	  
into	  global	  value	  chains	  and/or	  the	  international	  trade	  environments	  in	  which	  they	  operate.	  Yet,	  
given	  the	  export-­‐oriented	  focus	  of	  fruit	  industry,	  the	  value	  chain	  perspective	  is	  critical.	  
	  
This	  paper	  retrospectively	  applies	  value	  chain	  analysis	  to	  illustrate	  how	  the	  insertion	  of	  the	  
Western	  Cape	  fruit	  and	  wine	  industry	  into	  global	  value	  chains	  has	  affected	  the	  development	  of	  
farmworkers.	  	  It	  also	  responds	  to	  Neilson	  et	  al.’s	  (2014)	  call	  to	  explicitly	  foreground	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  South	  African	  state	  in	  global	  horticultural	  value	  chain	  governance.	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Therefore,	  the	  1976	  papers	  offer	  a	  glimpse	  into	  a	  time	  when	  South	  African	  agriculture,	  although	  
already	  integrated	  into	  global	  value	  chains,	  was	  far	  less	  tightly	  integrated	  than	  today.	  In	  1976	  South	  
African	  fruit	  and	  wine	  value	  chains	  could	  still	  be	  described	  as	  producer-­‐driven;	  the	  international	  
retail	  environment	  was	  still	  largely	  unconsolidated,	  and	  the	  sector	  was	  still	  heavily	  state-­‐supported.	  
	  
Of	  the	  1976	  papers,	  Morris’s	  paper	  is	  highlighted	  as	  he	  discusses	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  
key	  stakeholders	  and	  the	  state	  in	  shaping	  agricultural	  policy.	  Morris	  (1976)	  -	  who	  would	  later	  
become	  a	  key	  proponent	  of	  value	  chain	  analysis	  -	  offers	  an	  extremely	  useful	  analysis	  of	  how	  	  
Apartheid	  ideologies	  acted	  in	  a	  precise	  and	  definite	  way	  to	  ensure	  that	  major	  obstacles	  to	  the	  
interests	  of	  agricultural	  capital	  in	  regard	  to	  labour	  on	  farms	  were	  either	  removed	  or	  regulated.	  
However,	  by	  looking	  back	  to	  an	  even	  earlier	  period,	  before	  agriculture	  could	  count	  on	  such	  state	  
support,	  Morris	  (1976)	  contends	  that	  getting	  that	  level	  of	  state	  support	  was	  far	  from	  a	  fait	  
accompli,	  but	  resulted	  from	  ‘struggles	  and	  conflict	  within	  and	  over	  the	  state	  that	  characterised	  
the	  “current	  moments”	  of	  [that]	  particular	  society’.	  	  
	  
Later	  papers,	  especially	  those	  published	  from	  1994	  to	  2003,	  and	  in	  particular	  Williams	  et	  al.	  (1998),	  
describe	  Morris’s	  ‘struggles	  and	  conflict	  within	  and	  over	  the	  state’	  that	  again	  leads	  to	  a	  particular	  
‘current	  moment’.	  However,	  the	  more	  recent	  papers	  describe	  the	  effect	  of	  power	  transitions	  in	  
agriculture	  after	  democratisation	  in	  1994.	  Comparing	  1976	  and	  the	  period	  from	  1994	  to	  2015	  
therefore	  also	  allows	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  how	  the	  struggles	  for	  the	  “heart”	  of	  the	  state	  have	  shaped	  
South	  African	  agriculture,	  especially	  the	  fate	  of	  farmworkers	  over	  the	  past	  20	  years.	  
	  
The	  next	  section	  provides	  a	  historical	  review	  of	  farm	  work	  regulation	  -	  drawing	  largely	  on	  Morris	  
(1976)	  -	  before	  honing	  in	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Western	  Cape	  fruit	  farm	  labour	  force	  in	  1976,	  and	  
the	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  farmers’	  shaping	  their	  labour	  forces	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  as	  discussed	  by	  Levy	  
(1976),	  Graaff	  (1976)	  and	  Theron	  (1976).	  Thereafter,	  section	  3	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  main	  
regulatory	  changes	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  in	  the	  first	  ten	  years	  after	  democratisation.	  Section	  4	  
then	  discusses	  the	  broad	  themes	  found	  in	  labour-­‐focussed	  agricultural	  studies	  over	  the	  last	  20	  years.	  	  
	  
2. THE WESTERN CAPE FRUIT INDUSTRY 40 YEARS AGO 
A protective bulwark provided by the state 
The	  year	  1976	  was	  a	  watershed	  for	  South	  African	  politics,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  economy,	  which	  
would	  eventually	  also	  affect	  agriculture.	  After	  the	  1976	  student	  uprising,	  international	  	  
pressure	  on	  the	  Apartheid	  state	  increased	  steadily,	  culminating	  in	  sanctions	  against	  South	  Africa	  
in	  the	  1980s.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  dramatic	  hikes	  in	  the	  oil	  price	  led	  to	  a	  series	  of	  recessions:	  first	  	  
in	  1976,	  and	  another	  following	  in	  the	  next	  decade	  (Byrnes	  1996).	  Economic	  growth	  therefore	  
slowed	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  entered	  the	  doldrums	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Hanival	  and	  Maia	  (undated)	  
point	  out	  that	  after	  1976	  gross	  domestic	  product	  and	  gross	  fixed	  capital	  formation	  began	  to	  
slide	  down	  a	  slippery	  slope	  which	  only	  recovered	  somewhat	  by	  2002.	  
	  
However,	  in	  the	  decade	  before	  1976,	  the	  South	  African	  economy	  was	  booming	  due	  to	  ‘inwardly-­‐
focused	  policies	  aimed	  at	  industrialisation	  and	  import	  substitution’,	  which	  protected	  South	  
African	  companies	  from	  international	  competition	  (Hanival&Maia,	  undated).	  Given	  that	  
agricultural	  producers	  were	  a	  key	  National	  Party	  constituent,	  the	  state	  implemented	  various	  
protective	  measures	  to	  aid	  the	  sector.	  But	  even	  well	  before	  the	  Apartheid	  state’s	  rise	  to	  power,	  
laws	  were	  promulgated	  to	  support	  the	  sector,	  such	  as:	  
• The	  Land	  Bank	  of	  South	  Africa,	  founded	  in	  1912,	  provided	  subsidised	  financial	  services	  and	  
credit	  to	  white	  farmers.	  	  The	  Agricultural	  Credit	  Board,	  an	  agency	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  
Agriculture,	  also	  gave	  credit	  to	  farmers	  who	  did	  not	  qualify	  to	  borrow	  from	  the	  Land	  Bank	  
 
	  
4	   Going nowhere fast? Changed working conditions on Western Cape fruit and wine farms 
(Vink&Van	  Rooyen	  2009).The	  Marketing	  Act	  26	  of	  1937	  allowed	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  state-­‐
controlled	  marketing	  boards	  for	  most	  agricultural	  commodities.	  Morris	  (1976)	  argues	  that,	  
after	  the	  Great	  Depression	  of	  1933,	  farmers’	  financial	  situation	  only	  stabilized	  once	  the	  
Marketing	  Act	  was	  promulgated.	  Marketing	  boards	  controlled	  the	  movement	  of	  produce	  and	  
were	  in	  charge	  of	  price	  setting,	  monitoring	  quality	  standards,	  and	  selling	  and	  supplying	  
agricultural	  products.	  Significantly,	  the	  boards	  controlled	  sales	  of	  almost	  all	  exported	  
agricultural	  produce.	  The	  marketing	  boards	  were	  designed	  to	  protect	  farmers	  from	  the	  
vicissitudes	  of	  an	  uncertain	  climate,	  volatile	  prices,	  and	  the	  inability	  of	  foreign	  and	  local	  
markets	  to	  absorb	  their	  output	  (Williams	  et	  al,	  1998:	  70).	  Boards	  could	  use	  their	  monopoly	  
power	  to	  keep	  prices	  high,	  a	  system	  that	  became	  known	  as	  the	  single	  channel	  market	  system.1	  	  
Eventually	  22	  control	  schemes	  were	  established,	  managing	  four-­‐fifths	  of	  the	  gross	  value	  of	  
agricultural	  production	  (Williams	  et	  al,	  1998,	  citing	  the	  Kassier	  Committee	  1992;	  Kirsten&Van	  
Zyl	  1992).	  The	  Cooperative	  Societies	  Amendment	  Act	  (1925)	  allowed	  a	  network	  of	  primary	  
producer	  cooperatives	  to	  be	  established.	  As	  cooperatives	  bought	  inputs	  collectively,	  they	  
negotiated	  cheaper	  prices	  and	  provided	  services	  such	  as	  bulk	  grain	  storage	  and	  transport	  of	  
produce	  to	  market.	  They	  also	  monitored	  quality,	  regulated	  planting	  quotas,	  and	  got	  rid	  of	  
surpluses	  through	  processing	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  wine	  and	  milk).	  The	  cooperative	  system	  was	  
integrated	  into	  the	  work	  of	  the	  control	  boards	  and	  provided	  an	  important	  channel	  for	  other	  
institutional	  support.	  Williams	  et	  al	  (1998:	  71)	  point	  out	  that	  by	  eliminating	  competition	  over	  
prices	  and	  over	  transport	  costs,	  marketing	  boards	  contributed	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  co-­‐operative	  
bulking,	  storing	  and	  millings,	  and	  encouraged	  concentration	  among	  processing,	  wholesale,	  and	  
retail	  markets.	  Cooperatives	  were	  also	  important	  financial	  intermediaries:	  the	  Land	  Bank	  used	  
cooperatives	  as	  agents	  to	  provide	  short-­‐	  and	  medium-­‐term	  credit	  to	  commercial	  farmers	  at	  
subsidised	  interest	  rates	  (Bayley	  2000,	  cited	  in	  Greenberg	  2010;	  Vink&Van	  Rooyen	  2009).	  
Government	  also	  channelled	  disaster	  assistance	  through	  cooperatives,	  usually	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
debt	  consolidation	  (Ortmann&King,	  2007).	  	  	  
	  
Consecutive	  governments	  also	  created	  extensive	  measures	  to	  control	  the	  movement	  of	  Africans	  so	  as	  
to	  ensure	  cheap	  labour	  for	  producers.	  Levy	  (1976)	  notes	  that	  labour	  shortages	  among	  Cape	  farmers	  
were	  a	  problem	  from	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  Cape.	  Initially,	  Dutch	  colonisers	  met	  the	  demand	  with	  
slave	  labour.	  Seven	  years	  after	  the	  British	  became	  the	  new	  colonisers	  and	  abolished	  slavery	  in	  1834,	  
they	  passed	  the	  first	  version	  of	  the	  Masters	  and	  Servants	  Act	  15	  of	  1856	  which	  eventually	  went	  
down	  in	  history	  books	  as	  ‘draconian’,	  as	  it	  bound	  workers	  to	  their	  employers.	  The	  last	  Masters	  and	  
Servants	  Act	  was	  only	  abolished	  in	  1974.	  Commenting	  on	  the	  various	  versions	  of	  the	  Masters	  and	  
Servants	  Act,	  Le	  Roux	  (2002:	  6)	  notes	  that:	  	  
[t]echnically	  these	  laws	  were	  racially	  neutral.	  However,	  since	  the	  masters	  were	  white	  and	  the	  
servants	  not,	  it	  buttressed	  racial	  and	  class	  divisions	  and	  replaced	  the	  whip	  of	  the	  slave	  driver	  with	  penal	  
sanctions,	  securing	  'the	  employee's	  subordination	  as	  an	  incident	  of	  the	  contract	  of	  employment'.	  	  
	  
However	  restrictive	  these	  laws	  might	  have	  been,	  they	  seemingly	  did	  not	  prevent	  farmworkers	  from	  
exiting	  agriculture	  in	  search	  of	  better	  job	  opportunities.	  Apart	  from	  dire	  working	  and	  living	  conditions	  on	  
farms,	  workers	  were	  pulled	  north	  by	  the	  discovery	  of	  gold,	  which	  profoundly	  changed	  the	  South	  African	  
economy	  from	  one	  driven	  primarily	  by	  agriculture,	  to	  one	  driven	  by	  mining.	  The	  discovery	  of	  the	  gold	  on	  
the	  Witwatersrand	  in	  1886	  began	  to	  challenge	  agriculture’s	  labour	  market	  dominance,	  as	  mining	  
provided	  better	  paid	  work.	  Morris	  (1976)	  argues	  that	  competition	  for	  labour	  between	  the	  agriculture	  
and	  mining	  sector	  was	  a	  major	  impetus	  for	  enacting	  laws	  to	  control	  blacks.	  The	  most	  notorious	  of	  such	  
laws	  were	  the	  Natives	  Land	  Act	  27	  of	  1913	  and	  the	  Natives	  Trust	  and	  Land	  Act	  18	  of	  1936.2	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For instance, Mather&Greenberg (2003) note that, in overseas markets, the Citrus Exchange controlled more than half of 
2 The Natives Land Act was passed to allocate only about 7% of arable land to black people and leave the more fertile land 
for whites. The law created reserves for black people and prohibited the sale of territory in white areas to black people and 
vice versa. In effect, over 80% of land went to white people, who made up less than 20% of the population. The Act stipulated 
that black people could only live outside the reserves if they could prove that they were employed. Black people maintained that 
the law aimed to meet white farmers’ demands more agricultural land and force black people to work as labourers (South African 
 
	  
Working paper 41, Margareet Visser 5	  
Apart	  from	  better	  paid	  mine	  work,	  workers	  migrated	  from	  rural	  areas	  to	  cities	  because	  the	  
Great	  Depression	  and	  World	  War	  2	  put	  pressure	  on	  farmers’	  margins.	  These	  events	  stimulated	  
the	  mining	  and	  manufacturing	  industries,	  and	  devalued	  the	  currencies	  of	  countries	  which	  
abandoned	  the	  Gold	  Standard.	  South	  Africa	  did	  not	  initially	  drop	  the	  Gold	  Standard,	  so	  farmers	  
were	  hard	  hit	  when	  the	  devaluation	  of	  foreign	  currencies	  led	  to	  lower	  prices.	  The	  1930s	  price	  
crisis	  threw	  farmers	  into	  a	  ‘whirlpool	  of	  increasing	  costs,	  decreasing	  prices	  and	  increasing	  debts	  
[that]	  forced	  farmers	  to	  further	  squeeze	  their	  labour	  tenants’	  (Morris	  1976:	  4).	  As	  a	  result,	  
labour	  tenants	  increasingly	  migrated	  to	  urban	  areas,	  leading	  to	  agricultural	  labour	  shortages.	  
	  
When	  South	  Africa	  finally	  abandoned	  the	  Gold	  Standard	  in	  1932,	  higher	  gold	  prices	  sparked	  
economic	  expansion	  and	  created	  a	  huge	  demand	  for	  mining	  and	  industrial	  labour.	  After	  WW2	  
broke	  out	  –	  stimulating	  many	  national	  economies	  –	  the	  demand	  for	  labour	  rose	  further,	  and	  black	  
labour	  increasingly	  migrated	  first	  to	  the	  mines,	  then	  to	  factories,	  to	  benefit	  from	  better	  job	  
opportunities.	  In	  urban	  areas,	  the	  need	  for	  labour	  was	  so	  great	  that	  the	  Smuts-­‐government	  
relaxed	  influx	  control	  and	  considered	  revising	  the	  pass	  control	  system	  in	  1942	  (Cameron&Spies	  
1986;	  SAHO	  2013b).	  
	  
In	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s	  African	  farmworker	  migration	  to	  towns	  subtly,	  but	  critically,	  shifted	  (Morris	  
1976).	  Most	  town	  labour	  was	  previously	  drawn	  from	  the	  Reserves,	  but	  by	  1939,	  farms	  had	  become	  
what	  the	  Reserves	  used	  to	  be	  -	  sources	  of	  cheap	  labour	  (SAIRR	  1939,	  cited	  in	  Morris	  1976).	  As	  a	  
result,	  the	  farm	  labour	  shortage	  reached	  crisis	  proportions	  during	  and	  immediately	  after	  WW2	  
(Morris,	  1976:	  9).	  Already	  in	  1941,	  Parliament	  had	  noted	  that	  the	  ‘shortage	  of	  farm	  labour	  is	  
undoubtedly	  the	  greatest	  problem	  the	  farmer	  has	  to	  contend	  with	  at	  the	  moment’	  (Labuschagne	  
(Bethal)	  Col.	  5849,3/4/41,	  cited	  in	  Morris	  1976:	  9).	  Agricultural	  congress	  after	  congress	  drew	  
attention	  to	  the	  shortage.	  Farmers	  accused	  the	  Smuts-­‐government	  of	  failing	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  
migration	  of	  workers	  to	  towns	  and	  cities	  (which	  benefited	  industrial	  capital),	  and	  not	  taking	  into	  
account	  whether	  this	  labour	  flow	  came	  from	  capitalist	  agriculture	  or	  from	  the	  Reserves.	  They	  
actively	  lobbied	  the	  state	  to	  put	  measures	  in	  place	  to	  prevent	  migration	  from	  farms.	  	  	  
	  
The	  struggle	  for	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  state	  was	  particularly	  strong	  at	  this	  juncture.	  In	  1942,	  farmers	  gave	  a	  
special	  committee	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Agricultural	  Union	  (SAAU)	  unanimous	  support	  to	  ask	  
government	  to	  (1)	  ‘apply	  Chapter	  IV	  of	  the	  Native	  Trust	  and	  Land	  Act	  to	  all	  provinces	  immediately’;	  (2)	  
‘to	  exercise	  control	  over	  unemployed	  Natives	  in	  locations’;	  and	  (3)	  to	  ‘revise	  the	  recruitment	  of	  Native	  
labour	  for	  mines	  and	  for	  all	  public	  works	  …	  (so)	  that	  these	  bodies	  will	  obtain	  their	  labour	  mainly	  from	  
sources	  outside	  the	  Union’	  (cited	  in	  Morris,	  1976:	  11)	  There	  was	  also	  a	  general	  demand	  that	  pass	  
laws	  and	  the	  Urban	  Areas	  Acts	  be	  more	  rigorously	  enforced	  (Morris	  1976:	  11).	  
	  
The	  Smuts-­‐government	  resisted	  making	  such	  changes,	  inter	  alia	  to	  prevent	  an	  uprising	  of	  the	  black	  
populace.	  Instead,	  it	  proposed	  that	  farmers	  pay	  higher	  wages	  to	  retain	  farmworkers,	  a	  suggestion	  
that	  farmers	  scoffed	  at,	  pleading	  hardship.	  Only	  once	  the	  Verwoerd	  government	  –	  which	  drew	  
heavily	  on	  the	  farmer	  community	  for	  support	  –	  came	  to	  power	  were	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  SAAU’s	  
suggestions	  implemented.	  	  In	  1951,	  referring	  to	  two	  bills	  being	  debated	  in	  Parliament	  at	  the	  time	  -	  
the	  Prevention	  of	  Illegal	  Squatting	  Act	  52	  of	  1951	  and	  the	  Native	  Laws	  Amendment	  Act	  54	  of	  1952	  –	  
Verwoerd	  ‘publically	  summarised	  his	  intentions	  and	  the	  [SAAU’s]	  proposed	  measures	  to	  deal	  with	  
the	  farm	  labour	  shortage’	  (Morris	  1976:	  34-35).	  These	  Acts	  were	  the	  most	  important	  pieces	  of	  
legislation	  ‘in	  the	  post-­‐war	  era	  and	  laid	  the	  basis	  of	  all	  state	  intervention	  to	  control	  the	  “distribution	  
of	  labour”	  between	  town	  and	  country	  from	  1952	  until	  1971’	  (ibid).	  Verwoerd	  also	  explicitly	  
acknowledged	  that	  the	  move	  was	  a	  legislative	  attempt	  to	  put	  into	  effect	  the	  long-­‐term	  ‘native	  policy’	  
–	  originally	  formulated	  in	  the	  SAAU’s	  1944	  memorandum	  (Morris	  1976:	  35).	  	  Because	  Verwoerd	  
finally	  implemented	  the	  legislation	  that	  farmers	  had	  long	  clamoured	  for,	  by	  the	  late	  1950s	  
farmer	  journals	  and	  congresses	  stopped	  being	  ‘predominantly	  concerned	  with	  the	  farm	  labour	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
History Online 2013a). The Natives Trust and Land Act aimed to increase the land set aside for reserves from 7.3% to almost 13%, 
but this goal was seemingly never achieved (Lapping 1986: 204). 
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shortage’	  (Morris	  1976:	  42).	  Still,	  the	  National	  Party	  continued	  to	  pass	  legislation	  to	  control	  
movement	  of	  farmworkers’	  movement.	  For	  example,	  the	  Black	  Labour	  Act	  67	  of	  1964	  ensured	  
that	  once	  a	  person	  was	  categorised	  as	  a	  farm	  labourer,	  they	  could	  only	  be	  re-­‐categorised	  with	  
great	  difficulty	  to	  enter	  an	  urban	  area	  to	  seek	  work	  (Le	  Roux	  2002:	  7).	  
	  
In	  short,	  politically	  and	  economically	  from	  the	  late	  1950s	  until	  1976,	  South	  African	  farmers	  
were	  in	  the	  best	  position	  ever	  as	  far	  as	  state	  support	  was	  concerned.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  state	  pass	  
a	  host	  of	  supportive	  legislation	  to	  protect	  the	  direct	  interests	  of	  agriculture,	  it	  also	  implemented	  
repressive	  laws	  to	  ensure	  a	  cheap	  supply	  of	  labour.	  While	  the	  strong	  Rand	  at	  the	  time	  would	  
have	  meant	  that	  export	  prices	  were	  fairly	  low,	  the	  upside	  of	  a	  strong	  Rand	  was	  that	  it	  reduced	  
the	  cost	  of	  (mostly	  imported)	  production	  inputs.	  Moreover,	  farmers	  who	  exported	  at	  the	  time	  
were	  integrated	  in	  a	  producer-­‐driven	  value	  chain:	  export	  sales	  were	  controlled	  by	  marketing	  boards	  
that	  consolidated	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  individual	  farmers	  and	  enabled	  them	  to	  collectively	  
negotiate	  higher	  prices	  with	  overseas	  buyers.	  At	  that	  stage,	  the	  international	  retail	  environment	  was	  
still	  largely	  unconsolidated	  with	  the	  result	  that	  most	  sales	  still	  took	  place	  at	  municipal	  markets,	  such	  
as	  Covent	  Garden	  in	  London.	  Relatively	  speaking,	  producers	  were	  therefore	  in	  the	  proverbial	  pound	  
seat	  in	  the	  market	  place.	  
Relative labour shortage on Western Cape fruit farms in the 1970s 
While	  Western	  Cape	  farmers	  benefited	  from	  most	  of	  the	  state’s	  legislative	  support	  measures,	  in	  one	  
respect	  legislation	  may	  have	  disadvantaged	  them.	  Levy	  (1976)	  notes	  that	  for	  Western	  Cape	  farmers	  
-	  especially	  those	  growing	  labour-­‐intensive	  crops	  -	  influx	  control	  presented	  a	  real	  hurdle	  not	  only	  
to	  cheap	  labour,	  but	  sometimes	  to	  labour	  per	  se.	  He	  notes	  that	  as	  early	  as	  the	  1800s	  Western	  Cape	  
farmers	  used	  migrant	  labour	  from	  other	  parts	  of	  South	  Africa	  to	  supplement	  existing	  labour.	  In	  the	  
1870s,	  government	  brought	  about	  4	  000	  Africans	  to	  the	  Cape	  from	  the	  eastern	  frontier;	  they	  were	  
‘rapidly	  absorbed	  within	  a	  thirty	  mile	  radius	  of	  Cape	  Town’	  (Levy,	  1976:	  10).	  In	  subsequent	  years,	  
workers	  were	  recruited	  from	  the	  Transkei,	  Mozambique	  and	  the	  then	  South	  West	  Africa.	  	  
	  
By	  the	  1970s,	  the	  control	  system	  and	  official	  quotas	  aimed	  at	  regulating	  the	  African	  population	  
made	  it	  increasingly	  difficult	  for	  Western	  Cape	  farmers	  to	  find	  enough	  labour	  (Graaff	  1976:	  8).	  Only	  
so-­‐called	  “Section	  10”	  Africans	  were	  allowed	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  (Levy	  1976:	  11).3	  Other	  
Africans	  had	  to	  go	  back	  from	  whence	  they	  came	  once	  their	  employment	  contract	  expired.	  Given	  the	  
difficulty	  of	  securing	  migrant	  African	  workers,	  Theron	  (1976),	  Levy	  (1976)	  and	  Graaff	  (1976)	  
reported	  in	  their	  case	  studies	  that	  farmers	  mostly	  used	  Coloured	  workers.	  In	  Elgin	  and	  De	  Doorns,	  at	  
least	  65%	  of	  farmworkers	  were	  Coloured,	  while	  in	  Citrusdal	  only	  a	  handful	  were	  Coloured.	  
	  
Mechanisation	  of	  South	  African	  agriculture,	  which	  started	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  picked	  up	  pace	  in	  
the	  1970s,	  reduced	  labour	  demand	  in	  industries	  that	  could	  easily	  be	  mechanised	  (such	  as	  grain	  
farming)	  (Atkinson	  2007;	  Antrobus	  1976),	  but	  mechanisation	  had	  little	  impact	  on	  fresh	  fruit	  
farming,	  which	  cannot	  easily	  be	  mechanised	  due	  to	  the	  perishability	  of	  fruit.	  
	  
Increased	  urbanisation	  and	  peri-­‐urbanisation	  of	  Coloured	  workers	  in	  search	  of	  higher	  wages	  and	  
less	  harsh	  working	  conditions	  also	  drove	  the	  demand	  for	  agricultural	  labour	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  
(Levy	  1976;	  Thomas	  1976;	  Graaff	  1976).	  Moreover,	  two	  “supply	  shocks”	  in	  the	  Boland	  further	  
reduced	  the	  available	  pool	  of	  farm	  labour	  in	  the	  1970s.	  The	  first	  shock	  was	  the	  prison	  closure	  in	  the	  
De	  Doorns	  area	  (an	  important	  source	  of	  labour	  for	  farmers),	  due	  to	  foreign	  pressure	  against	  the	  use	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 was amended to specify that all black men and women over the age 
of sixteen were to carry passes and that no black person could stay in urban areas longer than seventy-two hours unless 
they had permission to do so. In terms of Section 10, governing who could legally stay in urban areas, those entitled to stay 
were: (1) only those black people born in urban areas, who had lived there continuously since their birth; (2) those who 
had been continuously employed for ten years; or (3) those in continuous residence in urban areas for fifteen years (Dugard 
1978; Horrell 1978, cited in O’Malley (undated)). 
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of	  prison	  labour	  (Levy	  1976;	  Graaff	  1976).4	  	  The	  second	  shock	  was	  an	  earthquake	  in	  1969,	  which	  
shook	  several	  Boland	  towns	  -	  especially	  Ceres,	  and	  resulted	  in	  a	  building	  boom	  which,	  due	  to	  higher	  
wages	  on	  offer,	  attracted	  labour	  from	  farms	  (Levy	  1976).	  The	  shocks	  led	  to	  increased	  reserve	  wages	  
for	  Coloured	  workers	  in	  the	  Elgin	  area	  (Levy	  1976).	  Coloured	  workers	  were	  reluctant	  to	  accept	  
permanent	  jobs	  on	  farms	  unless	  housing	  was	  “adequate”	  and	  ‘seasonal	  male	  “Coloured”	  labour	  was	  
apparently	  prohibitively	  expensive’	  (Levy	  1976:	  31;	  42).	  By	  1973,	  about	  28%	  of	  the	  farmers	  that	  
Levy	  surveyed	  in	  the	  Elgin	  area	  complained	  that	  they	  struggled	  to	  find	  enough	  permanent	  workers.	  
	  
A	  change	  in	  the	  demography	  of	  female	  pack	  house	  workers	  created	  a	  further	  labour	  shortage.	  
Initially,	  pack	  house	  work	  required	  skilled	  and	  better	  trained	  workers,	  so	  pack	  house	  workers	  
were	  quite	  well-­‐paid.	  Before	  WW2,	  white	  women	  commonly	  worked	  in	  Western	  Cape	  pack	  
houses.	  However,	  after	  the	  war,	  the	  reserve	  wage	  of	  white	  women	  increased	  due	  to	  an	  
expanding	  service	  sector;	  white	  women	  therefore	  increasingly	  took	  service	  jobs	  in	  the	  cities	  and	  
bigger	  towns.	  As	  the	  reserve	  wages	  of	  remaining	  white	  pack	  house	  workers	  rose,	  pack	  house	  
owners	  developed	  new	  packing	  methods,	  thus	  requiring	  less	  skilled	  workers.	  They	  began	  to	  
train	  unskilled	  Coloured	  women	  to	  work	  in	  pack	  houses	  and	  replace	  white	  women	  (Levy	  1976).	  
While	  this	  strategy	  drove	  down	  packing	  costs,	  it	  created	  a	  temporary	  shortage	  of	  Coloured	  
(women)	  workers	  to	  harvest	  apples,	  as	  in	  the	  picking	  season,	  the	  pack	  houses	  absorbed	  those	  
workers.	  However,	  women	  were	  historically	  not	  used	  to	  pick	  apples	  in	  the	  area	  as	  the	  work	  was	  
considered	  “too	  strenuous”	  for	  them.	  Given	  the	  higher	  reserve	  wages	  of	  Coloured	  men	  and	  the	  
fact	  that	  Coloured	  women	  were	  employed	  in	  pack	  houses,	  farmers	  began	  to	  employ	  African	  
migrants	  from	  the	  Transkei	  to	  pick	  apples	  (Levy	  1976).	  	  
Farmer strategies to secure permanent labour  
To	  secure	  and	  retain	  labour,	  farmers	  tied	  housing	  to	  employment.	  In	  Citrusdal,	  almost	  all	  permanent	  
workers	  lived	  on	  the	  farm;	  in	  De	  Doorns	  almost	  85%	  of	  permanent	  workers	  lived	  on	  the	  farm;	  and	  in	  
Elgin	  53%	  of	  permanent	  workers	  lived	  on	  the	  farm	  (Levy,	  1976;	  Graaff,	  1976;	  Theron,	  1976).	  As	  well	  
as	  tying	  employment	  to	  housing,	  farmers	  tied	  employees	  down	  by	  granting	  them	  loans	  (to	  enable	  
them	  to	  buy	  food	  from	  farm	  shops	  which	  put	  them	  in	  a	  continuous	  cycle	  of	  indebtedness	  to	  farmers),	  
and	  by	  using	  in-­‐kind	  payments	  (e.g.	  providing	  weekly	  rations)	  that	  lowered	  workers’	  monetary	  wage	  
and	  deprived	  them	  of	  choice	  about	  how	  they	  wanted	  to	  spend	  their	  wages	  (Theron	  1976).	  However,	  
the	  most	  notorious	  measure	  was	  the	  “dop”	  system,	  by	  which	  farmworkers	  received	  up	  to	  nine	  tots	  
of	  alcohol	  a	  day,	  leading	  to	  psychological	  and	  physical	  enslavement	  (Theron	  1976;	  Graaff	  1976).	  
	  
The	  combination	  of	  financial	  dependence,	  alcoholic	  dependence	  and	  isolation	  from	  towns	  and	  
other	  communities	  severely	  affected	  farmworker	  agency.	  Since	  social	  interactions	  with	  fellow	  
workers	  were	  confined	  to	  walking	  distances,	  workers	  knew	  very	  little	  about	  conditions	  on	  other	  
farms	  (Theron	  1976).	  Not	  surprisingly,	  none	  of	  the	  three	  authors	  mentioned	  any	  instances	  of	  
collective	  organisation	  or	  bargaining	  by	  farmworkers	  at	  the	  time.	  
Using dependents as a cheap source of flexible labour 
The	  strategy	  of	  tying	  housing	  to	  employment	  not	  only	  ensured	  the	  services	  of	  permanent	  
workers,	  but	  also	  secured	  the	  labour	  of	  their	  dependents,	  who	  became	  a	  cheap,	  readily	  available	  
and	  flexible	  source	  of	  labour.	  Through	  the	  advantage	  of	  such	  family	  labour,	  a	  farmer	  was	  ‘able	  to	  
minimise	  his	  labour	  costs	  by	  only	  employing	  people	  for	  specific	  functions	  without	  being	  
impelled	  to	  contract	  on	  the	  market	  –	  with	  all	  the	  costs	  involved,	  both	  in	  the	  dissemination	  of	  
information	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  transport	  for	  those	  employed	  –	  each	  time	  he	  require[d]	  this	  
labour’	  (Levy	  1976:	  31).	  	  On	  most	  South	  African	  farms	  the	  unit	  of	  employment	  has	  been	  the	  
worker’s	  family	  and	  not	  the	  individual	  worker	  themselves	  (Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004).	  Thus	  women	  
farmworkers	  historically	  accessed	  employment	  and	  on-­‐farm	  housing	  via	  a	  male	  partner	  and/	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 However, Theron (1976) found that farmers in the Vredendal area were still using prison labour. 
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or	  male	  family	  member.	  However,	  according	  to	  the	  1976-­‐authors,	  the	  issue	  at	  the	  time	  was	  not	  
that	  women	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  employment,	  but	  rather	  that	  they	  and	  their	  children	  were	  
forced	  into	  employment	  as	  part	  of	  the	  deal	  their	  husbands	  or	  fathers	  entered	  with	  the	  farmer.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  since	  permanent	  workers’	  had	  low	  wages,	  household	  units	  probably	  
welcomed	  the	  opportunity	  to	  supplement	  household	  income	  through	  dependents.	  
	  
The	  family	  of	  permanent	  workers	  could	  only	  work	  elsewhere	  (mostly	  on	  adjacent	  farms)	  with	  
the	  permission	  of	  their	  partner	  or	  father’s	  employer	  (Theron	  1976;	  Levy	  1976;	  Graaff	  1976;	  
Antrobus	  1976).	  In	  Levy’s	  De	  Doorns	  sample,	  13	  of	  the	  18	  farmers	  confirmed	  that	  permanent	  
workers’	  dependents	  who	  lived	  on	  the	  farm	  were	  obliged	  to	  work	  on	  the	  farm	  when	  required	  to	  do	  
so;	  indeed,	  ‘four	  farmers	  noted	  that	  an	  important	  criterion	  in	  their	  hiring	  of	  permanent	  workers	  is	  
the	  number	  of	  potentially	  productive	  dependents	  in	  the	  workers’	  family’	  (Levy,	  1976:32).	  But	  even	  
if	  women	  were	  free	  to	  work	  where	  they	  wanted,	  Theron	  (1976:	  6)	  notes	  that	  they	  could	  only	  
take	  on	  work	  within	  walking	  distance	  of	  the	  farm.	  
	  
At	  the	  time,	  child	  labour	  was	  common,	  especially	  during	  school	  holidays;	  during	  the	  thinning	  
season	  in	  De	  Doorns,	  51%	  of	  off-­‐farm	  seasonal	  workers	  were	  schoolchildren	  (Levy	  1976).	  Four	  
De	  Doorns	  farmers	  used	  schoolteachers	  to	  supervise	  children,	  often	  in	  teams	  organised	  by	  the	  
teachers	  themselves	  (Levy	  1976).	  Farmers	  competed	  for	  the	  services	  of	  teachers,	  who	  were	  
therefore	  highly	  paid	  to	  supervise	  children	  (Levy,	  1976).	  Given	  the	  lack	  of	  high	  schools	  for	  
Coloured	  and	  African	  children	  it	  was	  common	  for	  children	  to	  start	  working	  on	  farms	  once	  they	  
had	  finished	  primary	  school,	  i.e.	  from	  the	  age	  of	  thirteen	  onwards	  (Theron	  1976).	  Many	  schools	  
only	  went	  up	  to	  Grade	  6	  and	  no	  school	  transport	  was	  available	  for	  farm	  children	  wishing	  to	  
attend	  school	  in	  town.	  A	  lack	  of	  educational	  opportunities	  for	  Coloureds	  and	  Africans	  in	  the	  
Western	  Cape	  primed	  them	  for	  low	  wage	  work	  (Graaff	  1976;	  Theron,	  1976	  Antrobus	  1976).5	  	  
	  
On-­‐farm	  labour	  was	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  temporary	  labour,	  except	  during	  peak	  seasons	  when	  
most	  workers	  were	  off-­‐farm	  women	  and	  children	  in	  De	  Doorns	  and	  migrant	  labour	  in	  Elgin	  (see	  
Table	  1).	  In	  both	  Elgin	  and	  Hex	  River	  Valley,	  on-­‐farm	  temporary	  women	  were	  employed	  for	  
about	  8.5	  months	  a	  year	  as	  they	  also	  helped	  with	  pruning	  in	  the	  off-­‐season	  (Levy	  1976).	  On	  
Citrusdal	  farms,	  women	  and	  children	  mostly	  only	  worked	  in	  the	  four	  month	  harvesting	  season.	  
On	  farm,	  women	  also	  worked	  during	  the	  peak	  season;	  off-­‐farm	  seasonal	  workers	  were	  brought	  
in	  to	  meet	  additional	  labour	  demand	  during	  the	  peak	  season.	  
Table 1: Sources of seasonal workers in Citrusdal, Elgin and the Hexriver Valley in 1976 
Area 
  
Types of work 
Pre-
thinning 
Thinning Picking and Packing 
Citrusdal 
(citrus) N.A. N.A. 
Peak demand (4 months): 
On-farm women and children 
Elgin 
(apples) N.A. 
On-farm women: 68%  
Off-farm women: 22% 
Short-term migrants: 10%  
Peak demand (more than 3 months): 
African migrants on short-term: 95%   
Women did all the packing: 
On-farm women: 71% 






Peak demand (6 weeks): 
• Off-farmworkers recruited from Worcester,  
De Doorns, Touws River and neighbouring farms: 
66% (51% schoolchildren) 
• On-farm women and children: 34% (16% children) 
On-farmworkers (90% of packing 
workforce) 
Women from surrounding towns: 10% 
Sources:	  Levy	  1976;	  Theron	  1976.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Farm schools for Coloured children in the Western Cape were only built from the 1960s. By the 1970s, the number and quality 
of schools for African and Coloured children in the Western Cape were still deeply inadequate. Schools often had to operate 
double shifts to accommodate all pupils. The situation was worse for African school children in the Western Cape, because in 
terms of official policy, such children and their parents were not supposed to settle in the Western Cape (Graaff 1976). 
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Female work 
Pack	  house	  work	  provided	  a	  step-­‐up	  for	  Coloured	  women	  as	  the	  work	  was	  not	  only	  less	  
strenuous	  than	  orchard	  work,	  but	  also	  better	  paid.	  	  In	  Elgin	  12	  of	  the	  15	  farms	  in	  Levy’s	  sample	  
packed	  their	  own	  fruit,	  all	  using	  on-­‐farm	  women.	  The	  remainder	  consisted	  of	  women	  sourced	  
from	  nearby,	  surrounding	  areas,	  but	  also	  from	  areas	  further	  away.	  The	  recruitment	  of	  such	  off-­‐
farm	  pack	  house	  workers	  by	  farmers	  in	  the	  Elgin	  area	  was	  not	  very	  sophisticated:	  only	  three	  
farmers	  in	  Levy’s	  (1976)	  sample	  established	  contacts	  in	  the	  area	  to	  act	  as	  their	  recruiting	  
agents.	  Most	  drove	  into	  the	  local	  township	  and	  collected	  women	  who	  wanted	  to	  work.	  This	  
suggests	  that	  while	  some	  farmers	  might	  have	  experienced	  a	  shortage	  of	  male,	  permanent	  
labour,	  there	  was	  evidently	  no	  shortage	  of	  temporary	  female	  labour	  in	  the	  area.	  Secondly,	  the	  
ease	  with	  which	  farmers	  obtained	  temporary	  (female)	  labour,	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  
significant	  off-­‐farm	  community	  of	  available	  workers	  already	  existed	  in	  the	  Elgin	  area	  by	  1976.	  
	  
The	  two	  cooperative	  pack	  houses	  seemingly	  had	  a	  more	  structured	  recruitment	  drive,	  given	  that	  
Elgin	  Fruit	  Packers	  Cooperative	  and	  Krom	  River	  Pack	  House	  respectively	  employed	  400	  and	  
300	  women	  in	  the	  height	  of	  the	  season.	  Both	  operated	  hostels	  where	  some	  women	  resided	  for	  
the	  duration	  of	  the	  packing	  season	  (about	  120	  women	  were	  housed	  in	  hostels	  by	  Krom	  River	  
pack	  house)	  (Levy	  1976).	  Off-­‐season,	  only	  women	  from	  nearby	  -	  mostly	  the	  wives	  of	  permanent	  
men	  –	  were	  employed	  in	  the	  pack	  houses	  of	  local	  co-­‐operatives,	  which	  had	  cold	  storage	  facilities	  
that	  extended	  the	  season	  and	  created	  a	  longer	  packing	  period	  (Levy	  1976).	  
Use of migrant labour in 1976 
Motivation for migrant workers 
While	  there	  might	  have	  been	  a	  relative	  shortage	  of	  permanent	  (male)	  labour	  in	  the	  Elgin	  and	  Du	  
Doorns	  areas,	  the	  real	  shortage	  was	  not	  of	  labour	  per	  se,	  but	  of	  cheap	  full-­‐time	  labour.	  As	  
Coloured	  men’s	  reserve	  wages	  increased,	  farmers	  optimised	  the	  use	  of	  the	  labour	  of	  on-­‐farm	  
dependents,	  but	  increasingly	  sourced	  (cheaper)	  African	  migrants	  to	  replace	  Coloured	  male	  
permanent	  workers.	  Hence,	  despite	  influx	  control	  measures,	  migration	  from	  the	  Transkei	  to	  
Western	  Cape	  farms	  continued	  (often	  under	  the	  official	  radar)	  as	  the	  relatively	  lower	  total	  
labour	  costs	  of	  African	  labour	  encouraged	  farmers	  to	  substitute	  Coloured	  workers	  with	  African	  
migrants	  (Levy	  1976).	  	  Farmers	  had	  to	  choose	  between	  employing	  mainly	  African	  migrants	  (at	  
lower	  wages	  and	  with	  little	  additional	  housing	  costs)	  or	  Coloured	  workers	  and	  their	  dependents	  
(with	  a	  possibly	  higher	  wage	  bill	  and	  the	  necessity	  to	  provide	  adequate	  family	  housing)	  (Levy	  
1976).	  Especially	  in	  Elgin,	  family	  house-­‐provision	  was	  increasingly	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  obtaining	  
permanent	  Coloured	  labour.	  This	  choice	  ‘…	  helps	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  economic	  rationale	  for	  a	  
motion	  passed	  at	  the	  annual	  conference	  of	  the	  Boland	  Agricultural	  Union	  requesting	  that	  
dependents	  of	  African	  migrants	  be	  permitted	  to	  accompany	  their	  husbands’	  (Levy,	  1976:	  17).	  
	  
In	  places	  like	  Elgin	  and	  De	  Doorns,	  the	  use	  of	  African	  migrants	  was	  fairly	  high	  -	  probably	  due	  to	  
labour-­‐intensive	  farming	  being	  near	  urban	  and	  peri-­‐urban	  areas.	  Elgin	  was	  quite	  close	  to	  the	  
burgeoning	  metropolis	  of	  Cape	  Town,	  while	  the	  Hex	  River	  Valley	  was	  close	  to	  Worcester,	  which	  had	  
been	  recently	  demarcated	  as	  a	  new	  growth	  node.	  Unlike	  African	  workers,	  Coloured	  workers	  were	  
not	  restricted	  by	  pass	  laws,	  so	  Coloured	  farmworkers	  living	  near	  peri-­‐urban	  and	  metropolitan	  
areas	  would	  have	  found	  it	  easier	  than	  those	  in	  more	  isolated	  areas	  like	  Citrusdal	  to	  escape	  farm	  
work	  and	  find	  better	  paid	  work	  in	  towns	  and	  cities.	  Similarly,	  farming	  areas	  close	  to	  peri-­‐urban	  or	  
urban	  areas	  (such	  as	  Elgin	  and	  Worcester)	  would	  have	  been	  more	  attractive	  to	  African	  migrants	  
as	  such	  areas	  could	  be	  a	  springboard	  on	  their	  way	  to	  higher	  paid	  city	  jobs.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  use	  of	  
migrant	  workers	  in	  Citrusdal	  was	  quite	  rare	  as	  the	  area	  was	  (1)	  far	  from	  urban	  or	  peri-­‐urban	  
areas	  and	  (2)	  labour	  demand	  was	  only	  high	  in	  the	  four	  month	  of	  citrus	  picking	  season.	  On-­‐farm	  
women	  and	  children	  did	  most	  of	  the	  picking,	  and	  only	  about	  a	  quarter	  of	  farms	  sampled	  by	  
Theron	  (1976)	  employed	  a	  “handful”	  of	  workers	  from	  Transkei	  for	  11	  months	  of	  the	  year.	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In	  Elgin,	  market	  conditions	  also	  drove	  farmers	  to	  source	  cheaper,	  migrant	  labour.	  Improved	  cold	  
storage	  facilities	  enabled	  European	  apple	  farmers	  to	  store	  apples	  for	  longer	  and	  supply	  the	  
European	  market	  in	  the	  off-­‐season	  (the	  window	  period	  in	  which	  Southern	  hemisphere	  apples	  were	  
historically	  sold	  on	  the	  European	  market).	  European	  producers	  also	  enjoyed	  tariff	  protection	  from	  
imported	  apples.	  The	  combination	  of	  tariff	  protections	  and	  cold	  storage	  facilities	  in	  Europe,	  which	  
flooded	  the	  market,	  drove	  prices	  down.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community’s	  
(EEC)	  protective	  measures	  and	  high	  subsidy	  levels	  to	  European	  producers	  enabled	  them	  to	  absorb	  
lower	  prices.	  To	  cope	  with	  lower	  apple	  prices,	  South	  African	  farmers	  cut	  their	  labour	  costs	  and	  
replaced	  more	  expensive	  male	  Coloured	  workers	  with	  African	  migrant	  workers	  (Levy	  1976).	  
Prevalence of migrant work 
At	  the	  time,	  migrant	  labour	  was	  especially	  prevalent	  in	  Elgin,	  where	  apple	  picking	  was	  seen	  as	  too	  
strenuous	  for	  women	  and	  children.	  Transkei	  migrants	  made	  up	  almost	  95%	  of	  Elgin’s	  seasonal	  
picking	  force.	  Migrant	  workers	  were	  employed	  on	  contract	  for	  three	  months	  to	  a	  year,	  but	  most	  
(62%)	  were	  employed	  on	  contract	  for	  between	  eight	  and	  ten	  months.	  Such	  migrants	  stayed	  on-­‐
farm	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  their	  contract	  (Levy	  1976),	  so	  while	  migrants	  were	  ostensibly	  hired	  only	  
for	  the	  three	  month	  picking	  season,	  they	  ended	  up	  staying	  much	  longer.	  At	  Elgin	  Fruit	  Packers	  
Cooperative	  almost	  half	  of	  workers	  were	  migrant	  labour	  from	  the	  Transkei,	  with	  90%	  of	  them	  
employed	  on	  six	  month	  contracts	  –	  much	  longer	  than	  the	  three-­‐month-­‐long	  harvesting	  season.	  	  
	  
In	  Elgin	  and	  De	  Doorns	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  Citrusdal,	  several	  African	  workers	  permanently	  lived	  
and	  worked	  on	  farms	  in	  terms	  of	  Section	  10	  of	  the	  Natives	  (Urban	  Areas)	  Act	  21	  of	  1923.	  From	  the	  
1976	  papers,	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  percentage	  of	  permanent	  workers	  were	  African.	  Apart	  from	  the	  
Section	  10	  Africans,	  De	  Doorns	  table	  grape	  farmers	  also	  used	  “permanent”	  migrants	  from	  Transkei	  
who	  could	  not	  get	  a	  Section	  10	  permit	  (Levy	  1976).	  In	  De	  Doorns,	  these	  “permanent	  migrants”	  made	  
up	  14%	  of	  permanent	  workers	  in	  Levy’s	  (1976)	  De	  Doorns	  sample.	  Such	  migrants	  were	  employed	  
on	  nine-­‐	  to	  twelve-­‐month	  contracts,	  so	  Levy	  (1976)	  treated	  them	  as	  permanent	  workers.	  
Sourcing migrant labour 
To	  source	  migrant	  labour,	  one	  Elgin	  farmer	  in	  Levy’s	  (1976)	  sample	  used	  a	  Transkei	  agent	  who	  
recruited	  labour	  as	  a	  side-­‐line.	  Other	  Elgin	  farmers	  in	  his	  sample	  sourced	  workers	  directly,	  by	  
sending	  trucks	  to	  the	  Transkei	  to	  fetch	  workers	  (Levy	  1976).	  Sometimes	  farmers	  would	  even	  go	  
themselves	  to	  recruit	  workers;	  in	  other	  cases	  farmers	  would	  send	  foremen	  or	  “boss-­‐boys”	  to	  recruit	  
workers.	  Some	  Transkei	  workers	  apparently	  also	  returned	  to	  Elgin	  on	  their	  own	  steam,	  showing	  
that	  working	  relationships	  with	  some	  workers	  must	  have	  been	  well-­‐established	  at	  the	  time.	  In	  De	  
Doorns,	  the	  Hex	  Valley	  Boeregroep	  -	  already	  established	  in	  1966	  to	  recruit	  migrant	  workers	  for	  its	  
250	  member	  farms	  -	  	  recruited	  about	  2	  000–2	  500	  Transkei	  migrants	  a	  year	  by	  1976	  (Levy	  1976).	  	  
Struggle to get migrant labour 
Apart	  from	  influx	  control,	  which	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  Western	  Cape	  farmers	  to	  secure	  African	  
labour,	  the	  mining	  sector	  –	  which	  had	  an	  upsurge	  at	  the	  time	  due	  to	  increased	  gold	  prices	  -­‐	  
continued	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  for	  labour.6	  Given	  the	  (low)	  wages	  paid	  to	  
migrants	  on	  farms,	  the	  labour	  supply	  in	  the	  Transkei	  seemed	  to	  be	  drying	  up	  (Levy	  1976:	  12).	  
Seven	  of	  the	  nine	  Elgin	  farmers	  in	  Levy’s	  (1976)	  sample	  who	  used	  migrant	  labour	  struggled	  to	  
get	  enough	  migrants.	  Also	  the	  Hex	  Valley	  Boeregroep	  reported	  difficulties	  recruiting	  Transkei	  
workers.	  Levy	  (1976:	  13)	  noted	  that	  ‘[a]ccording	  to	  a	  reliable	  source,	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  workers	  
obtained	  by	  the	  Boeregroep	  [were]	  youths	  and	  old	  men,	  the	  only	  people	  prepared	  to	  accept	  
agricultural	  employment’.	  Hence,	  apart	  from	  struggling	  to	  source	  enough	  Coloured	  workers	  
willing	  to	  work	  for	  the	  low	  wages	  on	  offer,	  farmers	  also	  began	  to	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  get	  sufficient	  
African	  migrant	  labourers.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In the 1970s, a decision was taken to float the gold price, which led to high prices for gold and other export commodities. 
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The	  literature	  does	  not	  discuss	  whether	  and	  how	  farmers’	  use	  of	  migrant	  labour	  changed	  once	  
influx	  controls	  were	  abolished	  in	  the	  1980s,	  allowing	  Transkei’s	  migrant	  workers	  to	  settle,	  with	  
their	  families,	  in	  local	  Boland	  towns.	  The	  change	  might,	  however,	  have	  led	  to	  an	  influx	  of	  migrants	  
and	  an	  oversupply	  of	  workers	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  South	  African	  agriculture	  began	  to	  deregulate	  
and	  the	  South	  African	  economy	  was	  put	  under	  strain	  due	  to	  sanctions	  and	  a	  slowing	  economy.	  
Hence,	  the	  demographic	  shift	  in	  the	  agricultural	  labour	  market	  after	  influx	  controls	  were	  
abolished	  in	  1986	  must	  ironically	  have	  significantly	  weakened	  the	  structural	  position	  of	  the	  
existing	  pool	  of	  agricultural	  workers	  on	  Boland	  farms.	  Conversely,	  the	  new	  influx	  would	  have	  been	  
a	  godsend	  to	  farmers,	  who	  would	  have	  been	  under	  increasing	  economic	  pressure	  due	  to	  economic	  
sanctions,	  a	  weakening	  economy,	  and	  the	  gradual	  withdrawal	  of	  state	  agricultural	  subsidies.	  
Working conditions in 1976 
Given	  that	  labour	  legislation	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  agriculture	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  three	  1976	  papers	  do	  not	  
discuss	  compliance	  with	  legislation.	  Levy	  (1976:	  44)	  commented	  on	  the	  ‘rapidly	  improving	  living	  
and	  working	  conditions,	  for	  families	  based	  on	  farms	  [in	  the	  Hex	  River	  Valley	  and	  Elgin]	  
(noticeably	  in	  Elgin)’.	  	  Yet,	  since	  his	  paper	  focused	  on	  farmers’	  employment	  strategies	  and	  not	  on	  
farmworkers’	  working	  conditions,	  he	  gave	  little	  evidence	  of	  such	  improved	  working	  conditions.	  
Nevertheless,	  Levy	  (1976:	  44)	  argued	  that	  ‘with	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	  scarcity	  of	  migrant	  workers	  
there	  may	  well	  be	  a	  renewed	  attempt	  to	  attract	  Coloured	  workers	  back	  to	  farms,	  and	  reduce,	  
relatively,	  the	  number	  of	  Africans	  contracted’	  .	  In	  1976,	  farmers	  already	  competed	  greatly	  on	  
wages	  to	  attract	  off-­‐farmworkers	  in	  the	  thinning	  season	  (Levy	  1976).	  	  
	  
Graaff	  (1976:	  4)	  offered	  a	  more	  ambivalent	  picture	  of	  farm	  working	  conditions	  in	  De	  Doorns.	  On	  the	  
one	  hand,	  ‘far	  too	  few	  farmers	  give	  their	  staff	  any	  holiday	  at	  all’,	  while	  ‘some	  farms	  in	  the	  valley	  …	  
worked	  seven	  days	  a	  week’;	  with	  about	  50%	  of	  farms	  still	  having	  the	  dop	  system,	  and	  	  farmworkers	  
still	  finding	  themselves	  in	  a	  “socio-­‐economic	  morass”.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Graaff	  (1976)	  ‘is	  surprised	  
at	  the	  number	  of	  workers	  driving	  cars’,	  that	  the	  general	  standard	  of	  housing	  had	  improved	  
“tremendously”,	  but	  also	  that	  wages	  were	  rising.	  	  De	  Doorns	  farmworkers	  also	  received	  various	  on-­‐
site	  benefits,	  such	  as	  free	  electricity,	  bonuses	  and	  Christmas	  gifts,	  paid	  medical	  expenses	  and	  funeral	  
insurance.	  Farmers	  also	  increasingly	  built	  on-­‐farm	  churches,	  community	  centres,	  and	  television	  and	  
sport	  facilities	  (Graaff	  1976).	  In	  comparison,	  farmworker	  conditions	  in	  Citrusdal	  were	  utterly	  bleak,	  
since	  there	  were	  ‘everywhere	  the	  symptoms	  of	  poverty	  and	  deprivation	  –	  illiteracy,	  high	  infant	  
mortality,	  inadequate	  clothing,	  poor	  nutrition,	  endemic	  alcoholism	  …	  Workers	  were	  paid	  the	  
minimum	  amount	  necessary	  to	  keep	  them	  and	  their	  dependents	  alive’	  (Theron	  1976:	  1).	  
	  
Based	  on	  the	  three	  1976	  papers,	  it	  seems	  that,	  at	  the	  time,	  working	  conditions	  were	  best	  in	  Elgin,	  
followed	  by	  De	  Doorns,	  and	  Citrusdal	  conditions	  being	  worst.	  This	  situation	  would	  tie	  in	  with	  a	  
theory	  that	  working	  conditions	  improved	  where	  the	  demand	  for	  labour	  increased.	  	  However,	  
seemingly	  poorer	  working	  and	  living	  conditions,	  and	  more	  entrenched	  paternalism	  in	  Citrusdal,	  
may	  also	  be	  due	  to	  the	  authors’	  different	  perspectives.	  At	  the	  time	  Theron	  (1976)	  was	  the	  regional	  
director	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  Race	  Relations	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  and	  his	  paper	  focused	  on	  labour	  
conditions;	  Graaff	  (1976)	  was	  a	  De	  Doorns	  farmer;	  while	  Levy	  (1976)	  was	  an	  economist,	  who	  
focused	  on	  farmers’	  employment	  strategies,	  not	  farmworkers’	  working	  conditions.	  
	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  different	  foci	  of	  the	  1976	  papers,	  they	  do	  provide	  some	  information	  on	  working	  
conditions	  and	  Theron	  (1976)	  and	  Graaff	  (1976)	  also	  included	  wage	  information.	  	  Levy	  (1976)	  did	  
not	  provide	  wage	  information,	  but	  given	  that	  he	  observed	  that	  Elgin	  working	  conditions	  were	  more	  
favourable	  than	  those	  in	  De	  Doorns,	  it	  can	  probably	  be	  assumed	  that	  Elgin	  wages	  would	  at	  least	  be	  
on	  par,	  if	  not	  better,	  than	  those	  in	  De	  Doorns	  in	  1976.	  In	  Table	  2	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  compare	  1976	  wages	  
to	  the	  2015	  minimum	  wage.	  Wage	  figures	  from	  1976,	  provided	  by	  Graaff	  (1976)	  and	  Theron	  (1976),	  
were	  converted	  to	  2015	  values.	  While	  farmworkers’	  1976	  cash	  wages	  were	  much	  lower	  than	  the	  
2015	  minimum	  wage	  (see	  Table	  2),	  when	  in-­‐kind	  payments	  are	  added	  to	  1976	  cash	  wages,	  the	  
average	  1976	  wage	  package	  compares	  more	  favourably	  with	  the	  2015	  minimum	  wage.	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Table 2: A comparison of farmworker wages in 1976* and 2015 
1976 A: Monthly cash wage value B: Monthly ration valueǂ 
C: Value of monthly cash 
wage+rations 
	   Lowest Highest Average 
R 1 736 
Lowest Highest Average 
Citrusdal R 290 R 2 032 R 1 021 R 2 026 R3768 R 2 757 
De Doorns R 967  R 3 918  R 1 450 R 2 703 R 5 654 R 3 186 
2015 Minimum monthly wage: R2 606.79 
*	  1976	  wages	  were	  converted	  to	  2015	  values,	  at	  conversion	  rate	  of	  R1	  in	  1976=	  R36.28	  in	  2015.7	  
ǂTo	  calculate	  the	  1976	  full	  ration	  value,	  Theron	  (1976:2)	  and	  Graaff’s	  (1976:3)	  descriptions	  were	  used	  to	  “buy”	  the	  same	  
basket	  of	  products	  at	  Shoprite	  in	  2015.8	  
Source:	  Data	  extracted	  from	  Graaff	  1976:	  3-4;	  Theron	  1976:	  18-19.	  
	  
In	  conclusion,	  in	  1976,	  farm	  work	  had	  two	  sides.	  The	  downside	  was	  that	  in	  1976,	  workers	  were	  
not	  protected	  by	  labour	  rights,	  and	  forced	  labour	  and	  child	  labour	  were	  common.	  Due	  to	  
paternalism,	  farmers	  largely	  controlled	  workers’	  lives,	  so	  farmworkers	  had	  little	  choice	  in	  how	  
they	  lived	  their	  lives.	  Low	  cash	  wages	  further	  curtailed	  their	  options,	  while	  farmworkers’	  general	  
isolation	  (especially	  in	  far-­‐flung	  areas	  such	  as	  Citrusdal)	  restricted	  their	  mobility.	  Farmworkers	  
had	  little	  scope	  for	  bargaining	  with	  employers,	  let	  alone	  collective	  bargaining.	  The	  upside	  of	  the	  
1976	  period	  was	  that	  permanent	  work,	  albeit	  mostly	  reserved	  for	  men,	  was	  still	  much	  more	  
common	  (arguably	  the	  biggest	  advantage	  of	  that	  period).	  Most	  male,	  permanent	  workers	  had	  
access	  to	  free	  on-­‐farm	  housing.	  However,	  the	  “benefit”	  of	  on-­‐farm	  housing	  came	  with	  the	  
disadvantage	  of	  being	  trapped	  in	  a	  paternalist	  relationship	  with	  an	  employer	  who	  had	  
disproportionate	  power	  over	  workers	  and	  their	  dependents	  lives,	  even	  after-­‐hours.	  
	  
Even	  so,	  the	  Boland’s	  Coloured	  agricultural	  workers	  seemed	  to	  have	  a	  fairly	  structurally	  strong	  
workplace	  position	  due	  to	  a	  labour	  shortage,	  created	  by	  influx	  control,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
competition	  for	  labour	  from	  the	  mining	  sector,	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  Elgin	  and	  Grabouw.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  
farmers	  enjoyed	  much	  more	  state	  protection	  and	  market-­‐place	  bargaining	  power,	  which,	  
theoretically	  at	  least,	  meant	  that	  they	  may	  have	  benefited	  from	  (relatively)	  higher	  prices.	  Probably	  
because	  of	  these	  factors,	  wage	  packages	  in	  areas	  of	  high	  labour	  demand	  –	  especially	  farm	  areas	  
closer	  to	  urban	  areas	  -	  compared	  quite	  well	  to	  the	  minimum	  wage	  of	  today.	  
	  
3. THE WESTERN CAPE FRUIT INDUSTRY TODAY 
Main drivers of regulatory change post-1994 
After	  democratisation,	  trade	  liberalisation	  –	  which	  had	  already	  begun	  with	  reduced	  agricultural	  
state	  subsidies	  in	  the	  1980s	  -	  was	  deliberately	  stepped	  up	  due	  to	  local	  and	  international	  pressure,	  
and	  a	  change	  in	  government	  (Vink	  1993,	  cited	  in	  Williams	  et	  al.	  1998;	  Wegerif	  et	  al.	  2005).	  Locally,	  
the	  1992	  Kassier	  Committee	  criticised	  agricultural	  marketing	  schemes	  and	  recommended	  the	  
abolishment	  of	  statutory	  single-­‐channel	  marketing,	  uniform	  pricing,	  and	  the	  exercise	  of	  de	  facto	  
statutory	  powers	  by	  private	  organisations,	  which	  granted	  an	  export	  monopoly	  of	  deciduous	  fruit	  
to	  Unifruco	  and	  a	  citrus	  monopoly	  to	  Outspan	  International	  (Williams	  et	  al	  1998:	  74).	  
	  
At	  an	  international	  level,	  the	  US-­‐led	  Uruguay-­‐round	  of	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  
Trade	  (GATT)	  pressed	  governments	  to	  remove	  subsidies	  and	  to	  replace	  import	  controls	  and	  
sliding	  tariffs.	  The	  World	  Bank	  took	  a	  key	  role	  in	  shaping	  policy	  debates	  in	  a	  1993	  ANC-­‐aligned	  
Land	  and	  Agricultural	  Policy	  Centre	  (LAPC)	  conference.	  It	  advised	  the	  ANC	  to	  adopt	  a	  new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See: http://www.inflationcalc.co.za/?date1=1976-01-01&date2=2015-07-01&amount=1 
8 Weekly rations included ‘a bunch of dried fish, a bucket of wheat meal, a packet of beans, 6 pounds of meat (beef), 
sometimes fat, 1 pound of rice, milk daily and fruit and vegetables on the not very frequent occasions they were available. 
These rations are fairly typical of the area’ (Theron 1976: 2). As it was not regularly provided in 1976, this exercise 
excluded fruit from the 2015 basket.  
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agricultural	  pricing	  and	  marketing	  policy,	  and	  a	  land	  reform	  programme.	  The	  LAPC	  argued	  that	  
agricultural	  liberalisation	  would	  not	  just	  lead	  to	  greater	  efficiency	  but	  would	  also	  reduce	  the	  
privileges	  conferred	  on	  large-­‐scale	  white	  farmers	  by	  the	  Apartheid	  state.	  More	  importantly,	  it	  
was	  argued	  that	  trade	  liberalisation	  would	  level	  the	  playing	  fields	  on	  which	  black	  farmers	  had	  to	  
compete	  with	  white	  farmers	  (Binswanger&Deiniger	  1993,	  cited	  in	  Williams	  et	  al.	  1998).	  	  
	  
Economic	  liberalisation	  could	  only	  be	  completed	  when	  “organised	  agriculture”	  lost	  its	  place	  at	  
the	  centre	  of	  government	  (Williams	  et	  al.	  1998).	  The	  ANC’s	  1994	  election	  victory	  proved	  crucial	  
to	  economic	  liberalisation,	  even	  though,	  given	  that	  the	  ANC	  and	  it	  alliance	  partners’	  political	  
philosophy	  and	  rhetoric	  were	  steeped	  in	  Marxism,	  Williams	  et	  al.	  (1997)	  comment	  that	  the	  
government’s	  economic	  liberalisation	  policy	  was	  not	  expected	  by	  supporters	  or	  opponents.	  
	  
The	  ANC’s	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  Programme	  also	  argued	  for	  removing	  controls	  and	  
levies,	  and	  ‘unsustainable	  subsidies	  to	  the	  large-­‐scale	  farm	  sector’,	  and	  committed	  to	  a	  land	  
redistribution	  target	  of	  30%	  of	  land	  under	  white	  ownership	  (ANC	  1994a:	  19-	  22;	  102–4,	  cited	  
in	  Williams	  et	  al.	  1998:	  66).	  Market	  liberalisation	  was	  therefore	  narrowly	  tied	  to	  land	  reform.	  	  
	  
Williams	  et	  al.	  (1998)	  argue	  that	  the	  new	  ANC	  government	  went	  even	  further	  than	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  
proposals.	  While	  the	  World	  Bank	  (1993:	  18-23)	  accepted	  the	  case,	  ‘at	  least	  on	  a	  transitional	  basis’	  to	  
coordinate	  ‘export	  marketing	  for	  citrus,	  deciduous	  fruit	  and	  wine’,	  the	  ANC’s	  1994	  Agricultural	  
Policy	  aimed	  to	  remove	  ‘the	  remaining	  statutory	  powers	  of	  all	  control	  boards’	  and	  end	  the	  statutory	  
export	  monopolies	  (ANC	  1994b:	  17,	  cited	  in	  Williams	  et	  al.	  1998).	  So	  by	  1996	  ‘the	  centre	  piece	  of	  
state	  agricultural	  policy	  since	  1937	  –	  the	  Marketing	  Act’	  -	  was	  abolished	  (Williams	  et	  al.	  1998:	  67).	  	  
Extended agricultural labour legislation 
Apart	  from	  trade	  liberalisation,	  the	  ANC	  government	  extended	  agricultural	  labour	  legislation	  post-­‐
democratisation.	  From	  1993,	  farmworkers	  were	  partially	  incorporated	  into	  the	  previous	  labour	  
regime,	  and	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  farmworkers	  were	  fully	  incorporated,	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  
Labour	  Relations	  Act	  66	  of	  1995	  (LRA)	  and	  Basic	  Conditions	  of	  Employment	  Act	  75	  of	  1997	  
(BCEA).	  	  In	  2003,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Labour	  promulgated	  an	  agricultural	  sectoral	  determination	  
which,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  set	  a	  minimum	  wage	  and	  minimum	  working	  conditions	  for	  the	  sector.	  
Passed	  in	  1997,	  the	  Extension	  of	  Security	  and	  Tenure	  Act	  62	  of	  1997	  (ESTA),	  aimed	  to	  provide	  
more	  tenure	  security	  to	  all	  farm	  dwellers	  and	  protect	  them	  from	  arbitrary	  eviction.	  	  
	  
Post-­‐1994,	  therefore,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that,	  on	  one	  level,	  the	  state	  ended	  extensive	  farmer-­‐
support	  measures:	  phasing	  out	  marketing	  boards,	  ending	  tariff	  controls,	  and	  reducing	  subsidy	  
levels	  to	  farmers.	  The	  Producer	  Support	  Estimate	  to	  South	  African	  producers	  shrunk	  to	  about	  
3%	  -	  well	  below	  the	  20%	  average	  enjoyed	  by	  farmers	  in	  member	  countries	  of	  the	  Organisation	  
of	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  (OECD)	  (OECD	  2011,	  cited	  in	  Sender	  2012).	  	  
	  
At	  another	  level,	  the	  state	  intervened	  in	  the	  sector	  by	  passing	  legislation	  which	  aimed	  to	  give	  
farmworkers	  better	  protection	  since,	  due	  to	  weak	  trade	  union	  organisation	  in	  the	  sector,	  
farmworkers	  were	  considered	  vulnerable	  .	  The	  changes	  completely	  reversed	  the	  1976	  situation,	  
where	  the	  state	  actively	  supported	  farmers,	  but	  repressed	  workers.	  Would	  the	  new	  approach	  
significantly	  improve	  the	  lot	  of	  agricultural	  workers?	  Du	  Toit’s	  (2001)	  early	  prediction	  was	  that	  
it	  would	  not,	  since	  policymakers	  did	  not	  recognise	  that	  trade	  liberalisation	  contradicted	  
increased	  legislative	  protection	  for	  farmworkers.	  Both	  market	  deregulation	  and	  social	  
regulations	  were	  seen	  as	  essential	  moves	  against	  the	  labour-­‐repressive	  regime	  of	  the	  past.	  	  
	  
Policymakers	  assumed	  that	  deregulation	  would	  either	  force	  out	  farmers	  who	  still	  held	  onto	  
racist	  attitudes	  (perhaps	  even	  giving	  impetus	  to	  land	  redistribution)	  or	  force	  them	  to	  shift	  to	  
more	  competitive	  –	  and	  more	  ‘progressive’	  –	  labour	  management	  strategies	  (Lipton	  1996;	  
Ewert&Hamman	  1999;	  Ewert	  2000,	  cited	  in	  Du	  Toit	  2001).	  Sometimes,	  policymakers	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recognised	  that	  the	  new	  regulations	  would	  lead	  to	  labour-­‐shedding,	  but	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  
‘inevitable’	  and	  they	  argued	  that	  the	  trade-­‐off	  would	  create	  better	  working	  conditions	  for	  those	  
who	  stayed	  in	  employment.	  
	  
Greenberg	  (2003:	  2)	  argued	  that,	  due	  to	  restructuring	  in	  the	  global	  agro-­‐food	  system,	  the	  
insecurity	  faced	  by	  farmers	  
…	  has	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  farmers’	  labour	  hiring	  strategies.	  Thus,	  while	  workers	  have	  won	  
improvements	  in	  laws	  and	  policies,	  and	  a	  more	  progressive	  and	  protective	  legal	  environment	  than	  
in	  the	  past,	  the	  potential	  positive	  impacts	  have	  been	  weakened	  by	  the	  economic	  imperatives	  facing	  
businesses	  in	  commercial	  agriculture.	  
	  
The	  extent	  of	  ‘inevitable’	  labour	  shedding	  is	  discussed	  later.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  
policymakers	  possibly	  misjudged	  the	  impact	  their	  policies	  would	  have	  on	  the	  sector,	  as	  they	  
failed	  to	  appreciate	  how	  the	  profound	  changes	  in	  international	  retail	  would	  also	  shape	  
producers’	  responses	  to	  local	  policy	  changes.	  
Growing supermarket power 
After	  agricultural	  deregulation,	  structural	  power	  in	  tightly	  integrated	  global	  value	  chains	  -	  such	  
as	  the	  fresh	  fruit	  value	  chain	  stretching	  between	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  global	  North	  -	  shifted	  
downstream	  (Ewert&Du	  Toit	  2005).	  Instead	  of	  being	  the	  producer-­‐driven	  chain	  it	  was	  in	  1976,	  
the	  horticultural	  value	  chain	  became	  buyer-­‐driven	  (Barrientos&Visser	  2012).	  This	  change	  -	  
especially	  in	  the	  international	  fresh	  fruit	  value	  chain	  –	  resulted	  from	  two	  parallel	  processes:	  	  
(1)	  deregulation	  of	  South	  African	  agricultural;	  and	  (2)	  gradual	  consolidation	  of	  both	  local	  and	  	  
international	  retail	  since	  the	  1980s	  (Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004:	  17;	  Du	  Toit	  2001;	  Greenberg	  2003;	  
Barrientos&Visser	  2012).	  
	  
By	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  new	  millennium,	  an	  estimated	  75%-80%	  of	  the	  global	  North’s	  food	  
retail	  occurred	  in	  supermarkets,	  while	  supermarkets	  retailed	  50%	  of	  food	  in	  some	  emerging	  
economics	  (Reardon	  et	  al.	  2007;	  Emonger&Kirsten	  2009;	  Singh&Singla	  2011;	  Coe	  et	  al.	  2008,	  
cited	  in	  Barrientos&Visser	  2012).	  As	  the	  retail	  sector	  increasingly	  consolidated,	  distribution	  
channels	  became	  more	  integrated	  in	  the	  global	  horticultural	  value	  chain.	  Today,	  supermarkets	  
are	  directly	  involved	  in	  all	  stages	  of	  the	  chain:	  primary	  production	  and	  packing,	  cold	  chain	  
management	  and	  storage;	  transport;	  export;	  and	  sometimes	  even	  to	  final	  distribution	  
(Greenberg,	  2003).	  Retailers	  coordinate	  supply	  networks	  involving	  importers,	  exporters	  and	  
growers	  with	  whom	  they	  pre-­‐programme	  their	  orders	  on	  a	  weekly	  basis,	  often	  six	  months	  in	  
advance	  (Barrientos&Barrientos	  2002;	  Barrientos	  et	  al.	  2004).	  	  
	  
As	  supermarkets	  compete	  with	  each	  other	  and	  are	  pressurised	  to	  increase	  shareholder	  returns,	  
horticultural	  value	  chain	  integration	  continues	  apace	  to	  cut	  unnecessary	  costs	  from	  the	  chain.	  
For	  instance,	  while	  Barrientos	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  remark	  that	  some	  supermarkets	  outsourced	  value	  
chain	  management	  to	  ‘category	  managers’,	  eight	  years	  later	  Barrientos	  and	  Visser	  (2012)	  note	  
that	  international	  supermarkets	  are	  moving	  away	  from	  category	  managers	  towards	  global	  
sourcing	  platforms.	  Supermarkets	  effectively	  “govern”	  value	  chains:	  their	  ability	  to	  set	  prices	  
and	  determine	  the	  quality,	  processes	  and	  social	  standards	  under	  which	  goods	  are	  produced	  
have	  been	  well	  documented	  (Du	  Toit	  2001;	  Barrientos&Barrientos	  2002;	  Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004;	  
Barrientos&Smith	  2007;	  Greenberg	  2003;	  Greenberg	  2013).	  Increasingly,	  international	  retailers	  
are	  becoming	  supra-­‐national	  kingpins	  who	  make	  the	  rules	  that	  upstream	  value	  chain	  actors	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Producers under pressure  
Margins under pressure 
Several	  authors	  have	  commented	  on	  retailers’	  ability	  to	  set	  farm	  gate	  prices,	  such	  that	  most	  of	  the	  
rent	  on	  the	  final	  retail	  price	  of	  (fresh)	  agricultural	  product	  accrues	  to	  them	  (Greenberg	  2003;	  	  
Greenberg	  2013,	  Barrientos&Barrientos	  2002;	  Barrientos&Visser	  2012;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  
In	  the	  South	  African	  agricultural	  context,	  a	  review	  of	  literature	  on	  how	  this	  power	  relationship	  
plays	  out	  provides	  some	  concrete	  examples.	  In	  their	  comparison	  of	  international	  horticulture	  
value	  chains	  touching	  down	  in	  Chile	  and	  South	  Africa,	  Barrientos	  and	  Barrientos	  (2002)	  found	  
that	  producer-­‐cooperatives	  who	  also	  export	  get	  about	  28-30%	  of	  the	  final	  retail	  price,	  while	  
supermarket	  retailers	  get	  about	  35-40%.	  Barrientos	  and	  Visser	  (2012)	  found	  that,	  of	  the	  2011	  
final	  retail	  price	  for	  table	  grapes	  exported	  to	  the	  UK,	  supermarkets	  capture	  42%,	  distributors	  
capture	  32%,	  while	  growers	  receive	  18%	  (and	  26%	  if	  they	  pack	  their	  own	  fruit).	  Visser	  and	  
Ferrer	  (2015)	  found	  that	  from	  2003	  to	  2013	  producers	  never	  received	  more	  than	  27.5%	  and	  
29.4%	  respectively	  of	  the	  final	  retail	  price	  for	  apples	  and	  pears;	  for	  six	  years	  producers	  received	  
less	  than	  6%	  for	  apples	  and	  less	  than	  9%	  for	  pears.	  	  
	  
The	  financial	  position	  of	  wine	  grape	  producers	  is	  even	  worse.	  In	  the	  early	  2000s,	  via	  taxes	  	  
and	  Systembolaget9,	  the	  Swedish	  state	  earned	  about	  68.6%	  of	  the	  final	  retail	  price	  on	  a	  bottle	  
of	  branded	  wine	  sold	  in	  Sweden.	  Wine	  grape	  growers	  received	  0.8%,	  while	  wine	  producers	  
earned	  1.5%.	  For	  wine	  sold	  in	  bulk,	  wine	  grape	  growers	  and	  wine	  producers’	  earned	  4%	  	  
and	  2%	  respectively	  (Greenberg	  2003).	  In	  the	  ten	  years	  since	  Greenberg’s	  (2003)	  study,	  the	  
situation	  has	  not	  changed	  much:	  in	  2015	  farmers	  only	  received	  2%	  of	  the	  final	  price	  of	  a	  bottle	  	  
of	  branded	  wine	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  (However,	  researchers	  often	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  industry	  
sources	  for	  information,	  so	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  get	  reliable	  information	  on	  the	  breakdown	  of	  	  
final	  retail	  prices).	  
	  
Evidence	  suggests	  that	  producer	  margins	  specifically	  weakened	  after	  deregulation.	  Barrientos	  
et	  al.	  (2004,	  citing	  the	  Deciduous	  Fruit	  Producers’	  Trust	  2003)	  note	  that	  real	  net	  export	  
realisation	  in	  Rands	  per	  ton	  of	  apples	  fell	  from	  R2	  130	  (US$242.5)	  in	  1993-1994	  to	  R935	  
(US$150.8)	  in	  1998-1999	  (a	  year	  after	  deregulation)	  and	  only	  rose	  back	  to	  R1	  352	  (US$218)	  
by	  2001-2002	  (only	  63%	  of	  its	  value	  in	  eight	  years	  previously).	  An	  industry	  source	  told	  
Symington	  (2008,	  cited	  in	  Barrientos&Visser	  2012)	  that	  the	  pre-­‐Christmas	  price	  for	  a	  9	  kg	  
carton	  of	  table	  grapes	  fell	  from	  £39	  to	  £22	  from	  1998	  (a	  year	  after	  deregulation)	  to	  2004.	  
Symington	  (2008)	  also	  maintained	  that	  UK	  retailers	  increased	  their	  gross	  margins	  from	  15%	  
to	  as	  much	  as	  35%	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  
Poor purchase practices 
Apart	  from	  low	  prices,	  retailers’	  poor	  purchasing	  practices	  also	  increased	  producer	  vulnerability.	  
Retailers	  often	  do	  not	  provide	  written	  contracts	  or	  guarantees	  of	  purchase	  beyond	  a	  verbal	  
agreement;	  and	  they	  often	  buy	  fruit	  on	  ‘consignment’	  –	  with	  no	  prices	  agreed	  on	  until	  very	  	  
close	  to	  the	  point	  of	  final	  delivery.	  Producers	  complained	  about	  shorter	  lead	  times	  between	  
order	  and	  delivery,	  and	  the	  insecurity	  of	  orders	  (Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Barrientos&Visser	  2012;	  
Barrientos&Smith	  2007;	  Bolwig	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Retailers	  also	  increasingly	  exert	  pressure	  on	  
producers	  to	  meet	  a	  range	  of	  demands,	  such	  as	  codes	  controlling	  product	  quality	  and	  the	  
processes	  under	  which	  food	  is	  produced.	  Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally	  (2003)	  argue	  that	  these	  codes	  -	  
essentially	  a	  form	  of	  private	  sector	  self-­‐regulation	  -	  are	  as	  important	  as	  formal	  legislation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The Swedish state-owned alcohol retailing monopoly. 
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Producer mechanisms to cope with a changed policy environment 
The	  cumulative	  effect	  of	  trade	  liberalisation,	  the	  introduction	  of	  labour	  legislation,	  land	  reform,	  
increasing	  retail	  consolidation,	  and	  rising	  quality	  standards	  have	  “tightened	  the	  screws”	  on	  
South	  African	  fruit	  and	  wine	  producers	  (Du	  Toit	  2001;	  Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003;	  Greenberg	  2003;	  
Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Barrientos&Smith	  2007;	  Ewert&Du	  Toit	  2005).	  	  
Capital flight 
One	  way	  that	  farmers	  have	  responded	  to	  state	  interference	  has	  been	  through	  capital	  flight.	  
Where	  they	  could,	  farmers	  as	  a	  collective	  have	  tried	  to	  escape	  state	  interference.	  The	  
Cooperatives	  Amendment	  Act	  37	  of	  1993	  enabled	  the	  cooperatives	  to	  convert	  to	  private	  
companies	  (Williams	  et	  al.	  1998;	  Ewert&Du	  Toit	  2005).	  Major	  agricultural	  co-­‐operatives	  took	  
the	  gap	  and	  transformed	  into	  limited	  companies	  (Williams	  et	  al.	  1998).	  Controversially,	  in	  some	  
instances,	  expensive	  infrastructure,	  accumulated	  by	  cooperatives	  with	  state	  resources	  during	  
Apartheid,	  ended	  up	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  private	  shareholders	  (Mather&Greenberg	  2003).	  	  
Consolidation 
At	  individual	  farm-­‐level,	  deregulation	  has	  had	  uneven	  effects.	  Some	  farmers	  benefitted	  from	  
tighter	  integration	  into	  value	  chains,	  while	  others	  went	  out	  of	  business.	  While	  the	  process	  of	  
farm	  and	  agribusiness	  consolidation	  of	  farms	  and	  agribusinesses	  is	  described	  in	  general	  terms	  
by	  various	  authors	  (e.g.	  Greenberg	  2003;	  Greenberg	  et	  al	  2012;	  Ewert&Du	  Toit	  2005;	  
Barrientos&Visser	  2012;	  Meyer	  et	  al.	  2012),	  clear	  correlations	  between	  deregulation	  and	  farm	  
consolidation	  is	  not	  well	  established.	  The	  number	  of	  table	  grape	  growers	  declined	  by	  30%	  
between	  2007	  and	  2011	  (Barrientos&Visser	  2012,	  citing	  SATI	  2011).	  Similarly,	  between	  2005	  and	  
2011	  the	  number	  of	  grower	  units,	  ranging	  in	  size	  from	  100ha	  and	  250ha,	  increased	  by	  19%	  
(Meyer	  et	  al.	  2012).	  	  Both	  processes	  occurred	  nearly	  ten	  years	  after	  deregulation	  and	  it	  is	  more	  
likely	  that	  the	  start	  of	  the	  2008	  economic	  recession	  contributed	  to	  consolidation.	  However,	  there	  
is	  normally	  a	  time	  lag	  of	  four	  to	  six	  years	  between	  a	  rise	  in	  labour	  costs	  and	  the	  effect	  on	  
deciduous	  fruit	  production	  (Meyer	  et	  al.	  2012).	  While	  deregulation	  would	  not	  have	  led	  to	  higher	  
wage	  costs,	  it	  did	  seemingly	  (initially)	  result	  in	  lower	  prices.	  Perhaps	  a	  similar	  lag	  effect	  caused	  a	  
delay	  between	  lower	  prices	  (as	  a	  result	  of	  deregulation)	  and	  farm	  consolidation	  a	  few	  years	  later.	  
	  
Farmers	  who	  stayed	  in	  business	  also	  seem	  to	  have	  expanded	  and	  intensified	  production	  to	  
benefit	  from	  economies	  of	  scale	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015;	  Van	  Dyk&Maspero	  2004).	  	  While	  
expansion	  and	  intensification	  could	  have	  impacts	  on	  the	  environment,	  little	  known	  research	  has	  
measured	  this	  impact	  on	  the	  environment.	  
Mechanisation  
As	  labour	  costs	  are	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  production	  costs,	  farmers	  mechanise	  where	  possible.	  Wine	  
harvesting	  machines	  can	  replace	  up	  to	  seventy	  workers	  per	  twelve	  hour	  shift	  (De	  Satgé	  2010).	  
While	  some	  Western	  Cape	  wine	  farms	  have	  mechanised,	  the	  extent	  thereof	  has	  been	  debated.	  	  
A	  1997	  survey	  found	  that	  of	  104	  wine	  farms,	  36%	  used	  mechanical	  harvesters	  (Ewert	  et	  al.	  1998).	  
By	  2014,	  Vinpro	  found	  that	  about	  58%	  of	  hectares	  belonging	  to	  (mostly	  larger)	  producers	  in	  its	  
study	  group	  were	  mechanically	  harvested	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  However,	  mechanical	  
harvesters	  used	  for	  wine	  grape	  harvesting	  cost	  about	  R3	  million,	  and	  a	  seller	  of	  harvesting	  
machines	  alleged	  that	  only	  the	  top	  4%	  of	  producers	  can	  afford	  them	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  
Economies	  of	  scales	  would	  also	  influence	  decisions	  to	  buy	  harvesters	  as	  the	  average	  labour	  
costs	  of	  the	  top	  fifty	  wine	  grape	  producers	  –	  where	  one	  would	  expect	  to	  find	  mechanisation	  -	  
are	  only	  about	  5%	  lower	  than	  the	  industry	  average	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  	  
	  
For	  easily	  perishable	  crops	  (e.g.	  table	  grapes,	  deciduous	  fruit	  and	  citrus),	  the	  scope	  for	  
mechanisation	  is	  much	  more	  limited.	  According	  to	  the	  industry	  body,	  Hortgro,	  a	  few	  producers	  
are	  exploring	  the	  use	  of	  picking	  platforms,	  which	  cut	  out	  the	  need	  to	  use	  ladders	  in	  orchards.	  
However,	  the	  chair	  of	  a	  Ceres	  producers’	  association	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  likely	  that	  70-80%	  of	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activities	  on	  fruit	  farms	  will	  remain	  manual	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  Where	  producers	  cannot	  
mechanise,	  they	  tend	  to	  use	  “labour	  augmenting	  technologies”,	  such	  as	  pre-­‐cutters	  to	  prune	  
vineyards	  (a	  pre-­‐cutter	  can	  do	  the	  work	  of	  about	  fifteen	  people	  over	  a	  ten	  week	  period)	  
(Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  
	  
In	  pack	  houses,	  however,	  up	  to	  40%	  of	  workers	  can	  be	  replaced	  by	  mechanisation	  and	  pack	  
house	  modification	  (Meyer	  2012),	  so	  pack	  house	  mechanisation	  could	  result	  in	  job	  losses	  for	  
almost	  10	  000	  seasonal	  workers	  and	  2	  300	  permanent	  workers.	  A	  move	  towards	  pack	  house	  
mechanisation	  would	  be	  especially	  devastating	  for	  women	  workers,	  who	  have	  traditionally	  
been	  favoured	  for	  pack	  house	  work.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  producers	  are	  also	  switching	  to	  less	  labour	  intensive	  crops	  to	  save	  labour	  costs	  and	  
benefit	  from	  more	  lucrative	  cultivars,	  e.g.	  switching	  from	  seeded	  to	  seedless	  varieties	  in	  the	  
table	  grape	  sector	  (seedless	  varieties	  fetch	  higher	  prices	  and	  use	  up	  to	  a	  third	  less	  labour).	  	  
Restructuring labour 
Permanent	  labour	  is	  much	  more	  expensive	  that	  seasonal	  labour.	  Across	  agricultural	  subsectors,	  
by	  far	  the	  most	  common	  cost-­‐cutting	  strategy	  has	  been	  to	  restructure	  labour	  since,	  despite	  fairly	  
small	  increases	  in	  the	  minimum	  wage,	  labour	  costs	  have	  risen	  significantly,	  especially	  in	  labour	  
intensive	  subsectors	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  For	  instance:	  
• in	  the	  table	  grape	  industry,	  labour	  costs	  have	  increased	  from	  35%	  of	  gross	  farm	  income	  
in	  2000	  to	  52%	  by	  2011	  (Barrientos&Visser	  2012);	  	  
• in	  the	  wine	  industry,	  labour	  costs	  make	  up	  41%	  of	  total	  direct	  production	  costs	  (Murray	  2011);	  
• for	  the	  typical	  55ha	  (apple	  and	  pear)	  farm,	  permanent	  labour	  cost	  account	  for	  45%	  of	  
overhead	  costs	  and	  26%	  of	  total	  costs	  (Meyer	  et	  al	  2012).	  
	  
In	  the	  wine	  industry,	  while	  seasonal	  labour	  costs	  per	  hectare	  rose	  by	  53%,	  permanent	  labour	  
costs	  rose	  by	  98%	  from	  2010	  to	  2013	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  Restructuring	  strategies	  have	  
aimed	  to	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  permanent	  workers	  by	  retrenching	  and	  replacing	  permanent	  
workers	  with	  seasonal	  workers	  (“casualisation”)	  or	  contract	  workers	  (“externalisation”)10	  
(Barrientos&Barrientos	  2002;	  Barrientos	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Bolwig	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Barrientos&Visser	  
2012;	  Du	  Toit	  2001;	  Ewert&DuToit	  2005;	  Ewert&Hamman	  1996;	  Greenberg	  2003;	  	  
Kritzinger&Vorster	  1995;	  Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Simbi&Aliber	  2000;	  Sunde&Kleinbooi	  1999,	  
cited	  in	  Du	  Toit	  2001;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  	  
Measuring labour losses without reliable data 
Measuring	  the	  extent	  of	  agricultural	  job	  losses	  and/or	  externalisation	  at	  a	  regional	  and	  national	  
level	  and	  linking	  them	  to	  specific	  factors	  is	  difficult	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003;	  Theron	  et	  al.	  2007;	  
Barrientos	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Barrientos&Visser	  2012).	  One	  reason	  for	  the	  difficulty	  is	  that	  
measurement	  instruments	  used	  in	  nationwide	  surveys	  have	  changed	  over	  time.11	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Definitions of “casualisation” and “externalization” as proposed by Theron et al (2011: 7) are applied here. Casualisation 
refers to direct employment that is part-time or temporary and therefore not standard. Externalisation refers to indirect 
or triangular employment, where employees are also commonly employed on a temporary basis, but through an agency or 
intermediary or service provider, so that the employment contract between a core business and its employees is replaced 
by a commercial contract between the core business and an agency, intermediary or service provider. 
11While the 1993 and 2002 censuses surveyed everyone employed in agriculture, the 2005-survey only included those employed on 
farms with an annual turnover of more than R2 million. Also, in the 2002 census, 17 090 of the 45 818 potential respondents (i.e. 
more than a third) did not respond. Moreover, a strict comparison of the number of casual/ seasonal workers in 1993, 2002 and 
2005 is impossible: the 1993 census asked how many seasonal/casual workers were employed on 29 February 1993, while the 2002 
census asked how many casual and seasonal workers worked less and more than 90 days in 2002. The 2005 survey excluded 
contractors and their employees from the category of casual and seasonal employees. 
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Table	  3	  indicates	  how	  difficult	  it	  is	  to	  form	  a	  picture	  of	  employment	  losses	  over	  time,	  given	  that	  
such	  losses	  often	  indicate	  different	  time	  periods	  that	  do	  not	  neatly	  overlap,	  or	  are	  expressed	  in	  
terms	  of	  percentages.	  Moreover,	  authors	  do	  not	  necessarily	  use	  the	  same	  data	  sets	  and/or	  have	  
the	  same	  interpretations	  of	  data,	  further	  thwarting	  comparison.	  
	  
At	  a	  regional	  level,	  Ewert	  and	  Du	  Toit	  (2005),	  citing	  the	  1996	  agricultural	  census,	  point	  out	  that	  
agricultural	  employment	  only	  increased	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  and	  Mpumalanga	  (presumably	  
since	  1994,	  although	  the	  period	  is	  unclear).	  	  However,	  by	  2014	  agricultural	  growth	  per	  region	  
changed.	  Visser	  and	  Ferrer	  (2015,	  citing	  Quarterly	  Labour	  Force	  Survey	  3	  of	  2014	  of	  StatsSA	  
2014)	  argue	  that	  while	  employment	  of	  farmhands	  and	  labourers	  has	  declined	  from	  2008	  to	  
2014	  in	  KwaZulu-­‐Natal,	  the	  Free	  State,	  the	  North	  West	  Province	  and	  the	  Western	  Cape,	  
employment	  has	  increased	  in	  Limpopo	  and	  Mpumalanga.	  	  
Table 3: Data on employment losses gleaned from the literature review*  





110% decline in agricultural employment 
nationwide Unknown 




30% decline in total employment in 
agriculture nationwide (from 1.3 million 
to 1 million) 




20% decline in the number  of “regular 
jobs” on commercial farms  StatsSA&NDA 2000 
Theron et al. 
2007: 12 1993-2001 
32% decline in agricultural employment 
nationwide DFID Southern Africa 
Stanwix 2013: 2 2003-2007 Decline of 13% in aggregate employment on farms 
15 waves of the SA Labour 










2005: 327 1987-1997 
5% increase in permanent employment in 
wine industry 
Refers to a survey of 104 
farms by Ewert et al. 
(1997) 
Ewert&Du Toit 
2005: 327 1994-1998 
7% increase in employment in wine 
industry SAWIS (1994); (1998) 
Barrientos&Visser 
2012: 5  2005-2011 
4% growth in the number of full time 
equivalent positions for the deciduous 
fruit industry overall 
Hortgrow industry 
overview, Feb 2012 
	  
Although	  is	  agriculture	  data	  is	  generally	  unreliable	  and	  should	  be	  treated	  cautiously,	  certain	  
broad	  trends	  are	  noticeable.	  While	  total	  employment	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  seemingly	  
decreased,	  in	  the	  deciduous	  fruit	  industry	  the	  percentage	  of	  permanent	  workers	  slightly	  increased	  
by	  about	  4%	  between	  2005	  and	  2011.	  However,	  this	  growth	  has	  not	  been	  uniform:	  some	  
subsectors,	  such	  as	  those	  producing	  table	  grapes,	  plums	  and	  nectarines,	  saw	  employment	  growth,	  
while	  others	  saw	  a	  decline	  (Barrientos&Visser	  2012).	  	  
Casualisation 
Gauging	  the	  extent	  of	  casualisation	  is	  also	  difficult,	  because	  of	  the	  different	  categorisations	  
researchers	  have	  used	  to	  group	  workers.	  For	  instance,	  Levy	  (1976)	  treated	  those	  who	  work	  on	  
the	  farm	  for	  nine	  months	  of	  the	  year	  as	  permanent.	  Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally	  (2003:	  10)	  distinguish	  
between	  “permanent	  jobs”,	  “regular	  jobs”,	  and	  “off-­‐farm	  temporary	  workers”,	  defining	  (1)	  
“permanent	  jobs”	  as	  jobs	  performed	  by	  people	  who	  are	  formally	  contracted	  as	  permanent	  
employees	  on	  a	  particular	  farm;	  (2)	  “regular	  jobs”	  as	  for	  ‘on-­‐farmworkers	  –	  often	  the	  female	  
partners	  or	  dependants	  of	  permanent	  male	  workers	  –	  who	  work	  on	  an	  “as	  needed”	  basis	  …	  who	  
are	  not	  formally	  recognised	  as	  permanent	  workers	  …	  [but]	  have	  a	  permanent	  relationship	  with	  
the	  farm’;	  and	  (3)	  “off-­‐farm	  temporary	  workers”	  as	  those	  who	  do	  not	  live	  on	  the	  farm	  and	  are	  
employed	  to	  do	  work	  on	  a	  temporary	  basis.	  In	  some	  instances,	  Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally	  (2003)	  group	  
“regular	  jobs”	  and	  “permanent	  jobs”	  together,	  so	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  get	  a	  sense	  of	  how	  many	  people	  
work	  full-­‐time	  and	  how	  many	  part-­‐time.	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Distinctions	  are	  also	  often	  made	  between	  so-­‐called	  “casual	  workers”	  –	  viewed	  as	  temporary	  
workers	  who	  work	  for	  a	  very	  short	  period	  on	  the	  farm,	  sometimes	  without	  a	  contract	  -	  and	  seasonal	  
workers,	  who	  are	  on	  the	  farm	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  season.	  However	  the	  term	  “seasonal	  worker”	  can	  
be	  a	  misnomer	  in	  some	  contexts,	  as	  some	  “seasonal	  workers”	  work	  for	  longer	  than	  the	  duration	  of	  
the	  harvesting	  season.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  table	  grape	  industry	  there	  are	  four	  distinct,	  but	  
almost	  continuous	  seasons:	  pre-­‐thinning;	  thinning	  and	  harvesting;	  then	  a	  short	  break,	  ending	  with	  
the	  pruning	  season.	  Some	  seasonal	  workers	  are	  employed	  in	  all	  of	  these	  seasons,	  so	  they	  end	  up	  
working	  for	  ten	  months	  of	  the	  year.	  	  Moreover,	  Bhorat	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  point	  out	  that	  LFS	  data	  on	  
farmworkers’	  non-­‐permanent	  employment	  arrangements	  (i.e.,	  temporary,	  seasonal,	  or	  contract	  
work)	  fluctuates	  greatly	  over	  time,	  suggesting	  poor	  reporting	  and	  data	  collection.	  
	  
Overall	  though,	  the	  literature	  mostly	  concurs	  that	  casualisation	  is	  increasing	  and	  is	  more	  rife	  
on	  labour-­‐intensive	  farms	  that	  cannot	  mechanise	  and	  where	  labour	  demand	  fluctuates	  
between	  peak	  and	  off-­‐peak	  periods	  (Ewert&Du	  Toit	  2005;	  Greenberg	  2003;	  
Barrientos&Visser	  2012;	  Meyer	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015;	  Alford	  2015).	  For	  example,	  in	  
the	  deciduous	  fruit	  and	  citrus	  sub-­‐sectors	  extensive	  casualisation	  has	  taken	  place.	  Du	  Toit	  and	  
Ally	  (2003)	  found	  that,	  in	  their	  sample	  of	  77	  farms,	  about	  60%	  had	  reduced	  the	  number	  of	  
permanent	  jobs	  on	  their	  farms.	  
	  
In	  the	  last	  ten	  years,	  casualisation	  evidently	  further	  intensified.	  In	  the	  Sunday	  River’s	  Valley,	  
over	  90%	  of	  citrus	  production	  jobs	  (on	  farms	  and	  in	  pack	  houses),	  in	  the	  peak	  harvesting	  
season,	  were	  seasonal	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  In	  the	  wine,	  apple	  and	  pear,	  and	  table	  grape	  
subsectors,	  seasonal	  workers	  comprised	  80%	  of	  workers	  during	  the	  peak	  season	  
(Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  	  
The	  seasonal	  component	  decreased	  in	  the	  off-­‐peak	  season,	  but	  on	  at	  least	  half	  of	  the	  farms	  in	  	  
the	  Western	  Cape,	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  workforce	  remained	  seasonal	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  
Meyer	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  argue	  that	  as	  the	  minimum	  wage	  per	  day	  increases	  from	  R70	  to	  R150,	  
casualisation	  will	  also	  rise.	  	  
Externalisation 
Workers	  employed	  by	  labour	  brokers	  are	  used	  for	  a	  range	  of	  different	  tasks	  throughout	  the	  
year,	  most	  requiring	  unskilled	  work	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  Therefore,	  
labour	  brokers	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  employed	  to	  fulfil	  skilled	  work	  that	  cannot	  be	  performed	  by	  
a	  farmer’s	  own	  labour	  force.	  Workers	  also	  do	  not	  seem	  particularly	  inaccessible	  to	  the	  farmer,	  
because	  of	  where	  they	  stay.	  Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally	  (2003)	  found	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  (78.6%)	  labour	  
brokers	  supplied	  locally-­‐based	  workers	  and	  the	  broker	  was	  often	  also	  based	  in	  the	  same	  area.	  
Hence,	  contract	  workers	  could	  easily	  have	  been	  sourced	  by	  the	  farmer	  him/herself	  directly	  
(Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003).	  	  
	  
In	  Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally’s	  (2001)	  survey,	  only	  26.8%	  of	  farmers	  listed	  cost	  savings	  as	  a	  motive	  for	  
using	  brokers,	  and	  some	  authors	  have	  found	  that	  labour	  brokers	  increase	  farmers’	  labour	  
costs,	  because	  of	  the	  fees	  they	  charge.	  Instead,	  farmers	  favour	  the	  convenience	  of	  not	  having	  
to	  recruit	  and	  manage	  a	  temporary	  workforce	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003;	  Barrientos&Visser	  2012;	  
Greenberg	  2012).	  Another	  advantage	  of	  engaging	  brokers	  is	  that	  they	  can	  secure	  labour	  at	  
short	  notice	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015;	  Theron	  2009)	  -	  an	  important	  consideration	  when	  produce	  
quality	  is	  increasingly	  paramount.	  If	  yields	  are	  unexpectedly	  high,	  or	  if	  rainy	  weather	  delays	  
harvesting,	  the	  normal	  labour	  force	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  harvest	  the	  crop	  at	  optimum	  ripeness	  
levels,	  which	  would	  negatively	  affect	  fruit	  quality	  and	  prices.	  Farmers	  also	  said	  that	  using	  
brokers	  meant	  not	  having	  to	  provide	  workers	  with	  housing;	  and	  not	  having	  to	  deal	  with	  
workers’	  social	  problems	  after	  hours	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  Using	  brokers	  was	  a	  screening	  
tool	  to	  gauge	  workers’	  job	  performance	  before	  they	  were	  directly	  employed	  (Visser&	  Ferrer	  
2015;	  Theron	  2009).	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Networks	  and	  the	  power	  of	  labour	  brokers	  in	  De	  Doorns	  
Several	  studies	  note	  the	  influence	  of	  labour	  brokers,	  their	  local	  knowledge	  and	  extensive	  networks	  
in	  their	  respective	  communities	  (Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Theron	  2009;	  Misago	  2009).	  Many	  brokers	  
are	  ex-­‐farmworkers	  (usually	  foremen	  and	  supervisors),	  so	  have	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  
farm	  work,	  but	  also	  of	  farmworker	  communities	  (Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Theron	  2009).	  Brokers	  are	  
important	  gatekeepers	  to	  work.	  They	  even	  provide	  “permanent”	  work	  to	  some	  off-­‐farmworkers	  
year	  round	  by	  stringing	  together	  different	  short-­‐term	  contracts	  with	  farmers	  (Theron	  2010;	  
Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004).	  Brokers	  also	  provide	  employment	  for	  their	  teams	  in	  counter-­‐seasonal	  
regions	  when	  work	  in	  the	  area	  where	  they	  are	  based	  dries	  up	  (Theron&Visser	  2012).	  	  
	  
Off-­‐farm	  women	  are	  particularly	  dependent	  on	  brokers	  and	  their	  relationship	  with	  brokers	  
often	  resembles	  the	  paternalist	  relationship	  between	  farmers	  and	  their	  on-­‐farm	  workforce.	  
Nevertheless,	  brokers	  help	  their	  workers	  in	  various	  ways,	  such	  as:	  (1)	  helping	  them	  to	  get	  	  
work;	  (2)	  helping	  them	  to	  access	  credit;	  granting	  them	  loans;	  transporting	  them	  to	  and	  from	  
work;	  and	  also	  helping	  with	  personal	  problems	  (Barrientos&Kritzinger	  2004;	  Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003).	  
However,	  brokers	  more	  often	  than	  not	  have	  “fluid	  relationships”	  with	  a	  vast,	  reserve	  pool	  of	  off-­‐
farmworkers	  that	  they	  hire	  from	  time-­‐to-­‐time.	  The	  fluid	  relationship	  is	  perpetuated	  by	  the	  
brokers’	  own	  relative	  insecurity	  in	  the	  value	  chain,	  given	  that	  they	  seldom	  have	  fixed	  contracts	  
with	  farmers	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003;	  Theron	  2009).	  Contractors	  often	  operate	  under	  huge	  
pressure,	  with	  very	  narrow	  margins,	  competing	  on	  price.	  	  
	  
Hence,	  especially	  smaller	  brokers	  struggle	  to	  operate	  sustainable	  businesses.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  
that	  local	  labour	  brokers	  –	  disgruntled	  that	  Zimbabwean	  brokers	  scored	  most	  of	  the	  contracts	  
with	  farmers	  -	  contributed	  to	  the	  social	  conflict	  in	  De	  Doorns	  during	  the	  xenophobic	  attacks	  of	  
2008/9	  (Theron	  2010;	  Misago	  2009;	  Robb	  2009).	  Their	  insecure	  position	  in	  the	  value	  chain	  
affects	  their	  ability	  to	  pay	  minimum	  wages	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  Unemployment	  Insurance	  
Fund	  (UIF)	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003;	  Theron	  2010;	  Theron&Visser	  2012;	  Barrientos	  et	  al.	  2004;	  
Barrientos&Kritzinger	  2003).	  	  
	  
Given	  labour	  brokers’	  inability	  to	  guarantee	  compliance	  with	  labour	  legislation	  and	  their	  fluid	  
relationships	  with	  most	  workers,	  workers	  engaged	  by	  labour	  brokers	  often	  keep	  their	  options	  open	  
and	  will	  work	  for	  whichever	  contractor	  can	  provide	  work	  at	  the	  highest	  wage	  in	  a	  particular	  week	  
(Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally	  2003).	  As	  there	  are	  potential	  transaction	  costs	  for	  workers	  for	  switching	  between	  
brokers,	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  alienating	  a	  broker	  who	  provides	  them	  with	  regular	  work,	  it	  would	  be	  
interesting	  to	  know	  if	  keeping	  options	  open	  is	  the	  default	  position	  or	  an	  exception.	  
Private	  standards	  and	  brokers	  
Since	  2007,	  private	  standards	  have	  become	  increasingly	  common	  on	  fruit	  farms	  in	  the	  Western	  
Cape.	  After	  the	  2013-­‐protests,	  such	  standards	  were	  also	  much	  more	  vigorously	  enforced	  in	  the	  
wine	  industry.	  The	  standards	  apply	  both	  to	  workers	  directly	  employed	  by	  the	  farmer	  and	  to	  
workers	  supplied	  by	  labour	  brokers.	  To	  ensure	  compliance	  with	  labour	  legislation,	  many	  
producers	  have	  begun	  to	  directly	  employ	  seasonal	  workers	  supplied	  by	  labour	  brokers,	  using	  
labour	  brokers	  only	  to	  recruit	  and/or	  supervise	  workers.	  Apart	  from	  ethical	  trade	  standards,	  
quality	  standards	  also	  lead	  to	  farmers	  reconsidering	  the	  use	  of	  labour	  brokers:	  a	  key	  
disadvantage	  of	  using	  brokers	  includes	  poor	  quality	  workmanship	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  
Prevalence	  
Due	  to	  various	  definitions	  of	  what	  constitutes	  labour	  brokering,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  get	  an	  accurate	  
picture	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  externalisation.	  A	  further	  complication	  is	  that	  farmers	  tend	  to	  under-­‐report	  
or	  hide	  their	  use	  of	  labour	  brokers	  (due	  to	  controversy	  surrounding	  the	  practice).12	  Convincing	  
labour	  brokers	  to	  participate	  in	  any	  research	  -	  to	  gauge	  the	  extent	  of	  externalisation	  and	  the	  
different	  forms	  it	  takes	  -	  is	  also	  difficult.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The Congress of Trade Unions of South Africa (COSATU) has lobbied government to ban of labour brokers.  
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Although	  much	  has	  been	  made	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  a	  “growing”	  externalisation	  trend	  on	  	  
fruit	  and	  wine	  farms	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape,	  the	  claim	  is	  based	  on	  fairly	  thin	  evidence.	  A	  scan	  of	  
the	  Western	  Cape	  literature	  did	  not	  reveal	  many	  studies	  specifically	  focused	  on	  externalisation,	  
although	  studies	  that	  have	  adopted	  a	  (more)	  purposeful	  focus,	  include	  those	  of	  Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally	  
(2003);	  Barrientos	  et	  al.	  (2004);	  Kritzinger	  et	  al	  (2004);	  Visser	  and	  Ferrer	  (2014)	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  
extent,	  given	  its	  small	  sample,	  Theron	  (2010).	  A	  more	  comprehensive	  study	  measuring	  the	  
extent	  of	  externalisation,	  the	  different	  forms	  it	  takes	  and	  whether	  its	  incidence	  has	  changed	  
over	  time,	  seems	  overdue.	  
	  
From	  the	  few	  studies	  that	  cover	  labour	  brokering,	  the	  use	  of	  labour	  brokers	  seems	  to	  have	  
remained	  static,	  despite	  interesting	  variations	  per	  region,	  crop	  type	  and	  over	  time.	  In	  three	  
studies	  about	  half	  of	  producers	  in	  their	  respective	  samples	  engaged	  brokers	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  
2003;	  Barrientos&Kritzinger	  2004;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).13	  One	  study	  found	  that	  labour	  brokers	  
provided	  30-50%	  of	  some	  producers’	  temporary	  workforce	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  	  
	  
The	  incidence	  of	  labour	  brokering	  sometimes	  differs	  between	  regions.	  While	  both	  Grabouw	  and	  
Ceres	  are	  major	  apple	  production	  areas,	  in	  their	  sample	  Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally	  (2003:	  18)	  found	  that	  
all	  the	  Grabouw	  farmers,	  but	  only	  38%	  of	  Ceres	  farmers	  used	  a	  broker.	  In	  the	  Robertson	  area	  
(which	  has	  a	  mix	  of	  fruit	  and	  wine	  farms),	  labour	  brokering	  seemed	  common,	  with	  about	  fifty	  
contractors	  attending	  an	  information	  session	  hosted	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Labour	  post-­‐2012,	  
indicating	  a	  high	  prevalence	  of	  labour	  brokering	  in	  that	  area	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  
	  
When	  disaggregating	  Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally’s	  (2003)	  sample	  by	  crop	  type,	  interesting	  differences	  
emerge:	  while	  almost	  all	  deciduous	  fruit	  farmers	  and	  57%	  of	  wine	  grape	  farmers	  used	  brokers,	  
only	  33%	  of	  table	  grape	  producers	  used	  brokers.	  In	  her	  study,	  Conradie	  (2007)	  found	  an	  even	  
lower	  use	  of	  brokers	  (10%)	  by	  table	  grape	  farmers,	  which	  is	  surprising,	  given	  the	  high	  labour	  
intensity	  of	  the	  industry.	  	  
	  
Labour	  brokering	  also	  seems	  to	  fluctuate	  over	  time.	  While	  57%	  of	  wine	  farmers	  in	  Du	  Toit	  and	  
Ally’s	  sample	  (2003)	  used	  labour	  brokers,	  ten	  years	  later	  Theron	  (2012)	  found	  that	  brokering	  
was	  less	  of	  an	  issue	  among	  Rawsonville	  wine	  farmers.	  	  Theron	  (2012)	  suggests	  that	  the	  low	  use	  
of	  contract	  workers	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  mechanisation	  of	  the	  grape	  harvesting	  in	  the	  area.	  
However,	  it	  has	  also	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  extent	  of	  mechanisation	  in	  the	  wine	  industry	  is	  
exaggerated	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  In	  the	  most	  recent	  survey	  of	  the	  sector,	  brokers	  contracted	  
30%	  of	  off-­‐farmworkers;	  the	  rest	  were	  directly	  employed	  by	  farmers	  (De	  Satgé&Blecher	  2015).	  	  
	  
The	  fluctuating	  use	  of	  labour	  brokering	  in	  the	  Hex	  River	  Valley’s	  table	  grape	  growing	  region	  	  
is	  especially	  perplexing.	  In	  1976,	  65%	  of	  workers	  employed	  in	  the	  six	  week	  thinning	  period	  in	  De	  
Doorns	  were	  off-­‐farmworkers	  from	  De	  Doorns,	  Worcester	  and	  Touws	  River	  (Levy	  1976).	  While	  
Levy	  (1976)	  never	  explicitly	  referred	  to	  labour	  brokering,	  his	  reference	  to	  the	  use	  of	  “middlemen”	  
by	  table	  grape	  farmers	  is	  suggestive.	  He	  noted	  that	  these	  ‘agents-­‐cum-­‐team	  leaders’	  generally	  
received	  higher	  wages	  than	  their	  team	  and	  may	  have	  received	  a	  bonus	  per	  worker	  recruited.	  
Hence,	  labour	  brokering	  might	  already	  have	  been	  common	  in	  De	  Doorns	  by	  1976.	  	  
	  
While	  Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally	  (2003)	  and	  Conradie	  (2007)	  respectively	  found	  that	  only	  33%	  and	  10%	  
of	  table	  grape	  farmers	  in	  their	  De	  Doorns	  samples	  used	  contractors,	  by	  2009	  –	  following	  the	  
outbreak	  of	  xenophobic	  attacks	  in	  De	  Doorns	  –	  Misago	  (2009)	  found	  60-80	  contractors	  in	  the	  
De	  Doorns	  area.	  	  Hence,	  it	  seems	  that	  labour	  brokering	  grew	  rapidly	  in	  the	  area	  between	  2004	  
and	  2009	  –	  unless	  one	  or	  more	  authors	  either	  over-­‐	  or	  under-­‐reported	  the	  use	  of	  brokers.	  It	  
seems	  as	  if	  labour	  brokering	  in	  De	  Doorns	  peaked	  in	  the	  2008/9	  season	  and	  thereafter	  declined.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13Theron (2010) did not interview producers, so we do not know from that study to what extent producers in De Doorns were 
using labour brokers). 
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After	  the	  xenophobic	  attacks,	  farmers	  instead	  employed	  off-­‐farmworkers	  directly	  and	  used	  
foremen	  to	  recruit	  temporary	  workers	  (Theron&Visser	  2012;	  Theron	  2012).	  The	  decline	  of	  labour	  
brokering	  in	  De	  Doorns	  after	  2009	  may	  have	  been	  due	  to	  COSATU’s	  campaign	  to	  ban	  labour	  
broking	  (Theron&Visser	  2010).	  However,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  COSATU’s	  campaign,	  on	  its	  own,	  would	  
have	  swayed	  farmers,	  given	  extremely	  low	  levels	  of	  unionisation	  in	  the	  sector	  (less	  than	  5%	  
nationally)	  and	  farmers’	  relative	  lack	  of	  concern	  about	  unionisation	  (Du	  Toit&	  Ally	  2003).	  
	  
Another	  factor	  that	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  less	  labour	  brokering	  is	  the	  mainstreaming	  of	  
private	  ethical	  audits.	  Farmers	  may	  attach	  more	  importance	  to	  private	  audits	  than	  inspections	  
by	  the	  Department	  of	  Labour,	  as	  non-­‐compliance	  found	  in	  private	  audits	  may	  prompt	  retailers	  
to	  terminate	  contracts	  with	  a	  farmer	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  However,	  this	  argument	  is	  tentative;	  
more	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  ascertain	  link(s)	  between	  private	  standards	  and	  externalisation.	  	  
The	  trend	  to	  source	  workers	  from	  off-­‐farm	  areas	  
Since	  1998,	  farmers	  have	  increasingly	  sourced	  seasonal	  workers	  from	  off-­‐farm	  locations	  (Du	  
Toit&Ally	  2003;	  Williams	  et	  al.	  1998;	  Barrientos&Barrientos	  2002;	  Barrientos&Kritzinger	  2004;	  
Greenberg,	  2003;	  Theron,	  2009;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  Moreover,	  producers	  increasingly	  source	  
permanent	  workers	  from	  off-­‐farm	  locations	  (Greenberg	  2003;	  Theron	  2009;	  Visser&Ferrer	  
2015).	  The	  use	  of	  permanent	  off-­‐farmworkers	  was	  especially	  high	  in	  areas	  that	  produce	  labour-­‐
intensive	  crops	  and	  that	  are	  close	  to	  Traditional	  Communal	  Areas	  (TCAs)	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  
In	  the	  Western	  Cape,	  long	  distances	  between	  farms	  and	  local	  towns	  were	  associated	  with	  
employing	  mostly	  on-­‐farm	  permanent	  workers.	  Overall,	  Visser	  and	  Ferrer	  (2015)	  found	  that	  
Western	  Cape	  farmers	  were	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  house	  permanent	  workers	  on-­‐farm.	  	  	  	  
	  
Greenberg	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  and	  Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally	  (2003)	  respectively	  found	  that	  between	  35%	  and	  50%	  
of	  farmers	  surveyed	  used	  off-­‐farmworkers.	  However,	  as	  only	  25%	  of	  workers	  in	  Greenberg	  et	  al.’s	  
(2012)	  sample	  were	  seasonal,	  the	  percentage	  of	  workers	  living	  off-­‐farm	  was	  bound	  to	  be	  lower.	  	  
	  
While	  the	  trend	  to	  source	  workers	  from	  off-­‐farm	  locations	  is	  linked,	  in	  the	  literature,	  to	  the	  
introduction	  of	  ESTA	  (Mather	  2000;	  Barrientos&Barrientos	  2002;	  Greenberg	  2003;	  Du	  
Toit&Ally	  2003;	  Atkinson	  2007;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015;	  De	  Satgé&Blecher	  2015),	  it	  is	  unclear	  why	  
the	  shift	  occurred,	  i.e.	  was	  it	  due	  to	  evictions,	  retrenchment,	  firing	  of	  workers,	  attrition,	  or	  a	  
combination	  of	  these	  factors?	  Greenberg	  (2003)	  suggests	  that	  natural	  attrition	  and	  
encouragement	  from	  farmers	  likely	  caused	  the	  shift.	  For	  example,	  farmers	  might	  help	  workers	  
to	  get	  housing	  in	  town,	  pay	  them	  an	  off-­‐farm	  allowance,	  and	  ‘a	  set	  of	  other	  incentives	  to	  
encourage	  farmworkers	  to	  leave	  the	  land	  and	  establish	  their	  own	  houses	  in	  nearby	  townships’	  
(Greenberg	  2003:	  11-­‐12).	  Incentives	  may	  include	  helping	  farmworkers	  to	  secure	  loans	  and/or	  
government	  housing	  grants;	  giving	  them	  loans	  to	  build	  housing;	  and/or	  helping	  them	  to	  pay	  for	  
municipal	  services	  in	  the	  short	  term	  (Greenberg	  2003).	  Some	  farmers	  were	  encouraging	  
retrenched	  workers	  and	  permanent	  workers	  who	  were	  demoted	  to	  seasonal	  workers	  to	  move	  
off	  the	  farm	  by	  agreeing	  to	  pay	  them	  cash	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  	  
	  
Wegerif	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  suggest	  that	  the	  shift	  to	  a	  predominantly	  off-­‐farm	  workforce	  has	  happened	  
mainly	  through	  workers	  being	  displaced:	  between	  1984	  and	  2004,	  3.7	  million	  farm	  dwellers	  were	  
displaced.	  Importantly,	  Wegerif	  et	  al.	  (2005:	  iii)	  define	  a	  farm	  dweller	  as	  ‘any	  person,	  other	  than	  
the	  owner,	  who	  is	  living	  on	  a	  farm’,	  i.e.	  this	  is	  a	  much	  wider	  group	  than	  just	  the	  subgroup	  of	  
farmworkers	  and	  also	  includes	  farmworkers’	  dependents14.	  De	  Satgé	  and	  Blecher’s	  (2015)	  survey	  
supports	  Wegerif	  et	  al’s	  finding:	  44%	  of	  off-­‐farmworkers	  interviewed	  claimed	  that	  they	  had	  
previously	  lived	  on	  farms	  and	  that	  they	  had	  been	  evicted.	  The	  growth	  of	  off-­‐farm	  settlements	  in	  
De	  Doorns	  and	  Rawsonville	  includes	  ‘a	  predominantly	  Coloured	  segment	  which	  was	  formerly	  
resident	  on	  farms	  in	  the	  area,	  and	  Coloured	  and	  African	  migrants,	  both	  internal	  and	  foreign,	  who	  
have	  been	  drawn	  to	  the	  area	  because	  of	  the	  availability	  of	  work’	  (Theron	  2012:	  3).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Wegerif et al. (2005) found that 49% of the evictees in their study were children. 
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Wegerif	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  found	  that,	  of	  the	  evicted	  farm	  dwellers	  in	  their	  sample,	  only	  32%	  
remained	  in	  rural	  areas;	  the	  rest	  moved	  to	  formal	  and	  informal	  urban	  areas.15	  This	  finding,	  
coupled	  with	  Levy’s	  (1976)	  finding	  that	  off-­‐farmworkers	  were	  already	  prevalent	  in	  the	  Elgin	  
and	  De	  Doorns	  areas	  in	  1976,	  seems	  to	  challenge	  an	  assumption	  that	  most	  workers	  living	  in	  	  
the	  townships	  of	  the	  Boland’s	  agricultural	  towns	  have	  been	  evicted	  from	  farms.	  For	  instance,	  
already	  by	  1976,	  Levy	  (1976)	  found	  that	  seventeen	  of	  the	  eighteen	  farmers	  in	  his	  De	  Doorns	  
sample	  recruited	  off-­‐farm	  labour	  during	  the	  table	  grape	  thinning	  period.	  Of	  permanent	  workers	  
in	  Elgin	  and	  De	  Doorns,	  respectively	  47%	  and	  35%	  did	  not	  stay	  permanently	  on	  farms,	  but	  
migrated	  between	  farms	  and	  their	  permanent	  homestead	  (seemingly	  the	  Transkei).	  	  	  
	  
All-­‐in-­‐all	  little	  seems	  to	  be	  known	  about	  the	  (potentially	  changed)	  demographic	  profile	  of	  	  
the	  seasonal	  workforce	  or	  the	  demography	  of	  new	  townships	  that	  have	  sprung	  up	  next	  to	  	  
rural	  agricultural	  towns	  in	  the	  last	  20	  years.	  The	  growth	  of	  townships	  and	  informal	  areas	  in	  
agricultural	  nodes;	  their	  composition;	  the	  factors	  that	  have	  driven	  growth;	  and	  the	  relationship	  
between	  their	  residents	  and	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  present	  a	  considerable	  research	  gap.	  	  
	  
Lastly,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  to	  measure	  the	  growth	  of	  off-­‐farmworkers:	  should	  only	  workers	  	  
living	  in	  settlements	  in	  rural	  towns	  be	  counted	  or	  also	  migrant	  workers	  living	  on-­‐farm	  in	  	  
hostel-­‐type	  accommodation?	  What	  about	  workers	  living	  on	  a	  farm,	  but	  working	  on	  a	  different	  
farm?	  And	  how	  prevalent	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  latter	  two	  sources	  of	  off-­‐farm	  labour?	  De	  Satgé	  and	  
Blecher	  (2015)	  note	  that	  about	  28%	  of	  producers	  in	  their	  sample	  provided	  some	  temporary	  	  
on-­‐farm	  accommodation	  to	  seasonal	  workers;	  the	  rest	  transported	  off-­‐farmworkers	  to	  and	  	  
from	  town	  daily.	  The	  question	  arises	  as	  to	  why	  farmers	  resort	  to	  using	  on-­‐farm	  seasonal	  workers	  
(who	  are	  not	  family	  members	  of	  permanent	  workers)	  at	  all	  given	  the	  seeming	  availability	  of	  a	  
large	  pool	  of	  off-­‐farmworkers.	  The	  literature	  provides	  no	  clear	  explanations	  	  
for	  this	  labour	  strategy.	  
Implications	  of	  shifting	  to	  an	  off-­‐farm	  workforce	  	  
The	  shift	  to	  an	  increasingly	  off-­‐farm	  workforce	  is	  a	  serious	  downgrading	  in	  the	  living	  and	  
working	  conditions	  of	  farmworkers,	  due	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  on-­‐farm	  housing	  and	  many	  concomitant	  
benefits.	  Although	  on-­‐farm	  housing	  is	  far	  from	  ideal,	  off-­‐farm	  housing	  is	  dismal	  by	  comparison	  
(Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015;	  De	  Satgé&Blecher	  2015).	  The	  loss	  of	  on-­‐farm	  
housing	  often	  affects	  more	  than	  just	  the	  on-­‐farmworker’s	  nuclear	  family:	  in	  Greenberg	  et	  al.’s	  
(2012)	  survey,	  a	  quarter	  of	  respondents	  indicated	  that	  they	  lived	  with	  their	  parents,	  
grandparents	  or	  siblings,	  so	  if	  employees	  are	  evicted,	  often	  their	  dependents	  are	  also	  evicted.	  
Wegerif	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  note	  that,	  in	  their	  survey,	  three	  quarters	  of	  those	  evicted	  were	  women	  
and	  children	  who	  were	  the	  dependents	  of	  farm	  dwellers.	  
	  
There	  are	  signs	  that	  farmers	  are	  divesting	  in	  on-­‐farm	  housing.	  Du	  Toit&Ally	  (2003)	  found	  that	  
about	  50%	  of	  the	  farms	  in	  their	  survey	  had	  more	  than	  three	  houses	  standing	  empty.	  Ten	  years	  
later,	  the	  FARE	  report	  (cited	  in	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015)	  also	  noticed	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  empty	  
farmworker	  housing.	  An	  off-­‐farm	  workforce	  places	  a	  huge	  burden	  on	  rural	  municipalities	  at	  a	  
cost	  to	  the	  state,	  and	  there	  are	  many	  signs	  that	  rural	  municipalities	  are	  not	  coping	  with	  this	  
responsibility	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003:48;	  Visser	  &	  Ferrer,	  2015;	  De	  Satgé	  &	  Blecher,	  2015).	  	  
Migration	  
It	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  African	  internal	  migrant	  labour	  was	  already	  used	  in	  Elgin	  and	  De	  Doorns	  
in	  1976.	  A	  number	  of	  studies	  point	  towards	  the	  continuous	  use	  of	  African	  migrants	  in	  Grabouw	  
(Du	  Toit	  &	  Ally,	  2003;	  Barrientos	  &	  Kritzinger,	  2004:	  87),	  De	  Doorns	  (Theron,	  2009),	  Ceres	  
(Barrientos&Kritzinger	  2004;	  Visser	  &	  Ferrer	  2015:	  145)	  and	  Robertson	  (Du	  Toit	  &	  Ally	  2003).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Wegerif et al. (2005) only say what happened to evicted farmer dwellers, not all the displaced farm dwellers. 
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Zimbabwean	  migrants	  have	  also	  created	  a	  new	  Western	  Cape	  agricultural	  landscape.	  Since	  the	  
start	  of	  Zimbabwe’s	  political	  crisis,	  regional	  migration	  from	  Zimbabwe	  to	  South	  African	  farms	  
countrywide	  has	  massively	  increased	  (in	  particular	  to	  Limpopo	  farms)	  (Visser&	  Ferrer	  2015,	  
citing	  Wisborg	  et	  al.	  2013).	  Zimbabwean	  workers	  have	  also	  been	  reported	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape,	  
especially	  in	  De	  Doorns	  (Theron	  2009;	  Misago	  2009,	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  	  
	  
In	  De	  Doorns,	  Theron	  (2012)	  found	  a	  perception	  among	  farm	  worker	  representatives	  that	  farmers	  
were	  employing	  Zimbabweans	  because	  they	  were	  prepared	  to	  work	  for	  lower	  wages.	  However,	  
Theron	  (2012)	  found	  no	  evidence	  that	  Zimbabweans	  were	  exploited.	  Instead,	  he	  concluded	  that	  
farmers	  preferred	  to	  work	  with	  Zimbabweans	  because	  they	  had	  higher	  levels	  of	  education.	  Seven	  of	  
the	  Zimbabwean	  farmworkers	  he	  interviewed	  had	  completed	  their	  O-­‐Levels,	  one	  had	  completed	  his	  
A-­‐Levels,	  and	  two	  had	  university	  degrees.	  Compared	  to	  the	  populace	  of	  the	  valley	  they	  were	  highly	  
educated	  (Theron	  2012).	  Also	  Barrientos	  and	  Visser	  (2012:	  22)	  note	  that,	  for	  producers,	  recruiting	  
Zimbabwean	  and	  Mozambique	  labour	  filled	  the	  gap	  of	  ‘the	  right	  type	  of	  workers’.	  
	  
A	  hallmark	  of	  the	  ‘right	  type	  of	  worker’,	  apart	  from	  being	  skilled,	  is	  being	  reliable.	  An	  
advantage	  of	  housing	  workers	  on-­‐farm	  is	  that	  farmers	  can	  control	  workers’	  activities,	  not	  only	  
during	  working	  hours,	  but	  also	  after	  hours	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  attend	  and	  are	  fit	  for	  work.	  	  
This	  version	  of	  paternalism	  is	  thus	  extended	  to	  non-­‐permanent	  workers,	  explaining,	  for	  
instance,	  why	  farmers	  sometimes	  employ	  migrant	  workers	  and	  house	  them	  on-­‐farm,	  even	  
when	  their	  farms	  are	  quite	  close	  to	  the	  abundant	  labour	  in	  rural	  townships.	  Describing	  this	  
oversupply	  of	  labour,	  Ewert	  &	  Du	  Toit	  (2005:	  329)	  note:	  
[O]n	  any	  given	  day,	  there	  are	  many	  more	  work	  seekers	  than	  the	  farmer	  needs.	  In	  scenes	  
reminiscent	  of	  ‘Grapes	  of	  Wrath’,	  the	  farmer	  or	  his	  foreman	  can	  pick	  and	  choose	  among	  those	  
clambering	  to	  get	  onto	  the	  lorry	  for	  a	  day’s	  wages.”	  
	  
Another	  example	  of	  paternalism	  is	  that	  farm	  managers	  find	  that	  providing	  two	  free	  meals	  a	  day	  	  
drastically	  increases	  worker	  productivity	  (Barrientos&Visser	  2012).	  Migrant	  on-­‐farmworkers	  seem	  
to	  replace	  the	  dependents	  of	  permanent	  workers	  of	  yore	  who	  were	  forced	  to	  work	  on	  the	  farm.	  
While	  not	  being	  forced	  to	  work,	  migrant	  on-­‐farmworkers	  are	  similarly	  a	  “captured”	  labour	  force.	  
	  
Apart	  from	  the	  lack	  of	  data	  on	  migrants	  in	  rural	  agricultural	  areas,	  even	  less	  is	  known	  about	  the	  
potential	  existence	  of	  inter-­‐regional	  worker	  migrants	  to	  benefit	  from	  counter-­‐seasonal	  peak	  
periods	  (e.g.	  between	  orange	  harvesting	  from	  May	  to	  August,	  and	  table	  grape	  harvesting	  from	  
October	  to	  March).	  Theron	  (2012)	  came	  across	  signs	  of	  such	  migration	  between	  the	  table	  grape	  
area	  of	  De	  Doorns	  and	  citrus	  areas	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Cape.	  Theron	  (2012,	  citing	  Robb	  2009)	  also	  
refers	  to	  farmers	  from	  as	  far	  away	  as	  the	  Eastern	  Cape	  and	  Namibia	  collecting	  workers	  from	  	  
De	  Doorns	  to	  work	  on	  their	  farms.	  Theron	  reports	  that	  the	  Hex	  River	  Table	  Grape	  Association	  
(HTA)	  believes	  that	  De	  Doorns	  has	  become	  a	  labour	  recruiting	  ground	  for	  other	  areas.	  How	  such	  
migration	  works	  and	  the	  impact	  on	  local	  municipalities	  is	  under	  explored.	  	  
	  
All-­‐in-­‐all,	  fairly	  little	  is	  known	  about:	  (1)	  where	  migrants	  come	  from;	  (2)	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
migrants	  from	  elsewhere	  in	  South	  Africa	  are	  still	  used	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  after	  influx	  control	  
was	  abolished	  in	  the	  1980s;	  (3)	  how	  they	  find	  work	  in	  the	  area;	  (4)	  how	  long	  they	  stay;	  and	  	  
(5)	  why	  farmers	  still	  use	  them,	  given	  the	  apparent	  glut	  of	  labour	  in	  rural	  townships.	  	  
Evictions	  
Wegerif	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  contend	  that	  of	  the	  3.7	  million	  people	  displaced	  from	  commercial	  farms	  
between	  1984	  and	  2004,	  about	  1.7	  million	  dwellers	  were	  evicted	  - mostly	  illegally.	  According	  
to	  De	  Satgé	  and	  Blecher	  (2015)	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  discredit	  Wegerif	  et	  al.’s	  (2005)	  
findings,	  because	  they	  extrapolated	  eviction	  figures	  from	  a	  relatively	  small	  sample	  to	  determine	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figures	  for	  the	  entire	  country	  over	  a	  21-­‐year	  period	  (Coetzee	  2007;	  Annandale	  2010).16	  Also	  
Todes	  et	  al.	  (2010:	  337)	  argue	  that	  the	  scale	  of	  displacement	  reported	  by	  Wegerif	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  	  
is	  debatable	  and	  that	  their	  figures	  are	  possibly	  ‘too	  high’.	  They	  argue	  that	  Wegerif	  et	  al.’s	  (2005)	  
figures	  do	  not	  accord	  with	  census	  data,	  which	  shows	  an	  increase	  of	  Africans	  on	  commercial	  
farms.17	  Yet	  more	  recently,	  De	  Satgé	  and	  Blecher’s	  (2015)	  findings	  seem	  to	  corroborate	  Wegerif	  
et	  al	  (2005).	  In	  their	  survey	  of	  82	  off-­‐farmworkers,	  43.6%	  of	  those	  who	  previously	  lived	  on	  
farms	  claimed	  that	  they	  had	  been	  evicted.	  	  
	  
Other	  studies	  had	  much	  less	  definitive	  conclusions	  about	  the	  extent	  of	  evictions.	  On	  the	  farms	  in	  
their	  study,	  Du	  Toit	  &	  Ally	  (2003)	  found	  that	  57%	  of	  the	  farms	  in	  their	  survey	  had	  worker	  houses	  
standing	  empty.	  	  Of	  those	  farms,	  	  about	  50%	  had	  more	  than	  three	  houses	  standing	  empty,	  which	  
they	  argue,	  could	  point	  to	  possible	  evictions.	  However,	  they	  note	  that	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  if	  the	  houses	  
were	  in	  good	  condition	  or	  derelict,	  and	  when	  or	  why	  they	  had	  been	  evacuated.	  	  
	  
A	  scoping	  study	  conducted	  by	  Annandale	  (2010,	  cited	  by	  De	  Satgé&Blecher	  2015)	  highlights	  the	  
confusing	  array	  of	  figures	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  the	  extent	  of	  evictions.	  Annandale	  (2010)	  found	  
that,	  despite	  reports	  of	  a	  sharp	  increase	  in	  evictions	  in	  2005-2010,	  the	  Department	  of	  Land	  Affairs	  
and	  its	  successor,	  the	  Department	  of	  Rural	  Development	  and	  Land	  Reform	  (DRDLR),	  recorded	  only	  
357	  registered	  evictions	  in	  the	  Cape	  Winelands	  District	  Municipality	  for	  that	  period.	  Similarly,	  Visser	  
and	  Ferrer	  (2015,	  citing	  Andrews	  2013)	  note	  that	  after	  the	  2012	  De	  Doorns	  protest,	  when	  they	  tried	  
to	  verify	  reports	  of	  increased	  evictions	  from	  Western	  Cape	  farms,	  they	  found	  that	  municipalities	  
seldom	  had	  records	  of	  evictions	  on	  hand.	  More	  often	  than	  not	  a	  special	  search	  was	  needed	  before	  
any	  statistics	  were	  made	  available	  -	  if	  such	  data	  was	  made	  available	  at	  all.	  The	  Land	  Claims	  Court	  is	  
meant	  to	  be	  the	  main	  source	  of	  information	  on	  legal	  evictions,	  but	  despite	  numerous	  requests	  to	  an	  
officer	  of	  that	  court,	  no	  information	  on	  evictions	  was	  provided.	  Where	  statistics	  were	  made	  available	  
by	  different	  levels	  of	  government	  (e.g.	  a	  municipality	  and	  the	  provincial	  office	  of	  the	  DRDLR),	  
conflicting	  information	  was	  often	  provided,	  making	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  get	  a	  real	  sense	  of	  the	  problem	  
(Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  Also,	  De	  Satgé	  and	  Blecher	  (2015)	  note	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  streamlined	  system	  of	  
notification.	  They	  could	  find	  no	  evidence	  of	  district	  wide	  recording	  and	  analysis	  of	  eviction	  trends.	  
Moreover,	  respondents	  in	  their	  study	  were	  confused	  about	  the	  correct	  avenue	  for	  reporting	  evictions.	  	  
Factors	  leading	  farmworker	  evictions	  
According	  to	  Wegerif	  et	  al	  (2005)	  evictions	  were	  mainly	  due	  to	  farm	  dwellers’	  employment	  (or	  
that	  of	  their	  family	  member’s)	  being	  terminated.	  Of	  those	  evicted,	  31%	  of	  employed	  farm	  
dwellers	  were	  fired,	  whereas	  28%	  of	  farm	  dwellers	  were	  evicted	  because	  the	  main	  breadwinner	  
in	  their	  household	  had	  died;	  a	  further	  30%	  of	  farm	  dwellers	  were	  evicted	  because	  the	  farm	  was	  
either	  sold	  or	  liquidated.	  De	  Satgé	  and	  Blecher	  (2015)	  found	  an	  even	  higher	  correlation	  between	  
evictions	  and	  farm	  ownership	  being	  transferred;	  they	  found	  that	  on	  Boland	  farms,	  72%	  of	  those	  
evicted	  were	  evicted	  during	  a	  transfer	  of	  ownership.	  
	  
Wegerif	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  found	  that	  farm	  consolidation	  processes,	  which	  involved	  buying	  of	  farms,	  
could	  be	  associated	  with	  evictions.	  Yet	  two	  third	  of	  evictions	  in	  the	  survey	  happened	  on	  relatively	  
smaller	  farms,	  with	  a	  labour	  force	  of	  less	  than	  50	  workers.	  The	  peak	  evictions	  periods,	  were	  
seemingly	  triggered	  by	  adverse	  weather	  conditions	  and	  regulatory	  changes	  Wegerif	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  
These	  were	  in:	  	  	  
• 1984	  and	  1992,	  after	  severe	  droughts	  that	  put	  farmers	  under	  extreme	  economic	  pressure;	  
• 1996-1997,	  corresponding	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  ESTA;	  and	  
• 2003,	  when	  Sectoral	  Determination	  13	  (DoL	  2003),	  the	  law	  that	  regulates	  farmworkers’	  
working	  conditions,	  was	  promulgated	  and	  stipulated	  a	  minimum	  wage.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Wegerif et al. (2005) interviewed 355 evictee households out of a sample 7759 households. 
17 Wegerif et al. (2005) argued that this anomaly might have been due to mistakes in StatsSA’s classification of enumerator 
areas, and therefore in overall figures (Todes et al. 2010). 
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Significantly,	  Wegerif	  et	  al.’s	  (2005)	  study	  seems	  to	  indicate	  that	  worker	  evictions	  did	  not	  happen	  
haphazardly,	  but	  that	  labour	  needs,	  especially	  the	  need	  for	  skilled	  labour,	  were	  taken	  into	  account.	  
Of	  the	  adults	  evicted,	  39%	  were	  educated	  only	  up	  to	  Standard	  5,	  while	  34%	  had	  no	  education	  at	  
all.	  Only	  8%	  of	  evicted	  adults	  passed	  Grade	  11	  or	  12.	  Of	  these	  evicted	  farm	  dwellers,	  only	  32%	  
remained	  in	  rural	  areas;	  the	  rest	  moved	  to	  formal	  and	  informal	  urban	  areas	  (Wegerif	  et	  al.	  2005).	  
Most	  of	  those	  evicted	  therefore	  seem	  to	  be	  lost	  to	  the	  agricultural	  labour	  market.	  
Working conditions 
Compliance with legislation 
Studies	  gauging	  whether	  working	  conditions	  improved	  after	  labour	  legislation	  was	  extended	  to	  
the	  sector	  have	  not	  always	  reached	  the	  same	  conclusions.	  Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  (2004,	  citing	  
Kritzinger&Vorster	  2001)	  argue	  that	  by	  the	  late	  1990s	  (when	  farmworkers	  were	  already	  
protected	  by	  both	  the	  BCEA	  and	  LRA)	  on-­‐farm	  employment	  of	  women	  had	  hugely	  improved,	  
based	  on	  basic	  conditions	  of	  employment	  such	  as	  paid	  sick	  leave,	  holiday	  leave	  and	  paid	  
maternity	  leave.	  However,	  Greenberg	  (2003),	  possibly	  commenting	  just	  before	  SD13	  was	  
passed,	  notes	  that	  farmworkers’	  employment	  contracts	  were	  ‘more	  of	  a	  legal	  formality	  than	  a	  
truly	  legal	  agreement’.	  He	  found	  significant	  variation	  in	  compliance,	  with	  seasonal	  workers’	  
often	  granted	  fewer	  rights,	  with	  working	  hours	  of	  27-65	  hours	  a	  week	  (the	  legal	  number	  of	  
ordinary	  hours	  per	  week	  is	  45	  hours).	  While	  most	  (but	  not	  all)	  permanent	  workers	  indicated	  
that	  they	  had	  paid	  sick	  leave,	  maternity	  leave,	  family	  responsibility	  leave,	  and	  annual	  leave,	  a	  
number	  of	  seasonal	  workers	  said	  they	  did	  not	  get	  any	  type	  of	  leave.	  At	  the	  time,	  Greenberg	  
(2003)	  blamed	  the	  Department	  of	  Labour’s	  poor	  enforcement	  for	  a	  general	  failure	  to	  ensure	  
more	  significant	  improvements	  in	  working	  conditions.	  	  
Impact of private standards on working conditions 
Some	  studies	  have	  gauged	  whether	  retailer-­‐enforced	  private	  standards	  have	  improved	  working	  
conditions,	  with	  little	  impact	  reported	  on	  Western	  Cape	  farms	  before	  2005	  (i.e.	  Greenberg	  2003;	  
Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Barrientos	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Barrientos&Smith	  2007).	  However,	  before	  2005	  
monitoring	  of	  private	  standards	  was	  still	  quite	  new	  (Barrientos	  &	  Visser,	  2012).	  At	  first,	  private	  
certification	  schemes	  for	  agriculture,	  such	  as	  EuropGap	  (later	  GlobalGap)	  focussed	  mostly	  on	  
compliance	  with	  health	  and	  safety	  legislation.	  By	  2003,	  all	  South	  African	  fruit	  farmers	  exporting	  to	  
Europe	  had	  to	  be	  EuropGap	  accredited	  (Greenberg	  2003).	  	  However,	  the	  ‘welfare’	  section	  in	  
EuropGap	  that	  dealt	  with	  worker	  health,	  safety	  and	  welfare	  was	  fairly	  small	  (Greenberg	  2003).	  
Farmers	  at	  the	  time	  said	  all	  codes,	  including	  retailer	  codes	  (such	  as	  Tesco’s	  Nature’s	  Choice,	  as	  it	  was	  
referred	  to	  then)	  were	  largely	  technical	  and	  focused	  on	  environmental	  and	  food	  safety	  standards,	  
with	  worker	  welfare	  and	  labour	  conditions	  rarely	  discussed	  (Greenberg	  2003).	  Welfare	  codes	  in	  
EuropGap	  at	  the	  time	  were	  also	  ‘minor	  musts’,	  while	  most	  other	  codes	  were	  ‘major	  musts’,	  which,	  
when	  not	  met,	  involved	  EuropGap	  withdrawing	  certification	  (Greenberg	  2003).	  Similarly,	  
Barrientos	  and	  Smith	  (2007)	  found	  that	  the	  main	  improvements	  in	  working	  conditions	  of	  South	  
African	  farmworkers	  related	  to	  health	  and	  safety.	  	  
	  
Since	  2007	  however,	  several	  studies	  have	  found	  fairly	  good	  compliance	  with	  minimum	  labour	  
standards	  (many	  studies	  specifically	  checked	  compliance	  with	  the	  minimum	  wage)	  (Theron	  2009;	  
Theron&Visser	  2012;	  Barrientos&Visser	  2012;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015;	  Greenberg	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Alford	  2015).	  
It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  such	  improvements	  are	  due	  to	  more	  rigorous	  inspections	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  
Labour,	  which	  is	  still	  under-­‐resourced	  (Benjamin	  2010;	  2011).	  The	  compliance	  is	  more	  than	  likely	  
due	  to	  more	  persistent	  monitoring	  of	  private	  standards	  by	  retailers	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  from	  2007	  
onwards.	  	  Seven	  years	  later,	  Visser	  and	  Ferrer	  (2015)	  found	  that	  on	  farms	  regularly	  subjected	  to	  
auditing,	  there	  were	  higher	  rates	  of	  compliance	  with	  health	  and	  safety,	  and	  other	  labour	  legislation.	  
The	  higher	  compliance	  rates	  are	  likely	  because	  failing	  an	  audit	  by	  private	  standard	  setters	  could	  lead	  
to	  producers	  being	  excluded	  from	  supply	  chains,	  while	  failing	  a	  Department	  of	  Labour	  inspection	  
only	  resulted	  in	  a	  fine	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  The	  ability	  of	  private	  standards	  to	  improve	  (1)	  the	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working	  conditions	  of	  all	  workers,	  especially	  seasonal	  and	  contract	  workers,	  and	  (2)	  working	  
conditions	  beyond	  the	  legal	  minima	  has	  been	  questioned	  (Barrientos&Kritzinger	  2004;	  
Theron&Visser	  2012;	  	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  Yet,	  after	  private	  audits,	  Alford	  (2015:	  142)	  and	  
Barrientos	  and	  Visser	  (2012:	  34)	  found	  that	  on-­‐farm	  housing	  for	  seasonal	  workers	  had	  improved,	  
albeit	  from	  a	  very	  low	  base,	  as	  such	  on-­‐farm	  housing	  has	  historically	  been	  very	  poor	  quality	  
(Barrientos&Barrientos	  2002;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  
	  
The	  main	  criticism	  of	  private	  codes	  is	  that	  they	  fail	  to	  identify	  violations	  of	  enabling	  rights,	  such	  as	  
the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  association	  and	  collective	  bargaining.	  Moreover,	  since	  2007	  they	  have	  not	  
lifted	  the	  minimum	  wage	  to	  the	  level	  of	  a	  living	  wage.	  Current	  agricultural	  minimum	  wages	  are	  still	  
insufficient	  to	  feed	  an	  average	  four-­‐person	  household	  (Meyer	  et	  al.	  2012).	  	  A	  related	  criticism	  is	  that	  
private	  standard	  setters	  have	  remained	  silent	  about	  power	  imbalances	  in	  the	  value	  chain	  that	  have	  led	  
to	  low	  farm	  gate	  prices,	  which	  in	  turn	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  farmers	  to	  pay	  living	  wages	  (Du	  Toit	  2001;	  
Barrientos	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Barrientos&Smith	  2007;	  Greenberg	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  	  	  
	  
At	  this	  stage,	  state	  grants,	  and	  workers’	  own	  networks	  and	  survival	  instincts	  still	  subsidise	  
insufficient	  agricultural	  wages.	  Social	  security	  grants	  and	  pensions	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  
keeping	  households	  out	  of	  dire	  poverty	  (Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004,	  citing	  Vorster	  et	  al.	  2000).	  Grants	  
and	  pensions	  contribute	  to	  food	  and	  household	  security	  of	  entire	  households	  and	  often	  present	  
the	  only	  secure	  or	  constant	  source	  of	  income	  (Vorster	  et	  al.	  2000,	  cited	  in	  Kritzinger	  et	  al.,	  
2004).	  They	  also	  found	  that	  workers	  made	  ends	  meet	  by	  buying	  food	  in	  bulk,	  buying	  less	  food,	  
and	  buying	  on	  credit.	  The	  main	  survival	  strategy	  of	  workers	  employed	  by	  labour	  brokers	  
involved	  borrowing	  money	  from	  relatives,	  neighbours,	  foremen,	  or	  more	  often,	  from	  the	  
brokers	  who	  employ	  them.	  Some	  workers	  use	  all	  these	  resources	  to	  make	  ends	  meet.	  
Nevertheless,	  70%	  of	  respondents	  in	  Du	  Toit’s	  study	  (2005)	  indicated	  that	  their	  household	  had	  
experienced	  a	  food	  shortage	  at	  some	  time	  during	  the	  previous	  12	  months.18	  
An increasingly complex hierarchy of workers 
While	  there	  have	  always	  been	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  permanent	  and	  seasonal	  workers’	  
employment	  conditions,	  Ewert	  and	  Du	  Toit	  (2005:	  317)	  refer	  to	  a	  “deepening	  divide”	  between	  ‘a	  
core	  of	  workers	  who	  manage	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  permanent	  employment,	  though	  often	  still	  living	  on	  
the	  farm	  and	  caught	  in	  the	  web	  of	  paternalism’	  who	  benefit	  from	  better	  pay	  and	  housing,	  versus	  
‘the	  seasonal,	  casual	  and	  contract	  workers:	  a	  rural	  lumpen	  proletariat,	  often	  residing	  in	  rural,	  
peri-­‐urban	  or	  metropolitan	  shanty	  towns’.	  	  
	  
Yet,	  it	  seems	  that	  over	  time	  this	  divide	  has	  not	  only	  intensified,	  but	  that	  the	  workplace	  has	  also	  
become	  more	  stratified.	  Theron	  (2010:	  	  20)	  identifies	  three	  dividing	  lines	  in	  the	  workplace:	  one	  
between	  on-­‐farm	  and	  off-­‐farmworkers;	  one	  between	  permanent	  and	  seasonal	  workers;	  and	  one	  
between	  workers	  directly	  employed	  by	  the	  farmer	  and	  those	  employed	  by	  a	  broker.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  
important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  workers	  who	  are	  employed	  by	  a	  broker	  on	  a	  permanent	  basis,	  
and	  those	  employed	  by	  the	  broker	  on	  a	  ‘casual’	  basis	  only.	  Lastly,	  Barrientos	  et	  al	  (2004:	  117)	  
point	  to	  yet	  a	  further	  dividing	  line:	  between	  migrant	  workers	  and	  locals.	  They	  found	  that	  migrant	  
workers	  are	  often	  found	  at	  the	  lowest	  end	  of	  this	  employment	  hierarchy.	  
	  
Various	  studies	  have	  found	  evidence	  of	  a	  wage	  premium	  for	  more	  skilled	  (permanent)	  workers,	  
which	  also	  points	  to	  stratification	  at	  the	  higher	  end	  of	  this	  hierarchy.	  At	  face	  value	  this	  premium	  
seems	  to	  be	  huge,	  ranging	  from	  100%	  to	  260%	  between	  the	  lowest	  and	  highest	  wages	  
(Barrientos&Kritzinger	  2002;	  Alford	  2015;	  Barrientos&Visser	  2012;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  Yet,	  such	  
premiums	  are	  off	  a	  very	  low	  base.	  	  Second,	  only	  a	  very	  thin	  layer	  of	  permanent	  workers	  at	  the	  top	  
end	  of	  this	  hierarchy	  seem	  to	  benefit	  from	  significantly	  higher	  wages.	  In	  their	  sample	  of	  Western	  
Cape	  farms	  –	  where	  workers	  were	  generally	  paid	  the	  highest	  wages	  –	  Visser	  &	  Ferrer	  (2015)	  found	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In Du Toit’s (2005) sample, 40% of household members with access to paid work were reported to have spent some time 
doing wage labour in the agricultural sector, but only 32% indicated that they worked on commercial farms. 
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that	  most	  permanent	  workers	  earned	  only	  about	  16%	  more	  than	  the	  minimum	  wage.	  Moreover,	  
they	  found	  that	  only	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  permanent	  workers	  earned	  what	  Cosatu	  would	  begin	  to	  
define	  as	  a	  living	  wage.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  fraction	  was	  so	  small	  could	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  
farmers’	  need	  to	  adjust	  to	  the	  52%	  increase	  in	  the	  minimum	  wage	  in	  March	  2013.	  	  Given	  that	  Visser	  
&	  Ferrer’s	  study	  was	  conducted	  a	  year	  after	  the	  increase,	  producers	  did	  not	  have	  much	  time	  to	  
absorb	  it	  and	  as	  result	  probably	  gave	  smaller	  increases	  to	  more	  skilled	  workers	  who	  would	  
normally	  be	  paid	  a	  significant	  wage	  premium.	  As	  farmers	  absorb	  the	  new	  minimum	  wages,	  the	  size	  
and	  the	  number	  of	  permanent	  workers	  who	  benefit	  from	  such	  wage	  premiums	  may	  grow	  again.	  
Gender stereotypes in the workplace 
Apart	  from	  migrant	  workers,	  it	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  female	  workers	  tend	  to	  be	  found	  at	  the	  bottom	  
of	  the	  hierarchy.	  Several	  studies	  found	  that	  women	  comprise	  the	  bulk	  of	  seasonal	  and	  contract	  
workers,	  so	  often	  have	  less	  job	  security.	  They	  earn	  lower	  wages	  and	  have	  less	  opportunity	  for	  career	  
advancement	  because	  gender	  stereotypes	  relegate	  them	  to	  low(er)	  skilled	  positions.	  They	  also	  
receive	  fewer	  benefits	  than	  men	  and	  have	  worse	  conditions	  of	  employment.	  Moreover,	  their	  tenure	  
security	  and	  access	  to	  housing	  are	  worse	  than	  those	  of	  their	  male	  counterparts,	  because	  housing	  is	  
often	  reserved	  for	  permanent	  male	  workers	  and	  women	  only	  get	  access	  to	  housing	  via	  their	  
relationship	  with	  men.	  If	  women	  are	  able	  to	  squeeze	  their	  way	  into	  higher	  job	  grades,	  within	  those	  
grades	  they	  still	  tend	  to	  be	  worse	  off	  than	  men	  (Barrientos&Barrientos,	  2002;	  Greenberg	  2003;	  
Barrientos	  et	  al	  2004;	  Ewert&Du	  Toit	  2005;	  Wegerif	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Greenberg	  et	  al.	  2012).	  
	  	  
However,	  some	  gender	  stereotypes	  favour	  farm	  women.19	  Functional	  upgrading	  of	  producers	  in	  
the	  value	  chain	  has	  resulted	  in	  more	  pack	  houses	  being	  built.	  Process	  and	  product	  upgrading	  have	  
also	  resulted	  in	  the	  need	  to	  pack	  fruit	  to	  various	  specifications,	  under	  strict	  food	  safety	  standards.	  
Given	  the	  stereotype	  that	  women	  are	  more	  “nimble-­‐fingered”	  and	  that	  they	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  
detail,	  most	  pack	  house	  work	  is	  performed	  by	  women.	  	  More	  skilled	  (better	  paid)	  packers	  are	  
needed	  to	  pack	  to	  a	  range	  of	  specifications,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  ensure	  high	  quality	  produce,	  food	  
safety	  and	  product	  traceability	  has	  led	  to	  various	  higher	  paid	  positions	  being	  created,	  such	  as	  
quality	  controllers	  and	  record	  keepers	  (Barrientos&Visser	  2012).	  However,	  because	  pack	  houses	  
can	  be	  mechanised,	  pack	  house	  women,	  especially	  sorters,	  are	  now	  in	  a	  vulnerable	  position.	  	  
	  
In	  orchards/vineyards,	  a	  small	  group	  of	  women	  have	  benefited	  from	  process	  upgrading,	  once	  
again	  due	  to	  the	  need	  for	  better	  quality	  control	  measures	  and	  record	  keeping.	  Given	  the	  
stereotype	  that	  women	  are	  good	  at	  secretarial	  work,	  these	  positions	  –	  which	  are	  also	  less	  
physically	  demanding	  –	  are	  often	  given	  to	  women.	  Clerical	  positions	  are	  better	  paid	  than	  field	  
work,	  and	  offer	  more	  opportunities	  for	  training	  in	  transferable	  skills	  such	  as	  record	  keeping,	  
data	  capturing,	  computer	  work,	  and	  managing	  payroll	  software	  (Kritzinger&Vorster	  1995;	  
Barrientos&Kritzinger	  2004,	  cited	  in	  Barrientos&Visser	  2012;	  Greenberg	  et	  al.	  2012;	  
Barrientos&Visser	  2012).	  
	  
On-­‐farm	  women	  –	  often	  the	  partners	  of	  permanent	  men	  –	  are	  starting	  to	  be	  more	  regularly	  
employed	  in	  permanent	  positions	  (Theron	  2009;	  Barrientos&Visser	  2012).	  The	  driver	  of	  this	  
trend	  is	  not	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  and	  should	  be	  further	  explored.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  farmers	  
want	  to	  optimise	  the	  labour	  of	  farm	  residents	  and	  employing	  resident	  women	  on	  a	  permanent	  
basis	  ensures	  their	  availability	  throughout	  the	  year.	  Women	  benefit	  from	  the	  situation	  in	  that	  they	  
have	  longer	  employment,	  more	  job	  security,	  and	  potentially	  more	  benefits.	  The	  advantage	  of	  
appointing	  women	  on	  a	  permanent	  basis	  from	  a	  farmer’s	  perspective	  is	  that	  it	  obviates	  the	  need	  
to	  build	  more	  housing	  to	  accommodate	  (new)	  permanent	  male	  workers	  and	  their	  families.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Functional upgrading refers to the process where producers in the change value chain take on new functions, e.g. in the 
case of agriculture, if a farmer no longer just produces fruit, but also packs, exports and distributes his own fruit. Process 
upgrading transforms inputs into outputs more efficiently by reorganising the production system or introducing superior 
technology (Gereffi&Fernandez-Stark 2011). 
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However,	  women	  in	  the	  workplace	  continue	  to	  be	  exposed	  to	  threats,	  aside	  from	  the	  loss	  of	  job	  
opportunities	  due	  to	  pack	  house	  mechanisation.	  The	  influx	  of	  migrants	  is	  affecting	  the	  gender	  
composition	  of	  the	  temporary	  (mostly	  female)	  workforce,	  with	  more	  males	  working	  in	  temporary	  
positions	  than	  in	  the	  past	  (Theron	  2009;	  Greenberg	  2003).	  This	  shift	  might	  be	  because	  
employment	  equity	  legislation	  means	  that	  men	  and	  women	  in	  the	  same	  position	  should	  be	  paid	  
the	  same	  wage	  (Greenberg	  2003).20	  	  Several	  farmers	  argued	  that	  ‘given	  the	  same	  wage	  rate	  for	  
men	  and	  women,	  they	  would	  prefer	  men	  to	  work	  in	  the	  fields’,	  as	  they	  are	  usually	  physically	  
stronger	  and	  therefore	  can	  do	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  work	  (Greenberg	  2003:	  12).	  The	  finding	  of	  
changed	  gender	  demographics	  in	  the	  workplace	  is	  however	  tentative.	  
Shifting paternalism 
Ewert	  and	  Du	  Toit	  (2005:	  324)	  argue	  that	  after	  1994:	  	  
[a]	  paternalist	  state	  has	  stepped	  in	  to	  push	  back	  the	  paternalist	  authority	  of	  the	  farmer	  and	  has	  
created	  new	  limits	  to	  farmers’	  control	  over	  workers’	  lives.	  These	  changes	  seriously	  challenge	  the	  
legal	  and	  formal	  underpinnings	  of	  traditional	  farm	  paternalism.	  	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  effective	  organisation	  that	  enables	  collective	  bargaining,	  farmworkers	  are	  
dependent	  on	  the	  largesse	  of	  the	  state;	  the	  paternalistic	  state	  has,	  in	  effect,	  displaced	  the	  
paternalistic	  farmer	  (Theron	  2009).	  	  But,	  far	  from	  being	  destroyed	  by	  the	  pressures	  on	  agriculture,	  
paternalism	  has	  ‘simply	  modified	  and	  adapted	  itself	  over	  time’	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003:	  3;	  22;	  50).	  
Increasingly,	  the	  paternalist	  relationship	  is	  used	  not	  to	  tie	  a	  large	  pool	  of	  cheap	  and	  readily	  available	  
labour	  to	  the	  farm,	  but	  to	  secure	  the	  loyalty	  of	  a	  much	  smaller	  population	  of	  skilled,	  relatively	  
privileged,	  mostly	  Coloured	  workers	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003).	  However,	  in	  typical	  paternalist	  fashion,	  
such	  loyalty	  is	  not	  bought	  with	  higher	  wages,	  but	  rather	  with	  non-­‐wage	  benefits,	  including	  giving	  
permanent	  workers	  access	  to	  a	  provident	  fund	  or	  funeral	  fund,	  on-­‐farm	  housing,	  subsidised	  
energy	  bills;	  access	  to	  crèches	  and	  vegetable	  gardens;	  and	  providing	  on-­‐farm	  clinics	  
(Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  The	  value	  of	  such	  contributions	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated;	  one	  fruit	  
producer	  calculated	  that	  the	  additional	  non-­‐wage	  benefits	  are	  a	  35%	  top	  up	  of	  the	  standard	  wage	  
packet	  (Alford	  2015).	  	  Kritzinger	  et	  al.’s	  (2004)	  estimate	  was	  slightly	  lower	  at	  30%.	  From	  a	  
producer’s	  perspective,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  pay	  on-­‐farmworkers	  lower	  wages	  and	  extend	  non-­‐
monetary	  benefits	  that	  bind	  workers	  to	  the	  farm	  and	  ensure	  their	  continued	  employment.	  	  
	  
While	  the	  strategy	  of	  providing	  non-­‐wage	  benefits	  seems	  similar	  to	  1976	  efforts	  to	  retain	  labour	  
at	  a	  time	  of	  labour	  scarcity,	  the	  current	  aim	  is	  not	  just	  to	  retain	  labour	  per	  se,	  but	  to	  retain	  a	  skilled,	  
loyal,	  and	  permanent	  labour	  force	  that	  knows	  the	  farm	  set-­‐up	  and	  its	  business.	  	  Importantly,	  this	  
layer	  of	  permanent	  on-­‐farmworkers	  also	  form	  a	  buffer	  between	  management	  and	  a	  much	  larger	  
pool	  of	  seemingly	  disaffected	  off-­‐farm,	  temporary	  workers.	  The	  permanent	  workers	  become	  the	  
farmers	  “eyes	  and	  ears”	  to	  identify	  threats	  to	  the	  farmer’s	  business	  interests,	  but	  -	  	  in	  the	  light	  of	  
farm	  attacks	  -	  	  also	  to	  the	  physical	  safety	  of	  his	  family.	  The	  type	  of	  benefits	  provided	  to	  such	  
permanent	  workers	  also	  point	  to	  the	  changed	  function	  of	  paternalism.	  Instead	  of	  the	  1976	  
strategy	  of	  providing	  “dop”	  to	  psychologically	  enslave	  workers,	  today	  farmers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  
send	  alcoholic	  permanent	  workers	  for	  rehabilitation	  and	  arrange	  a	  social	  worker	  to	  assist	  their	  
families.	  It	  is	  no	  longer	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  farmer	  to	  have	  alcoholics	  on	  the	  farm.	  Although	  such	  
alcoholics	  are	  a	  legacy	  of	  the	  dop	  system,	  they	  are	  also	  often	  the	  first	  to	  be	  retrenched.	  
	  
Permanent	  workers	  also	  benefit	  from	  a	  range	  of	  training	  programmes,	  aimed	  at	  “upliftment”.	  
Some	  programmes	  have	  a	  serious	  paternalist	  bent	  and	  invariably	  aim	  to	  teach	  workers	  life	  skills	  
–	  specifically	  to	  help	  them	  stop	  drinking.	  But	  other	  programmes	  are	  more	  useful,	  including	  skills	  
such	  as	  debt	  management	  and	  basic	  health	  care	  skills.	  A	  thin	  layer	  of	  workers	  also	  benefit	  from	  
transferable	  skills,	  such	  as	  training	  in	  management	  and	  administrative	  support.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 prohibits unequal pay for equal work. 
 
	  
30	   Going nowhere fast? Changed working conditions on Western Cape fruit and wine farms 
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  paternalist	  relationships	  between	  producers	  and	  their	  on-­‐farm,	  
permanent	  workers,	  ‘[off-­‐farm]	  workers	  will	  find	  that	  the	  relationships	  between	  them	  and	  
employers	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  cash	  payments	  for	  particular	  tasks’	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003:	  46).	  
While	  piece	  work	  -	  the	  epitome	  of	  “cash	  payments	  for	  particular	  tasks”	  -	  is	  nothing	  new,	  more	  
novel	  is	  the	  extension	  of	  piece	  work	  to	  an	  ever	  broader	  range	  of	  tasks,	  especially	  after	  the	  
minimum	  wage	  increase	  in	  March	  2013.	  Piece	  work	  is	  also	  more	  closely	  monitored	  to	  root	  out	  
non-­‐performing	  staff	  (Barrientos&Visser	  	  2012;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  While	  it	  has	  been	  claimed	  
that	  workers	  can	  earn	  significantly	  higher	  wages	  doing	  piece	  work	  (Theron	  2009:	  16;	  Graaff	  
1976;	  Visser&Barrientos	  2012),	  such	  work	  carries	  risks	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003).	  For	  instance,	  
when	  work	  is	  stopped	  due	  to	  adverse	  weather	  conditions,	  workers	  may	  go	  for	  days	  without	  pay.	  
	  
However,	  because	  of	  process	  and	  functional	  upgrading	  in	  value	  chains,	  producers	  are	  starting	  to	  
recognise	  the	  limits	  of	  a	  mercenary,	  arms-­‐length	  relationship	  with	  off-­‐farm,	  seasonal	  workers	  
(Barrientos&Visser	  2012;	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  Although	  there	  is	  a	  	  
…	  high	  churn	  of	  seasonal	  workers	  …[yet	  also	  a]…	  constant	  demand	  to	  produce	  bigger	  volumes	  of	  
fruit	  of	  higher	  quality…	  [and	  that	  t]he	  need	  to	  attract	  and	  retain	  a	  more	  skilled	  and	  educated	  
workforce	  at	  every	  level	  is	  not	  facilitated	  by	  the	  use	  of	  casualised	  workers	  on	  minimum	  legal	  wages	  
and	  conditions	  …	  [t]he	  horticulture	  industry	  is	  thus	  facing	  a	  double	  edged	  sword.	  While	  growers	  
downsize	  their	  permanent	  workforce	  in	  favour	  of	  seasonal	  workers,	  they	  increasingly	  need	  more	  
skilled	  and	  educated	  workers...	  
Source:	  Barrientos	  and	  Visser	  (2012:	  22).	  
	  
In	  the	  deciduous	  fruit	  industry	  –	  where	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  need	  for	  more	  skilled	  seasonal	  workers	  
(as	  incorrect	  pruning	  and	  manipulation	  of	  plants	  can	  critically	  affect	  yields	  and	  quality)	  –	  
producers	  needed	  to	  retain	  a	  stable	  seasonal	  workforce	  because	  of	  increasing	  quality	  and	  process	  
standards	  enforced	  by	  supermarkets	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  “Perma-­‐temps”	  are	  becoming	  more	  
common,	  i.e.	  ‘workers	  who	  return	  regularly	  despite	  not	  having	  any	  long-­‐term	  legal	  guarantee	  that	  
they	  will	  be	  employed’	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003:	  15).	  In	  the	  fruit	  industry,	  high	  retention	  rates	  of	  
seasonal	  labour	  are	  not	  entirely	  new;	  in	  De	  Doorns	  Levy	  (1976)	  noted:	  
…	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  farmers	  maintain	  the	  same	  agents	  for	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time,	  a	  reliable	  agent	  
being	  regarded	  as	  a	  most	  valuable	  asset.	  	  
Source:	  Levy	  (1976:	  35).	  
	  
He	  also	  noted	  that	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  seasonal	  workforce	  provided	  by	  agents	  (ranging	  
from	  a	  “solid	  core”	  to	  as	  much	  as	  80%)	  returned	  to	  the	  same	  farm	  annually.	  On	  Western	  Cape	  
fruit	  farms,	  and	  Levubu’s	  (Limpopo)	  tropical	  fruit	  farms,	  retention	  rates	  for	  seasonal	  workers	  
were	  found	  to	  be	  50%-80%	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  Oddly	  enough,	  despite	  a	  fairly	  low	  need	  for	  
skilled	  workers	  and	  the	  perceived	  unattractiveness	  of	  the	  work,	  the	  sugar	  industry	  had	  the	  
highest	  retention	  rates	  of	  seasonal	  workers	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  An	  obvious	  interpretation	  of	  
high	  retention	  rates	  is	  that	  seasonal	  workers	  are	  desperate	  for	  work	  and	  return	  to	  the	  same	  jobs	  
annually	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  choice.	  Another	  interpretation	  could	  be	  that	  both	  farmers	  and	  
workers	  benefit	  from	  a	  high	  retention	  rate	  as	  it	  reduces	  the	  transaction	  costs	  for	  both	  parties:	  it	  
saves	  workers	  the	  effort	  of	  finding	  new	  work	  and	  farmers	  the	  effort	  of	  finding	  workers	  that	  need	  
to	  be	  newly-­‐trained.	  Visser	  and	  Ferrer	  (2015)	  argue	  that	  high	  retention	  rates	  to	  some	  extent	  
challenge	  the	  perception	  that	  producers	  view	  seasonal	  workers	  as	  easily	  replaceable.	  In	  some	  
cases	  producers	  use	  strategies	  to	  actively	  retain	  seasonal	  workers,	  for	  example	  in	  Visser	  and	  
Ferrer’s	  (2015)	  sample,	  one	  producer	  was	  paying	  his	  seasonal	  workers	  more	  than	  the	  regional	  
average	  and	  paid	  his	  Namibian	  seasonal	  workers	  a	  retainer	  out	  of	  season.	  Another	  provided	  a	  
fully-­‐equipped	  canteen	  for	  seasonal	  workers,	  and	  a	  pack	  house	  operator	  planned	  to	  give	  his	  
female	  packers	  a	  share	  in	  his	  pack	  house	  to	  retain	  their	  skills.	  	  Another	  major	  pack	  house	  company	  
found	  temporary	  work	  for	  their	  packers	  elsewhere	  when	  the	  pack	  house	  burned	  down	  and	  re-­‐
employed	  them	  once	  the	  pack	  house	  was	  rebuilt	  (Barrientos&Visser	  2012).	  
 
	  
Working paper 41, Margareet Visser 31	  
In	  an	  attempt	  to	  retain	  seasonal	  workers,	  some	  producers	  ‘shared’	  a	  team	  of	  seasonal	  workers	  
with	  other	  producers	  who	  grew	  counter-­‐seasonal	  crops	  so	  as	  to	  provide	  seasonal	  workers	  with	  
employment	  for	  most	  of	  the	  year.	  All	  the	  producers	  in	  Barrientos	  and	  Visser’s	  (2012)	  study	  
complained	  about	  a	  shortage	  of	  reliable	  labour,	  and	  sometimes	  simply	  about	  a	  lack	  of	  labour.	  
The	  issue	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  labour	  was	  surprising	  given	  the	  prevailing	  belief	  that	  unemployment	  is	  rife	  
in	  rural	  areas	  and	  that	  most	  people	  would	  jump	  at	  a	  job	  opportunity.	  Given	  the	  demand	  for	  a	  
returning,	  loyal	  core	  of	  seasonal	  workers,	  the	  implication	  is	  that	  seasonal	  workers’	  structural	  
position	  is	  not	  quite	  as	  weak	  as	  previously	  assumed.	  
Disaggregating the causes of the various pressures 
How	  and	  if	  the	  drivers	  of	  restructuring	  correlate	  with	  specific	  consequences,	  is	  much	  debated	  in	  
the	  literature.	  Different	  authors	  highlight	  different	  drivers,	  while	  some	  argue	  that	  all	  of	  these	  
contribute	  to	  a	  range	  of	  consequences.	  
	  
Newman	  et	  al	  (1997,	  cited	  in	  Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003)	  and	  Bhorat	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  argue	  that	  extending	  
labour	  regulation	  to	  the	  sector,	  specifically	  introducing	  a	  minimum	  wage,	  has	  resulted	  in	  job	  
loss.	  The	  effect	  of	  a	  regulated	  minimum	  wage	  becomes	  particularly	  stark	  after	  the	  52%	  hike	  in	  
the	  minimum	  wage	  in	  March	  2013.	  However,	  the	  March	  increase	  was	  exceptional	  and	  should	  be	  
viewed	  as	  a	  correction	  to	  previous,	  insufficient	  increases.	  Even	  so,	  from	  2012	  to	  2013,	  the	  
nominal	  cost	  of	  labour	  per	  carton	  for	  the	  production	  of	  apples	  and	  pears,	  respectively	  rose	  by	  
60%	  for	  pears	  and	  68%	  for	  apples	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  In	  Limpopo	  and	  Mpumalanga,	  which	  
demonstrated	  strong	  growth	  in	  on-­‐farm	  employment	  from	  2011	  to	  2012,	  there	  was	  a	  decline	  in	  
on-­‐farm	  employment	  after	  the	  March	  2013	  increase	  in	  minimum	  wages	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  
	  
Yet	  the	  absence	  of	  legislation,	  specifically	  legislation	  that	  would	  give	  more	  protection	  to	  non-­‐
permanent	  workers,	  could	  arguably	  have	  driven	  casualisation	  and	  externalisation	  (Du	  Toit	  2001;	  
Barrientos&Barrientos	  2002;	  Greenberg	  2003;	  Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003;	  Kritzinger	  et	  al.	  2004;	  
Theron	  2009).	  Because	  non-­‐permanent	  workers	  enjoy	  less	  legislative	  protection,	  legislation	  
effectively	  encourage	  farmers	  to	  employ	  non-­‐permanent	  workers	  as	  they	  provide	  farmers	  with	  
more	  flexibility	  (ibid).	  Seasonal	  workers	  can,	  for	  instance,	  be	  paid	  on	  an	  hourly	  basis	  passing	  on	  
the	  risk	  to	  the	  worker	  in	  case	  of	  work	  stoppage	  as	  a	  result	  of	  bad	  weather.	  Lack	  of	  clarity	  about	  
some	  of	  the	  stipulations	  of	  SD13	  leaves	  room	  for	  interpretation,	  thus	  disadvantaging	  workers.	  
For	  instance,	  some	  farmers	  argue	  that	  seasonal	  workers	  are	  only	  entitled	  to	  leave	  once	  they	  
have	  worked	  for	  more	  than	  four	  months	  continuously	  for	  the	  same	  employer,	  instead	  of	  being	  
entitled	  to	  leave	  on	  a	  pro	  rata	  basis.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  by	  recognising	  labour	  brokers	  as	  the	  employer	  of	  workers	  provided	  to	  clients,	  
labour	  legislation	  has	  created	  legal	  space	  so	  that	  the	  real	  employer	  (the	  client)	  can	  restructure	  
and	  externalise	  the	  employment	  relationship	  (Theron	  2009).	  No	  special	  concessions	  exist	  to	  
accommodate	  the	  consequences	  of	  agricultural	  labour	  broking	  in	  the	  sectoral	  determination	  
(Theron	  2009).	  	  
	  
Instead	  of	  blaming	  labour	  legislation	  for	  job	  losses	  and	  casualisation,	  Theron	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  argue	  that	  
the	  main	  driver	  of	  job	  losses,	  externalisation	  and	  casualisation	  is	  trade	  liberalisation.	  Employment	  in	  
agriculture	  fell	  by	  32%	  from	  1993	  to	  2001,	  even	  before	  SD13	  was	  promulgated	  in	  2003,	  but	  within	  
the	  period	  in	  which	  trade	  liberalisation	  was	  affected	  (Theron	  et	  al.	  2007).	  The	  minimum	  wage	  was	  
decidedly	  modest	  and,	  in	  certain	  areas,	  would	  probably	  not	  have	  even	  been	  an	  increase	  (Theron	  et	  
al.	  2007).	  They	  therefore	  question	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  introducing	  the	  minimum	  wage	  would	  have	  
increased	  producers’	  labour	  costs.	  
	  
Closer	  integration	  into	  global	  value	  chains	  could	  have	  had	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  labour	  (Bolwig	  et	  al	  
2010,	  citing	  Hughes,	  2001	  and	  Tallontire	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Greenberg	  et	  al	  2012).	  Higher	  labour	  and	  
environmental	  sustainability	  standards	  are	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  ‘if	  grape	  growers	  and	  wineries,	  and	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even	  importers	  have	  very	  thin	  margins’	  (Greenberg	  et	  al	  2012:	  59).	  The	  terms	  of	  trade	  between	  
retailers	  and	  suppliers	  in	  large	  retailer-­‐driven	  value	  chains	  are	  intimately	  connected	  to	  working	  
conditions	  at	  production	  sites,	  having	  greater	  or	  less	  direct	  effects	  on	  conditions,	  including	  a	  lack	  of	  
job	  security,	  low	  wages,	  pressure	  to	  work	  overtime,	  and	  employment	  of	  many	  temporary	  workers:	  
[L]abour	  conditions	  at	  sites	  of	  export	  production	  cannot	  be	  treated	  as	  hermetically	  sealed	  
economic	  environments	  separate	  from	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  value	  chains	  that	  strongly	  shape	  them.	  	  
Source:	  Bolwig	  et	  al.	  (2010:	  182,	  citing	  Hughes,	  2001	  and	  Tallontire	  et	  al.	  2005)	  
	  
However,	  some	  employment	  data	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  employment	  losses	  happened	  well	  
before	  any	  of	  the	  identified	  pressures	  were	  introduced,	  i.e.	  before	  the	  extension	  of	  labour	  
legislation,	  the	  promulgation	  of	  ESTA	  or	  trade	  liberalisation.	  In	  1994	  alone	  –	  well	  before	  the	  
ANC	  government	  introduced	  any	  new	  legislation	  -	  there	  was	  a	  19%	  decline	  in	  the	  number	  of	  
permanent	  jobs.	  In	  the	  wine	  industry,	  the	  peak	  period	  of	  mechanisation	  seems	  to	  have	  occurred	  
from	  1995	  to	  1997-	  before	  changes	  in	  the	  regulatory	  environment	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  Did	  
farmers’	  expectations	  about	  the	  future	  drive	  them	  to	  pro-­‐actively	  cut	  labour	  costs?	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  changes	  in	  employment	  practices	  should	  be	  ascribed	  to	  producer	  agency,	  not	  
just	  changes	  in	  the	  regulatory	  and	  trade	  environment.	  Farmers’	  anger	  at	  state	  withdrawal	  and	  
‘interference’	  in	  their	  businesses	  by	  the	  promulgation	  of	  legislation,	  has	  led	  to	  a	  backlash	  by	  farmers	  
that	  contributed	  to	  the	  rate	  of	  job	  shedding,	  casualisation	  and	  externalisation	  (Simbi&Aliber	  2000,	  	  
cited	  in	  Du	  Toit&Ally	  2001;	  Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003;	  Ewert&Du	  Toit	  2005).	  Bitterness	  in	  many	  farmers’	  
observations	  is	  ‘too	  strident	  to	  be	  dismissed’	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003:	  46).	  
	  
Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally	  (2003:	  46)	  comment	  that	  ‘[c]learly,	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  the	  rural	  Western	  Cape	  
is	  not	  only	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  pressure	  of	  economic	  realities,	  but	  also	  the	  renegotiation	  of	  ideological	  
and	  cultural	  frameworks	  that	  legitimised	  social	  and	  power	  labour	  relations	  on	  these	  farms	  in	  previous	  
decades’.	  It	  is	  alleged	  that	  this	  bitterness,	  rather	  than	  economic	  pressures,	  unleashed	  a	  farmers’	  
“backlash”	  against	  the	  52%	  wage	  increase	  in	  March	  2013.	  	  It	  has	  been	  claimed	  that	  after	  the	  wage	  
increase,	  farmers	  withdrew	  permanent	  on-­‐farm	  workers’	  benefits,	  retrenched	  permanent	  workers,	  
while	  demoting	  some	  to	  seasonal	  workers,	  and	  also	  stepped	  up	  work	  intensification	  (Andrews,	  2013,	  
cited	  in	  Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  	  Yet,	  if	  the	  “backlash”	  was	  indeed	  driven	  by	  anger,	  it	  must	  have	  been	  
tempered	  by	  an	  economic	  imperative	  to	  retain	  a	  loyal	  (permanent	  and	  skilled)	  workforce.	  Post	  March-­‐
2013	  most	  producers	  continued	  to	  provide	  free	  on-­‐farm	  housing	  and	  a	  range	  of	  benefits	  to	  on-­‐farm	  
permanent	  workers,	  suggesting	  that	  claims	  of	  a	  backlash	  against	  permanent	  workers	  were	  
exaggerated	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015;	  Alford	  2015;	  De	  Satgé&Blecher	  2015).	  More	  likely,	  seasonal	  off-­‐
farmworkers	  would	  have	  been	  the	  main	  casualties	  of	  such	  a	  backlash.	  
	  
As	  to	  farmers’	  perceptions	  of	  the	  drivers	  of	  change,	  Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally	  (2003:	  20)	  found	  that	  the	  most	  
important	  factors	  influencing	  farmers’	  decisions	  were	  socio-­‐economic	  factors	  (cost	  and	  price),	  
closely	  followed	  by	  legislation.	  Economic	  pressures	  on	  farmers	  were	  the	  main	  cause	  of	  evictions	  
(Wegerif	  et	  al.	  2005).	  
	  
Ultimately	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  -	  if	  not	  impossible	  -	  to	  disaggregate	  what	  drives	  labour	  
restructuring.	  Whatever	  the	  main	  drivers,	  40	  years	  later,	  farmworkers	  –	  much	  more	  than	  the	  
previous	  generation	  -	  have	  to	  contend	  with	  casualisation,	  externalisation,	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  
off-­‐farmworkers,	  and	  evictions.	  
	  
4. CONCLUSION 
This	  paper	  focuses	  on	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  employment	  conditions	  and	  the	  structural	  factors	  
that	  impact	  on	  such	  conditions	  in	  the	  labour-­‐intensive	  fruit	  sector	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wine	  sector	  of	  the	  
Western	  Cape.	  The	  paper	  focused	  on	  fresh	  fruit	  subsector	  as	  it	  is	  the	  agricultural	  subsector	  that	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contributes	  most	  to	  sectoral	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP)	  and	  employment.	  While	  the	  review	  
mostly	  covered	  papers	  dealing	  with	  employment	  and	  written	  in	  the	  last	  fifteen	  years	  -	  mainly	  on	  
Western	  Cape	  fruit	  and	  wine	  farms	  -	  other	  seminal	  papers	  on	  agricultural	  employment	  in	  South	  
Africa	  were	  also	  included.	  The	  review	  also	  compared	  the	  findings	  on	  labour	  practices	  and	  conditions	  
on	  farms	  between	  1976	  and	  2000-	  2015,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  investigating	  the	  impact	  of	  changed	  public	  
and	  private	  regulation	  on	  farmworkers’	  working	  conditions,	  but	  especially	  to	  reveal	  the	  critical	  role	  
of	  state	  policy	  in	  improving	  (or	  not	  improving)	  worker	  conditions.	  
	  
From	  a	  rights	  perspective,	  farmworkers	  are	  clearly	  much	  better	  off	  today	  than	  they	  were	  40	  years	  
ago.	  Labour	  legislation	  has	  been	  extended	  to	  the	  sector	  and	  farmworkers	  now	  also	  enjoy	  (1)	  social	  
protection	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Unemployment	  Insurance	  Fund	  and	  the	  Compensation	  for	  Occupational	  
Injuries	  and	  Diseases	  Act	  61	  of	  1997;	  (2)	  health	  and	  safety	  protection	  due	  to	  the	  Occupational	  Health	  
and	  Safety	  Act	  85	  of	  1993;	  and	  (3)	  protection	  from	  discrimination	  in	  the	  workplace,	  thanks	  to	  the	  
Employment	  Equity	  Act	  55	  of	  1998.	  To	  curb	  the	  arbitrary	  eviction	  of	  farm	  dwellers,	  ESTA	  was	  
promulgated	  in	  1997.	  	  At	  one	  level,	  the	  state	  has	  actively	  intervened	  in	  the	  sector,	  putting	  in	  place	  a	  
raft	  of	  protective	  measures	  to	  improve	  farmworkers’	  livelihoods.	  	  
This	  new	  rights	  regime	  has	  challenged	  the	  paternalist	  authority	  of	  farmers	  over	  the	  lives	  of	  
workers	  and	  their	  families	  (Ewert&Du	  Toit	  2005).	  However,	  subsequent	  literature	  reveals	  the	  
limits	  of	  relying	  on	  a	  narrow	  rights-­‐based	  approach	  to	  improve	  farmworker	  conditions.	  A	  
combination	  of	  factors	  lead	  to	  farmworker	  rights	  remaining	  largely	  unrealised,	  including:	  (1)	  an	  
understaffed	  inspectorate	  division	  within	  the	  Department	  of	  Labour	  that	  fails	  to	  effectively	  
monitor	  and	  enforce	  compliance	  with	  rights;	  (2)	  workers’	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  about	  their	  rights;	  
and	  (3)	  low	  levels	  of	  unionisation	  in	  the	  sector	  (with	  only	  about	  5%	  of	  farmworkers	  nationally	  
belonging	  to	  a	  union).	  
	  
Secondly,	  the	  macro-­‐economic	  context	  in	  which	  rights	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  realised	  can	  facilitate	  or	  
thwart	  realisation.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  agriculture,	  especially	  labour-­‐intensive,	  export-­‐orientated	  
agriculture,	  the	  context	  has	  changed	  dramatically	  over	  the	  past	  20	  years,	  in	  no	  small	  measure	  
due	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state.	  While	  the	  state	  has	  intervened	  in	  farmworkers’	  lives	  to	  give	  them	  
more	  protection,	  it	  has	  withdrawn	  extensive	  farmer	  support.	  In	  international	  markets,	  farmers	  
now	  enjoy	  far	  less	  protection	  than	  they	  did	  40	  years	  ago.	  In	  1976,	  the	  global	  fresh	  fruit	  value	  
chain	  could	  still	  be	  described	  as	  a	  “producer-­‐driven”	  chain	  (Gereffi	  1994).	  	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  
Marketing	  Act	  -	  which	  allowed	  state-­‐controlled	  marketing	  boards	  to	  be	  created	  -	  strengthened	  
the	  hand	  of	  producers	  by	  effectively	  forcing	  them	  to	  bargain	  collectively	  with	  international	  
retailers.	  Moreover,	  international	  retailer	  power	  was	  far	  less	  consolidated	  than	  it	  is	  today,	  so	  
collective	  producer	  power	  gave	  producers	  clout	  in	  the	  international	  market.	  The	  state	  also	  
supported	  producers	  through	  (1)	  various	  tariff	  support	  measures,	  (2)	  financial	  support	  (with	  
subsidies	  and	  state-­‐financed	  loans);	  (3)	  large	  scale	  state-­‐supported	  research	  and	  extension	  
services;	  and	  (4)	  various	  iterations	  of	  the	  Cooperative	  Societies	  Amendment	  Act	  38	  of	  1925,	  
which	  enabled	  producers	  to	  buy	  inputs	  collectively	  and	  build	  agricultural	  infrastructure	  with	  
state	  funding.	  	  
	  
Since	  1997,	  the	  state’s	  agricultural	  regulation	  has	  however	  changed	  significantly.	  Subsidisation,	  
and	  sectoral	  state-­‐supported	  research	  and	  extension	  services	  were	  greatly	  curtailed,	  marketing	  
control	  boards	  abolished,	  and	  tariff	  protections	  phased	  out.	  The	  state’s	  regulatory	  about-­‐turn	  
happened	  at	  a	  time	  of	  increased	  international	  retail	  consolidation,	  so	  the	  global	  fresh	  fruit	  value	  
chain	  touching	  down	  in	  South	  Africa	  changed	  from	  being	  producer-­‐driven	  to	  buyer-­‐driven.	  Most	  
importantly,	  enforced	  collective	  bargaining	  by	  the	  state	  fell	  away,	  so	  producers	  now	  have	  to	  
bargain	  with	  increasingly	  powerful	  retailers	  on	  an	  individual	  basis.	  Because	  of	  this	  change,	  fresh	  
fruit	  producers	  have	  increasingly	  become	  price	  takers,	  which	  put	  pressure	  on	  their	  profits.	  
Retailers	  have	  applied	  further	  pressure	  on	  producers	  by	  demanding	  that	  they	  comply	  with	  a	  range	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Changes	  in	  state	  policy	  do	  not	  happen	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  but	  result	  from	  intense	  contestation	  by	  a	  
range	  of	  actors	  (Morris	  1976;	  Williams	  et	  al.	  1998).	  In	  1948,	  farmers	  -	  a	  key	  constituency	  of	  the	  
National	  Party	  –	  won	  this	  contest,	  and	  were	  afterwards	  supported	  by	  a	  veritable	  bulwark	  of	  
protective	  measures,	  propelling	  them	  to	  a	  strong	  position	  until	  the	  economic	  recession	  of	  1985.	  
In	  1994,	  due	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  ANC-­‐aligned	  LAPC	  and	  World	  Bank	  influence,	  farmer	  
support	  was	  withdrawn.	  Binswanger	  and	  Deiniger	  (1993,	  cited	  in	  Williams	  et	  al.	  1998)	  argued	  
that	  this	  approach	  would	  lead	  to	  greater	  efficiencies,	  and	  also	  reduce	  the	  privileges	  which	  the	  
state	  conferred	  on	  large	  scale	  white-­‐farmers,	  levelling	  the	  playing	  fields	  on	  which	  black	  farmers	  
would	  have	  to	  compete	  with	  them.	  However,	  the	  world	  had	  changed	  since	  the	  1950s	  -	  
especially	  the	  globalisation	  of	  international	  retail	  markets	  –	  and	  this	  was	  probably	  not	  
significantly	  enough	  factored	  into	  policy	  making	  at	  the	  time.	  This	  policy	  change	  would	  
eventually	  have	  serious	  repercussions	  for	  farmworkers.	  	  
	  
Increasingly,	  while	  the	  state	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  regulate	  the	  national	  sphere	  in	  which	  producers	  
and	  farmworkers	  carve	  out	  their	  livelihoods,	  international	  retailers	  have	  supranational	  
regulatory	  powers.	  Importantly,	  retailer	  power	  enables	  them	  to	  privately	  regulate	  the	  national	  
sphere	  (the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  state),	  and	  the	  international	  sphere	  -	  where	  the	  state	  has	  little,	  or	  
even	  no	  effective	  power.	  While	  retailer	  power	  sometimes	  reinforces	  country	  legislation,	  such	  as	  
when	  private	  social	  standards	  demand	  that	  farmers	  have	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  country’s	  labour	  
legislation,	  it	  also	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  erode	  the	  working	  conditions	  of	  farmworkers,	  in	  that	  
retailers	  pass	  financial	  risk	  on	  to	  producers	  who,	  in	  turn,	  pass	  down	  such	  risk	  to	  their	  workers.	  	  	  
	  
Taking	  a	  more	  global	  view,	  changes	  in	  value	  chain	  governance	  are	  linked	  to	  increasingly	  adverse	  
incorporation	  of	  South	  African	  farmworkers	  into	  the	  global	  fresh	  fruit	  value	  chain	  (Du	  Toit	  2001;	  
Mather&Greenberg	  2003;	  Barrientos	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Du	  Toit	  2005;	  Ewert&Du	  Toit	  2005;	  Greenberg	  
2003;	  2012;	  Barrientos&Visser	  2012).	  State	  regulatory	  changes,	  along	  with	  international	  retail	  
consolidation,	  have	  increasingly	  put	  producers	  on	  the	  back	  foot,	  driving	  them	  to	  restructure	  
their	  labour	  force	  (the	  main	  cost	  component	  of	  their	  business).	  	  
	  
Restructuring	  the	  labour	  forces	  has	  entailed	  three	  major	  strategies:	  casualisation,	  externalisation	  
and	  the	  growing	  trend	  of	  sourcing	  workers	  from	  off-­‐farm	  communities,	  frequently	  from	  rural	  
townships.	  While	  the	  growth	  of	  such	  townships	  has	  been	  linked	  mainly	  to	  farmworker	  evictions	  
from	  farms	  (exacerbated	  by	  the	  ESTA	  stipulations,	  which	  aim	  to	  give	  farm	  dwellers	  more	  tenure	  
security),	  apart	  from	  Wegerif	  et	  al.’s	  (2005)	  study,	  there	  is	  little	  concrete	  evidence	  suggesting	  
that	  rural	  township	  growth	  should	  primarily	  be	  ascribed	  to	  evictions.	  
	  	  
It	  is,	  however,	  clear	  that	  the	  combination	  of	  externalisation,	  casualisation	  and	  the	  trend	  to	  
source	  workers	  from	  off-­‐farm	  locations	  has	  greatly	  eroded	  the	  potential	  of	  a	  rights-­‐based	  
regime	  to	  improve	  farmworkers’	  lives.	  By	  shifting	  workers	  into	  a	  sphere	  that	  cannot	  easily	  be	  
reached	  by	  the	  fairly	  short	  arm	  of	  labour	  law	  and	  security	  of	  tenure	  regulation,	  the	  need	  to	  
comply	  with	  such	  legislation	  has	  in	  effect	  been	  circumvented.	  	  While	  the	  ability	  of	  labour	  
legislation	  to	  regulate	  agricultural	  working	  relations	  is	  not	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  paper,	  
casualisation	  -	  even	  more	  than	  externalisation	  –	  has	  certainly	  put	  labour	  legislation	  out	  of	  step	  
with	  employment	  relations	  in	  the	  fruit	  sector,	  as	  labour	  law	  has	  mainly	  been	  written	  with	  
permanent	  workers	  in	  mind.	  Most	  fruit	  sector	  workers	  are	  now	  employed	  as	  temporary	  
workers,	  with	  the	  effect	  that	  current	  legislation	  does	  not	  provide	  them	  with	  sufficient	  
protection.	  Since	  farmworkers	  are	  increasingly	  living	  off-­‐farm,	  ESTA	  provisions	  are	  also	  
irrelevant	  to	  such	  workers.	  
	  
An	  inherent	  tension	  between	  different	  regulatory	  pressures	  –	  especially	  between	  different	  strands	  
of	  private	  regulation	  -	  has	  been	  noted	  by	  several	  researchers.	  Having	  to	  meet	  ever	  more	  rigorous	  
private	  standards,	  while	  also	  having	  to	  cope	  with	  retailer	  pressure	  on	  profit	  margins,	  has	  driven	  
producers	  to	  adopt	  an	  increasingly	  differentiated	  approach	  to	  managing	  their	  labour.	  Initially,	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the	  differentiation	  was	  described	  as	  a	  split	  between	  a	  well-­‐looked	  after	  core	  of	  permanent	  workers	  
who	  access	  a	  range	  of	  benefits,	  and	  a	  growing	  pool	  of	  temporary	  workers	  who	  toil	  under	  
minimum	  working	  conditions	  (Du	  Toit&Ally	  2003).	  	  
	  
However,	  instead	  of	  a	  binary	  split,	  it	  may	  be	  more	  apt	  to	  talk	  about	  a	  workplace	  hierarchy,	  
split	  along	  various	  lines,	  for	  example	  in	  terms	  of	  (1)	  tenure	  (permanent	  or	  temporary),	  but	  
also	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  those	  (2)	  living	  on-­‐farm	  or	  off-­‐farm;	  (3)	  being	  directly	  employed	  or	  via	  
a	  labour	  broker;	  (4)	  being	  a	  migrant	  or	  a	  local;	  and	  (5)	  being	  an	  internal	  versus	  an	  external	  
migrant	  (Barrientos&Barrientos	  2002;	  Barrientos	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Barrientos&Kritzinger	  2004;	  
Theron	  2012;	  Alford	  2015).	  	  
	  
Certain	  types	  of	  workers	  -	  often	  women,	  contract	  workers,	  and	  migrants	  -	  are	  consistently	  at	  
the	  bottom	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  (Barrientos&Barrientos	  2002;	  Greenberg	  2003;	  Barrientos	  et	  al.	  
2004;	  Du	  Toit&Ewert	  2005;	  Wegerif	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Greenberg	  et	  al.	  2012).	  The	  different	  categories	  
of	  farmworkers,	  in	  effect,	  give	  producers	  a	  range	  of	  flexible	  labour	  options.	  While	  the	  situation	  
clearly	  benefits	  producers,	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  the	  various	  categories	  of	  workers	  imply	  for	  labour.	  
But	  it	  does	  not	  bode	  well	  for	  worker	  unity.	  
	  
However,	  there	  is	  some	  light	  on	  this	  dark	  horizon	  of	  change.	  Although	  moving	  off-­‐farm	  resulted	  
in	  most	  farmworkers	  now	  living	  in	  arguably	  worse	  housing	  conditions	  than	  those	  of	  on-­‐farm	  
colleagues,	  the	  move	  means	  off-­‐farm	  workers	  are	  less	  beholden	  to	  paternalist	  employers	  and	  
they	  have	  (theoretically	  at	  least)	  improved	  access	  to	  a	  range	  of	  government	  services.	  Living	  in	  
townships	  has	  also	  reduced	  previous	  isolation,	  allowing	  new	  forms	  of	  farmworker	  organisation	  
to	  sprout	  up,	  as	  was	  seen	  in	  the	  De	  Doorns	  2012	  strike	  (Wilderman	  2015).	  
	  
Despite	  legislative	  changes	  implemented	  and	  the	  protest	  action	  of	  November	  2012,	  however,	  
when	  farmworkers’	  conditions	  today	  are	  compared	  with	  those	  in	  1976,	  workers	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  
be	  significantly	  better	  off.	  In	  fact,	  they	  might	  be	  worse	  off.	  Most	  farmworkers	  now	  have	  less	  job	  
security	  and	  seemingly	  live	  in	  more	  dire	  housing	  conditions	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  
generation	  of	  fruit	  farmworkers	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape.	  	  
	  
Although	  based	  on	  the	  small	  samples	  provided	  by	  Theron	  (1976)	  and	  Graaff	  (1976)	  and	  using	  
only	  their	  description	  of	  wage	  packages	  as	  a	  yardstick,	  it	  would	  appear	  as	  if	  the	  average	  worker	  
in	  Theron	  and	  Graaff’s	  samples	  was	  better	  off	  than	  a	  worker	  who	  would	  only	  receive	  the	  
minimum	  wage	  today.	  Meyer	  et	  al’s	  (2012)	  finding	  that	  a	  wage	  of	  R150	  per	  day	  is	  not	  able	  to	  
sustain	  a	  household	  of	  four	  to	  nutritionally	  acceptable	  levels,	  further	  underscores	  the	  fact	  that	  
labour	  legislation	  alone	  has	  failed	  to	  lift	  workers	  out	  of	  dire	  poverty,	  even	  when	  such	  legislation	  
provides	  for	  the	  government	  to	  set	  a	  minimum	  wage.	  
	  
Du	  Toit	  (2001:	  9)	  has	  argued	  that	  a	  contradiction	  in	  the	  state’s	  policy	  –	  withdrawing	  regulatory	  
support	  to	  producers,	  while	  extending	  regulatory	  support	  to	  workers	  –	  is	  partially	  to	  blame	  for	  
this	  state	  of	  affairs.	  While	  the	  question	  at	  this	  stage	  is	  theoretical,	  one	  cannot	  help	  but	  wonder:	  if	  
the	  state	  had	  maintained	  regulatory	  support	  for	  producers	  in	  the	  face	  of	  increasing	  retailer	  
consolidation,	  but	  simultaneously	  extended	  its	  raft	  of	  protective	  legislation	  to	  farmworkers,	  
may	  farmworkers	  not	  have	  been	  better	  off?	  
	  
5. THE GAPS 
While	  this	  review	  points	  to	  some	  clear	  trends,	  highlighted	  by	  the	  gamut	  of	  studies,	  it	  also	  found	  
some	  remaining	  knowledge	  gaps	  about	  employment	  in	  the	  sector.	  These	  are	  outlined	  below.	  
 
	  
36	   Going nowhere fast? Changed working conditions on Western Cape fruit and wine farms 
The impact of other producer strategies on labour restructuring  
While	  labour	  restructuring	  has	  been	  a	  key	  producer	  response	  to	  the	  triple	  transition,	  producers	  
have	  also	  implemented	  other	  strategies	  to	  challenge	  -	  or	  at	  least	  mitigate	  -	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  
power	  imbalance	  between	  themselves	  and	  international	  retailers.	  Much	  less	  is	  known	  about	  the	  
effect	  these	  other	  responses	  on	  producers’	  labour	  strategies.	  Such	  responses	  can	  for	  instance	  
include	  (1)	  product	  expansion	  and	  diversification;	  (2)	  product	  and	  process	  upgrading,	  but	  also	  
(3)	  “downgrading”,	  or	  redirecting	  some	  volumes	  to	  the	  local	  market,	  which	  seemingly	  has	  lower	  
and	  less	  standards,	  or,	  (4)	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  wine	  industry,	  to	  switch	  to	  exporting	  bulk	  wine	  
(Barrientos&Visser	  2012;	  Ponte&Ewert	  2009).	  A	  range	  of	  questions	  arise	  when	  entertaining	  
these	  other	  strategies.	  To	  what	  extent	  has	  such	  expansion	  led	  to	  the	  need	  for	  more	  labour?	  Or	  
did	  economies	  of	  scale	  obviate	  the	  need	  for	  more	  labour?	  	  Are	  farmworker	  conditions	  better	  or	  
worse	  on	  big,	  consolidated	  farms,	  well	  integrated	  into	  global	  supply	  chains	  than	  on	  smaller	  
farms	  supplying	  mostly	  the	  local	  market	  (which	  has	  implications	  for	  land	  reform)?	  
The effect of private standards on labour 
Most	  studies	  that	  purposefully	  set	  out	  to	  gauge	  the	  impact	  of	  private	  standards	  were	  
undertaken	  before	  2007,	  i.e.	  before	  international	  retailers	  enforced	  private	  social	  standards	  
on	  Western	  Cape	  fruit	  and	  wine	  farms	  (e.g.	  Du	  Toit	  2001;	  Barrientos&Barrientos	  2002;	  
Barrientos	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Barrientos&Smith	  2007).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  authors	  of	  these	  studies	  
conclude	  that	  private	  standards	  have	  little	  impact	  on	  farmworkers’	  working	  and	  living	  
conditions,	  and	  the	  only	  positive	  impacts	  relate	  to	  workplace	  health	  and	  safety	  improvements.	  
In	  terms	  of	  strengthening	  enabling	  rights,	  such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  association,	  very	  little	  
impact	  is	  observed.	  More	  recently	  though,	  Visser	  and	  Ferrer	  (2015)	  found	  that	  farms	  which	  
were	  regularly	  monitored	  by	  ethical	  trade	  auditors,	  were	  more	  compliant	  with	  health	  and	  safety	  
and	  labour	  legislation	  than	  those	  who	  were	  not	  subjected	  to	  audits.	  Moreover,	  Alford	  (2015)	  
found	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  labour	  brokering	  among	  farmers	  in	  the	  Ceres	  area.	  To	  what	  extent	  can	  
such	  changes	  indeed	  be	  ascribed	  to	  more	  rigorous	  enforcement	  of	  private	  social	  standards?	  
Coordinating off-farm labour 
The	  shift	  towards	  a	  temporary,	  off-­‐farm	  workforce	  has	  created	  the	  need	  to	  better	  coordinate	  
labour.	  Existing	  literature	  suggests	  that	  labour	  brokers	  have	  largely	  facilitated	  coordination,	  
leading	  to	  more	  externalisation.	  Yet,	  this	  review	  found	  that	  claims	  of	  increased	  externalisation	  
are	  based	  on	  fairly	  thin	  evidence.	  A	  scan	  of	  the	  literature	  about	  externalisation	  in	  the	  Western	  
Cape	  did	  not	  reveal	  many	  studies	  specifically	  focussing	  on	  externalisation.	  	  Studies	  that	  have	  
adopted	  a	  (more)	  purposeful	  focus	  include	  those	  of	  Du	  Toit	  and	  Ally	  (2003);	  Barrientos	  and	  
Kritzinger	  (2004);	  Visser	  and	  Ferrer	  (2014)	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  given	  its	  small	  sample,	  
Theron	  (2010).	  A	  more	  comprehensive	  study	  to	  measure	  the	  extent	  of	  externalisation,	  the	  
different	  forms	  it	  takes	  and	  to	  gauge	  whether	  the	  incidence	  thereof	  has	  changed	  over	  time	  
therefore	  seems	  overdue	  especially	  in	  the	  light	  of	  Alford’s	  (2015)	  study	  which	  suggests	  that	  
farmers	  in	  some	  areas	  may	  be	  switching	  to	  employing	  workers	  directly.	  
	  
Moreover,	  while	  the	  use	  of	  labour	  brokers	  may	  be	  declining,	  does	  it	  mean	  that	  farmers	  have	  
phased	  out	  intermediaries,	  or	  just	  that	  they	  are	  not	  using	  them?	  If	  farmers	  are	  using	  new	  types	  
of	  intermediaries,	  who	  are	  they?	  Do	  they	  have	  the	  same,	  less,	  or	  possibly	  more	  scope	  to	  exploit	  
farmworkers?	  
	  
Furthermore,	  while	  a	  lot	  is	  known	  about	  the	  working	  conditions	  of	  permanent	  workers,	  this	  
review	  found	  limited	  discussion	  about	  the	  working	  conditions	  of	  non-­‐permanent	  workers.	  
Where	  literature	  does	  deal	  with	  the	  topic,	  discussion	  is	  based	  on	  very	  small	  samples.	  	  Moreover,	  
there	  is	  a	  serious	  knowledge	  gap	  about	  the	  average	  income	  of	  workers	  who	  do	  piece	  work	  and	  
what	  strategies	  farmers	  implement	  to	  retain	  seasonal	  workers.	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The impact of migration on labour demand 
Both	  Levy	  (1976)	  and	  Graaff	  (1976)	  reported	  a	  scarcity	  of	  cheap	  labour	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  in	  
1976	  with	  Levy	  (1976)	  arguing	  that	  such	  scarcity	  increased	  the	  reserve	  wages	  of	  Coloured	  
farmworkers	  in	  the	  province	  at	  the	  time.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  from	  more	  recent	  literature	  whether	  
farmers	  are	  operating	  in	  an	  environment	  of	  labour	  abundance	  or	  labour	  scarcity.	  In	  particular,	  
no	  studies	  have	  investigated	  the	  impact	  of	  in-­‐migration	  on	  agricultural	  labour	  restructuring	  in	  
the	  Western	  Cape	  after	  influx	  control	  was	  abolished	  and	  the	  country	  democratised.	  
	  
Bekker	  (2002:	  26)	  reports	  high	  migration	  levels	  from	  the	  Eastern	  Cape	  to	  the	  Western	  Cape	  
from	  1995	  to	  1998.	  	  Did	  some	  migrants	  also	  move	  to	  rural	  areas	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape?	  If	  they	  
did,	  they	  would	  have	  arrived	  at	  a	  time	  when	  farmers,	  responding	  to	  the	  “triple	  transition”,	  began	  
restructuring	  their	  labour	  forces.	  Migrant	  arrival	  would	  have	  aggravated	  the	  structural	  position	  
of	  newly	  casualised	  and	  externalised	  workers.	  Conversely,	  in-­‐migration	  would	  have	  given	  
farmers	  a	  bigger	  army	  of	  cheap	  labour,	  thereby	  further	  decreasing	  workers’	  reserve	  wages.	  	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  there	  was	  less	  in-­‐migration	  to	  the	  rural	  Western	  Cape	  than	  imagined,	  but	  
significant	  out-­‐migration	  of	  Coloured	  workers	  (the	  traditional	  farmworkers	  on	  Western	  Cape	  
farms)	  the	  effects	  of	  labour	  restructuring	  would	  have	  been	  less	  pronounced.	  While	  it	  is	  unlikely	  
that	  a	  situation	  of	  labour	  scarcity	  had	  ever	  occurred	  -	  gauged	  by	  persistent	  low	  wages	  paid	  to	  
farmworkers	  -	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  farmers	  consistently	  complained	  about	  a	  lack	  of	  labour	  
during	  peak	  periods	  (Visser&Ferrer	  2015).	  How	  do	  producers	  retain	  workers	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  
possible	  shortage	  in	  peak	  periods,	  which	  seem	  to	  be	  getting	  ever	  longer?	  
The implications of a range of worker sources 
While	  different	  sources	  of	  temporary	  workers	  now	  exist	  (e.g.	  on-­‐farm	  temporary	  workers;	  on-­‐
farm	  migrant	  workers;	  off-­‐farm	  migrant	  and	  local	  workers;	  contract	  workers)	  there	  is	  little	  
discussion	  about	  if	  and	  how	  farmers	  make	  use	  of	  these	  various	  sources	  of	  labour.	  What	  are	  
farmers’	  preferred	  sources	  of	  labour	  and	  what	  the	  implications	  of	  their	  choices	  for	  the	  wider	  
worker	  community?	  It	  has	  for	  instance	  been	  argued	  that	  a)	  rivalry	  between	  Zimbabwean	  and	  
local	  labour	  brokers	  and	  b)	  farmers’	  alleged	  preference	  for	  Zimbabwean	  workers	  have	  
contributed	  to	  xenophobic	  conflict	  flaring	  up	  of	  in	  De	  Doorns	  in	  2009	  (Misago,	  2009;	  Robb,	  2009).	  
Both	  Theron	  (2012)	  and	  Greenberg	  et	  al	  (2012)	  hint	  that	  the	  traditional	  gender	  profile	  of	  the	  
workplace	  might	  be	  changing.	  Greenberg	  et	  al	  (2012)	  suggest	  that	  female	  temporary	  labour	  
might	  be	  displaced	  by	  migrants.	  Yet	  Theron	  suggests	  that	  female	  workers	  now	  have	  access	  to	  
more	  permanent	  job	  opportunities.	  More	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  test	  these	  findings,	  but	  also	  to	  
explore	  other	  impacts	  of	  migration	  on	  labour	  restructuring	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector.	  
Worker agency in labour restructuring 
To	  the	  extent	  that	  worker	  responses	  to	  labour	  restructuring	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  are	  
discussed,	  the	  focus	  tends	  to	  be	  on	  collective	  responses	  and	  mostly	  those	  of	  unions.	  Apart	  from	  
Du	  Toit’s	  study	  (2005),	  which	  explores	  the	  survival	  strategies	  of	  people	  living	  in	  the	  townships	  
of	  Ceres,	  the	  individual	  agency	  of	  workers	  to	  mitigate	  the	  pressure	  caused	  by	  the	  triple	  
transition	  in	  their	  lives	  has	  received	  little	  attention.	  Visser	  and	  Ferrer’s	  study	  (2015)	  suggest	  
that	  many	  of	  those	  living	  in	  off-­‐farm	  communities	  are	  ex-­‐farmworkers	  now	  making	  a	  living	  by	  
servicing	  farmworkers.	  Moreover,	  nascent	  findings	  on	  the	  incidence	  of	  circular	  migration	  
suggest	  that	  migrating	  farmworkers	  may	  have	  more	  employment	  options	  than	  workers	  
permanently	  located	  on-­‐farms	  (Theron	  2012).	  Yet,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  expected	  that	  the	  potential	  
benefits	  of	  migration	  will	  have	  some	  serious	  trade-­‐offs,	  such	  as	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  family	  life.	  Overall,	  
the	  strategies	  that	  workers	  employ	  to	  survive,	  given	  their	  seemingly	  unsustainable	  wages	  and	  
decreasing	  work	  security,	  are	  underexplored.	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